POLITICAL REFORM 



Representation of Minorities 



MATTHIAS NO FORNEY 



;. fo 



J / J ri 



NEW YORK: 

Published by the Author at 47 Cedar St. 

[894. 



H 



v 






^o^ 



Copyright, 1894, by M. N. Forney. 



PRINTED BY 

CLARK 4 ZUGALLA, 

33 TO 43 GOLD STREET, 

NEW YORK. 



CONTENTS. 



Page. 

Chapter I. Representation 5 

II. Misrepresentation 14 

III. The Evils of Majority Representation 29 

IV. The Representation of Minorities 40 

V. Cumulative or " Free ' ' Voting 43 

VI. Free Voting in Illinois „ . . . 53 

VII. Objections to Cumulative Voting 65 

VIII. Principles of Free Voting 88 

IX. The Burnitz System of Election 102 

X. Political Evils which Free Voting would Lessen. 116 
XL Influence of Free Voting on Party Organization. 121 
XII. Objections to Minority Representation Con- 
sidered 128 

" XIII. Advantages of Free Voting, 136 

Appendix. A. Different Systems of Election for securing Mi- 
nority Representation 147 

6 c B. " A Method of assuring to the Minorities as well 

as to the Majority, at all kinds of Elections, 
the number of Representatives corresponding 

to their strength. " 159 

" C. Election by Preponderance of Choice 175 

11 D. Bibliography of Proportional or Minority Repre- 
sentation 180 

Index . . . 189 



PREFACE. 

When the compilation of the following pages was commenced the 
intention was first, to describe briefly the evils growing out of the pres- 
ent system of electing, by a majority or plurality of the votes cast in 
each district, single members to represent the people in it, in national, 
state or municipal legislative assemblies ; second, to show that by 
increasing the size of or consolidating a number of the present dis- 
tricts and electing several members from each, by a system which would 
give minorities as well as majorities representation, at least some of 
these evils would be remedied ; third, to give a very brief, simple, 
and as clear an explanation as possible of what is meant by min- 
ority, proportional or personal representation — as it has been called 
by different writers — then to collect from the various books and essays. 
on the subject some of the most convincing arguments which have: 
been advanced in favor of adopting some such method of electing rep- 
resentatives to our national, state, and municipal legislative bodies. 

In making such an explanation the practice which has prevailed in 
Illinois, for more than twenty years, of choosing the members of the- 
House of Representatives in that State by a system of cumulative vot- 
ing, afforded an object lesson from which the general principles of the 
simplest form of minority representation could be described and made- 
obvious to those who are totally ignorant of the. subject — and at least 
nineteen-twentieths of all who are ordinarily regarded as intelligent peo- 
ple are included in this class — more easily than in any other way. As. 
the Illinois system was used as an illustration, it was thought readers 
would naturally ask how it has worked in practice. To answer this 
anticipated inquiry a method of getting information was adopted which 
has been used very successfully in various associations with which the 
writer has been connected, for making investigations relating to tech- 
nical subjects. This method is to prepare a series of questions framed 
with a view to eliciting the kind of information which is wanted, and 
then print them in the form of a circular of inquiry, and send copies 
of it to those who are likely to be possessed of the information or ex- 



2 PREFACE. 

perience which is desired and solicit replies to the questions. This 
was done and answers were received from persons in all parts of the 
State of Illinois, to whom the circular was sent, giving their opinions 
and the results of their observation and experience, with reference to the 
practical working of the system of electing representatives to the legis- 
lature of that State. The information thus obtained indicated the 
merits and also some of the defects of the Illinois system of election. 
This led to investigations for remedies for the defects indicated and 
extended the scope of the following pages much beyond the purpose 
with which their compilation was commenced. 

It has been said that notwithstanding the fact that minority repre- 
sentation has been discussed for nearly half a century, that the system 
has secured but a limited adoption, probably because '-' no entirely 
satisfactory plan has been proposed." The final object aimed at in 
the following pages was to explain a system which it is thought would 
be " satisfactory " and to set forth the reasons for that belief. 

The writer feels that a word of apology is due to himself, on 
account of the haste with which the book has been prepared. All the 
work has been done in time which could be taken from the exacting 
duties of editing a technical paper. While he has not consciously 
* ' depended upon his imagination for his facts, ' ' he has often relied 
upon his memory and quotations for his arguments. The abundance 
of quotations, in fact, leaves little room for any claims of authorship, 
but only for such as a compiler may make. In the latter capacity free 
use has been made of the contributions of other writers on the subjects 
of these pages, many of which are scattered through periodicals and 
are thus difficult of access to the general reader. These quotations 
were made because the facts and the arguments contained therein were 
set forth with much greater force and clearness than the writer could 
hope to command, and such quotations have often the additional 
weight which is added by the names of distinguished authors. 

The immediate purpose of the book was to present its subject to the 
consideration of the members of the Constitutional Convention of this 
State who are assembling at the same time that this preface is being 
written. To accomplish that purpose it should now be in the hands of 
those who are t© revise the organic law of the State of New York. It was 



PREFACE. 3 

only by the most incessant work that it was brought as near to com- 
pletion as it now is. Its purpose requires that it be launched at once 
with whatever defects it has — and many will doubtless become obvious 
when it will be too late to retrieve them. 

Persons interested in the reform proposed in the following pages, 
and disposed to give their aid and countenance to secure its adoption, 
are invited to send their names and addresses to the writer. 

M. N. Forney, 
47 Cedar Street, New York. 
May 8, 1894. 



POLITICAL REFORM 

BY THE 

Representation of Minorities. 



CHAPTER I. 



REPRESENTATION. 



With the struggle for civil liberty there has always been a contest 
for the representation of the people in legislative bodies. During the 
colonial period of our existence disputes of this kind were frequent and 
to-day, in the great city of New York and in other places where a 
great part — and often the best part — of the people are deprived of 
adequate representation in the municipal, state, and national govern- 
ment the strife is still continued. A standing grievance in labor 
strikes is that the representatives of the laborers are not " recognized " 
and the interests of the men are thus without satisfactory representa- 
tion. In the first written charter granted in 1606 to the colony which 
was planted in Virginia, we are told* that none of the rights of self- 
government or elements of popular government nor the elective fran- 
chise was introduced into the form of government, and that the fruits 
thereof were tyranny, confusion, oppression, poverty and suffering. 

Contrasted with the results of this misrepresentative form of govern- 
ment it is said that in 161 9 Sir George Yeardley arrived in the Vir- 
ginia colony with ' ' commissions and instructions from the company 
for the better establishinge of a commonwealth. ' ' It provided ' ' that 
the planters might have a hande in the governing of themselves, yet 
was graunted that a generall assemblie shoulde be helde yearly once, 
whereat were to be present the governor and counsell with two bur- 
gesses from each plantation, freely to be elected by the inhabitants 

^Bancroft's "History of the United States. " 

5 



O REPRESENTATION. 

thereof, this assemblie to have power to make and ordaine whatsoever 
laws and orders should by them be thought good and profitable for 
their subsistence. ' ' 

This charter ' ' had the general assent and the applause of the whole 
assemblie, with thanks for it to Almighty God and to those from whom 
it had issued, in the names of the burgesses and of the whole colony 
whom they represented. ' ' 

Of this charter Bancroft says : "A perpetual interest attaches to 
this first elective body that ever assembled in the Western world, rep- 
resenting the people of Virginia, and making laws for their govern- 
ment, more than a year before the Mayflower, with the Pilgrims, left 
the harbor of Southampton." 

In 1 6 2 1 a written constitution was established for the .colony cre- 
ating a general assembly to consist of the members of the council, 
and of two burgesses to be chosen from each of the several planta- 
tions by the respective inhabitants. The historian's comments on 
this are : ' ' The system of representative government thus became in 
the new hemisphere an acknowledged right. * . * * It constituted 
the plantation, in its infancy, a nursery of freemen ; and succeeding 
generations learned to cherish institutions which were as old as the first 
period of the prosperity of their fathers. ' ' 

In Massachusetts it is recorded that "for more than eighteen 
years ' the whole body of the male inhabitants ' constituted the legis- 
lature ; the state was governed like our towns as a strict democracy. 
* * * At length the increase of population, and its diffusion over a 
wider territory, led to the introduction of the representative system, 
and each town sent its committee to the general court." 

In 1639 the first assembly of Maryland framed a declaration of 
rights, which ' •' established a system of representative government. ' ' 

The charter granted to Roger Williams in 1644 gave to the people 
in Rhode Island ''full power and authority to rule themselves." It 
asserted that ' ' all men were equal ; all might meet and debate in the 
public assemblies ; all might aspire to office ; the people for a season 
constituting itself its own tribune, and every public law required con- 
firmation in the primary assemblies." 

In his book on ' ; Representative Government and Personal Repre- 



REPRESENTATION. 7 

sentation," Mr. Simon Sterne refers to "the remarkable degree to 
which the ideas of representative government and free institutions 
were developed in the colony of New Netherland as early as 1645. 
By the eighth clause of the instructions of the commissioners of the 
Assembly of XIX, relative to the government of the colony, it was 
declared that ' Further, inasmuch as the respective colonists have been 
allowed by the freedoms to delegate one or two persons to give infor- 
mation to the Director and Council at least once a year, of the 
state and condition of their colonies, the same is hereby confirmed.'^ 

1 ' That the colonists were not contented with the simple right ' to 
give information,' but demanded a representative form of government, 
is indicated by the petition of the commonalty of New Netherland, 
etc., to Director Stuyvesant, in the year 1653, of which the fourth 
clause contains the following very remarkable words : 

< ' ' Tis contrary to the first intentions and general principles of every 
well-regulated government that one or more men should arrogate to 
themselves the exclusive power to dispose at will, of the life and prop- 
erty of any individual, and this by virtue, or under pretense of a law 
or order, he or they might enact, without the consent, knowledge, or 
election of the whole body, or its agents or representatives. 

' ' ' Hence the enactment of new laws or orders affecting the com- 
munity or inhabitants, their lives or property, is contrary and opposed 
to the granted freedoms of the Dutch government, and odious to every 
free-born man, and principally so to those whom God has placed in a 
free state or on newly-settled lands, which might require new laws or 
orders, not transcending, but resembling as near as possible, those of 
Netherland. We humbly submit that it is one of our privileges that 
our consent, or that of our representatives, is necessarily required in the 
enactment of such laws and orders. ' " * 

In reviewing these events Bancroft says : "In the early history of 
the United States, nothing is more remarkable than the uniform attach- 
ment of each colony to its franchises ; and popular assemblies burst 
everywhere into life with a consciousness of their importance, and an 
immediate capacity for efficient legislation." 

*" Documents relating to the Colonial History of the State of New York." Vol. I. 
PP- 499, 550- 



S REPRESENTATION. 

In the management of their local affairs during the colonial period 
it was, then, a struggle for representation and every student of our early 
history must be impressed with the fact that, in the long contest with 
the mother country, which began soon after the first settlement on this 
side of the Atlantic, and ended with our revolutionary war, it was al- 
ways a contest for this right. 

Just prior to the revolution in an examination before a committee of 
the House of Commons, in England, Franklin testified as follows : 

" An internal tax is forced from the people without their consent, 
if not laid by their representatives. * * * The Americans think it 
extremely hard and unjust, that a body of men, in which they have no 
representatives, should make a merit to itself of giving and granting 
what is not its own, but theirs ; and deprive them of a right they 
esteem of the utmost value and importance, as it is the security of all 
their other rights. * * * 

" As to an internal tax, how small soever, laid by the legislature here 
on the people there, while they have no representatives in this legisla- 
ture, I think it will never be submitted to. * * * 

li They (the people) find in the Great Charter, and the Petition 
and Declaration of Rights, that one of the privileges of English sub- 
jects is, that they are not to be taxed but by their common consent ; 
they have therefore relied upon it, from the first settlement of the 
province, that the Parliament never would, nor could, by color of that 
clause in the charter, assume a right of taxing them, till it had quali- 
fied itself to exercise such right, by admitting representatives from the 
people to be taxed, who ought to make a part of that common con- 
sent." * * * 

This sentiment was finally formulated during our contest with 
Britain in the acclamation of "No Taxation without Representation," 
and partly under its incitement the historical cargo of tea was thrown 
overboard in Boston harbor. 

The banners which have been carried in the conflicts for liberty in 
the past have always had inscribed on them a demand for representa- 
tio)i, and at the present day the question of representation is often the 
real one at issue in labor strikes and sometimes forms the chief ob- 
stacle which stands in the way of amicable agreement and the settle- 



REPRESENTATION. 



ment of disputes between employers and their men. At the critical 
period of a recent strike on a railroad, the following notice was 
issued by the president of the company : 
' i To all e?nployes : 

" To correct any misapprehension regarding the position of the 
officers of this company I would state that they are at all times ready 
and willing to give patient hearing to complaints on the part of its em- 
ployes, or any number of them, in any department. If dissatisfied 
with the conclusions reached by the division superintendents or general 
superintendent, the President will hear their cases and decide, but we 
decline to confer with organized committees composed of several 
branches of the service, for the reason that we cannot know that such 
committees fairly represent its employes. Engineers cannot, of course, 
fairly represent grievances of telegraph men, nor can firemen properly 
represent trainmen." 

It will be seen that in this ' ' notice ' ' there were several collateral 
issues involved and whether the President would have ' ' recognized ' ' 
committees who " fairly' ' represented the employes, or whether he would 
have acknowledged the right of the latter to select their own representa- 
tives are probably questions which were not then decided, but will be 
sure to continue to come up until some equitable decision is reached. 
Among the commonest — and it may be added — often the righteous 
" grievances " of workingmen is the refusal of employers to " recog- 
nize ' ' or treat with the committees who have been appointed by the men 
to represent their interests, and probably the recognition of this right 
of representation would in times past have done, and would do 
much in the future to avoid these contests which, in modern times, 
are so detrimental to the interests of both the parties engaged 
therein. 

While representing the American cause in England it is reported 
that Franklin in an interview with a distinguished English statesman 
said, " It seems to me that every body of men who cannot appear in 
person should have a right to appear by an agent " (or representative). 
The right of representation could not be more concisely or forcibly 
stated and the doctrine is applicable to all our relations, be they polit- 
ical, social or industrial. 



IO REPRESENTATION. 

What may be called the philosophy — or perhaps better — the ethics 
of representation, in civil government, is elucidated with remarkable 
clearness and conclusiveness in Guizot's "History of Representative 
Government, ' ' and at the risk of a long quotation the following extract 
from that book is reprinted here : 

" Starting from the principle that truth, reason and justice, — in one 
word, the divine law, — alone possess rightful power, the reasoning of 
the true doctrine of representation is somewhat as follows :— Every so- 
ciety, according to its interior organization, its antecedents, and the 
aggregate influences which have or still do modify it, is placed to a 
certain extent in a position to apprehend truth and justice as the di- 
vine law, and is in a measure disposed to conform itself to this law. 
Employing less general terms— there exists in every society a certain 
number of just ideas and wills in harmony with these ideas, which respect 
the reciprocal rights of men and social relations with their results.. 
This sum of just ideas and loyal wills is dispersed among the individ- 
uals who compose society, and unequally diffused among them on ac- 
count of the infinitely varied causes which influence the moral and 
intellectual development of men. The grand concern, therefore, of 
society is — that, so far as either abiding infirmity or the existing con- 
dition of human affairs will allow, this power of reason, justice and 
truth, which alone has an inherent legitimacy, and alone has the right 
to demand obedience, may become prevalent in the community. The 
problem evidently is to collect from all sides the scattered and incom- 
plete fragments of this power that exist in society, to concentrate them, 
and form them, to constitute a government. In other words, it is re- 
quired to discover all the elements of legitimate power that are dissem- 
inated throughout society, and to organize them into an actual power ; 
that is to say, to collect into one focus, and to realize, public reason 
and public morality, and to call them to the occupation of power. 

{i What we call representation is nothing else than a means to ar- 
rive at this result, — it is not an arithmetical machine employed to 
collect and count individual wills, but a natural process by which public 
reason, which alone has a right to govern society, may be extracted 
from the bosom of society itself. Xo reason has in fact a right to say 
beforehand for itself that it is the reason of the communitv. If it 



REPRESENTATION. 1 1 

claims to be such, it must prove that it is so, that is to say, it must ; 
accredit itself to other individual reasons which are capable of judging 
it. If we look at facts, we shall find that all institutions, all condi- -. v; 
tions of the representative system, flow from and return to this point. 
Election, publicity, and responsibility, are so many tests applied to in- 
dividual reasons, which in the search for, or in the exercise of, power, 
assume to be the interpreters of the reason of the community ; so many 
means of bringing to light the elements of legitimate power, and pre- 
venting usurpation. 

" In this system, it is true — and the fact arises from the necessity 
of liberty as actual in the world — that truth and error, perverse and 
loyal wills, in one word, the good and evil, which co-exist and con- 
tend in society as in the individual, will most probably express 
themselves ; this is the condition ot the world ; it is the necessary 
result of liberty. But against the evil of this there are two guarantees : 
one is found in the publicity of the struggle, which always gives the 
right the best chance of success, for it has been recognized in all ages 
of the world that good is in friendship with the light, while evil ever 
shelters itself in darkness ; this idea, which is common to all the relig- 
ions of the world, symbolizes and indicates the first of all truths. The 
second guarantee consists in the determination of a certain amount of 
capacity to be possessed by those who aspire to exercise any branch of 
power. In the system of representing wills, nothing could justify such 
a limitation, for the will exists full and entire in all men, and confers 
on all men an equal right ; but the limitation flows necessarily from 
the principle which attributes power to reason and not to will. 

"So far then from representation founding itself on the right, 
inherent in all individual wills, to concur in the exercise of power, it on 
the other hand rests on the principle that no will has in itself any 
right to power, and that whoever exercises, or claims to exercise power, 
is bound to prove that he exercises, or will exercise it, not according 
to his own will but according to reason. If we examine the represen- 
tative system in all its forms, * * * we shall see that such are 
everywhere the necessary results and the true foundations of that 
which we call representation." 



12 REPRESENTATION. 

The principle which attributes power to reason and not to will 
and that a certain amount of capacity should be possessed by those 
who aspire to exercise any branch of power, has been recognized in 
our various kinds of government, national, state and municipal. In the 
State of New York every male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, 
who has been a resident in his district and state a certain length of 
time, is of a sound mind and who has not bribed or been bribed at or 
made a bet on the elections, or been convicted of an infamous crime 
can vote. The question whether this is the wisest discrimination 
which could be made between those who are assumed to have and those 
who have not the " capacity " for exercising the power which the fran- 
chise gives will not be discussed now. The fact is this is the discrim- 
ination which has been made not only in the State of New York but 
is substantially the same in nearly all the other states in the Union. 
It was said half a century ago " that the notion that in any large 
community, government is the creation of the whole people, or 
that it has in any proper sense, received the assent of all, is entirely 
fanciful. The truth is, that even in the most favorable cases, but a 
comparatively small portion of the people have actually any share in 
directing the affairs of state ; and of that portion, a bare majority, as 
will be shown, and often less, may usually prescribe the form and pol- 
icy of the government, under which all are to live, and to which all 
are held equally bound to render obedience. More than three-fourths 
of the entire population are excluded by reason of their sex, age, or 
other declared disqualification, from all participation in the right of 
voting. The exclusion is somewhat arbitrary ; indeed, no more is 
pretended than that it proceeds upon a general presumption of unfit- 
ness which is adopted for the sake of convenience." * 

In other words, in effect, it is asserted by the Constitution and 
Laws of nearly all the states, that the persons described have the 
' ' capacity ' ' required or are qualified for the exercise of the power 
which the franchise gives, and by inference it would follow that those 
not embraced by the conditions, which have been enacted into law, 
have not the capacity and are in fact disqualified. This discrimina- 

* From " An Elementary Treatise on the Structure and Operation of the National 
and State Governments of the United States," by Charles Mason, A. M. 



REPRESENTATION. 1 3 

tion places very great limitations on the definition of our system of 
government as "Government of the People, by the People, and for 
the People." 

Interpreted in accordance with our legislation this formula is now 
accurately expressed as Government of and for all the People by those 
declared to be qualified. The " Sovereignty of the People" in New 
York and other states really means the Sovereignty of the Male 
Citizens of the age of twenty-one years, who have been Residents in 
their Districts and States, a certain length of time, are of Sound Minds 
and have not Bribed or been Bribed at nor made Bets in Elections or 
been convicted of an Infamous Crime. The phrase the "Sovereignty 
of the People ' ' then in an American community really means, what 
may be expressed, as the Sovereignty of the " Qualified." Para- 
phrasing Guizot's language slightly our theory then is that " represen- 
tation is a means of collecting from all sides the scattered and incom- 
plete fragments of the power of reason, justice and truth that exist 
among the 'Qualified' voters, to concentrate them and collect them 
into one focus and call them to the occupation of power." This 
theory should include the right of the ' ' Qualified " "to appear by an 
agent ' ' or representative, which Franklin declared ' ' every body of 
men who cannot appear in person had," and which those of us, whom 
the law says are qualified to vote, somewhat vaguely and, as we will 
try to show, often erroneously imagine we possess. The Sovereignty 
of the Qualified is the theory, but under existing practice and the 
present administration of affairs the result is often very different, and 
as has been said a bare majority of those qualified to vote — often less — 
"may prescribe the form and policy of the government, under which 
all are held equally bound to render obedience. ' ' 



CHAPTER II. 



MISREPRESENTATION. 



To show how a minority may govern the a priori demonstration 
given by Mr. Alfred Cridge of San Francisco in a little pamphlet on 
Proportional Representation, will be given. In this he says : 

' ' It can be demonstrated, aside from any actual experience, that 
under representation by districts, minorities, from one-third down (the 
proportion growing less with the increased number of parties), can 
return a majority of the members in elective bodies." 

He then gives the following illustrations of this — suppose three 
constituencies or districts having 3000 voters each, select each a 
member to a representative body, and that the voters in the different 
districts are divided between the two dominant parties as shown in 
the following table : 





VOTERS. 


REPRESENTATIVES 




REPUBLICANS. 


DEMOCRATS. 


ELECTED. 


First 


2,000 
2,000 


1,000 
1,000 
3,000 


Republican. 
Republican. 
Democrat. 


Second 

Third 


Total Votes. . . . 


4,000 


5,000 





It is obvious that with such a division of voters that in the first and 
second districts Republicans would be elected, and in the third a Dem- 
ocrat. The total number of Republican voters in the three districts is 
4000 while the Democrats number 5000 so that we would have the 
anomaly and the injustice of having 4000 Republicans represented by 
two members while 5000 Democrats have only one, and yet this may 

14 



MISREPRESENTATION . 



15 



and does occur under our present system wHcrTTs 
pie that " the majority should rule." — *■ 

Another illustration with seven districts each 
is cited by Mr. Cridge : 



based on the princi- 
having 7000 voters 





VOTERS. 


REPRESENTATIVES 




REPUBLICANS. 


DEMOCRATS. 


ELECTED. 


First 


3,000 
3,000 
3,000 
3,000 

7,-000 

7,000 
7,000 


4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
4,000 


Democrat. 


Second 

Third 


Democrat. 
Democrat. 


Fourth 

-Fifth:.-. ...... ;-.- 


Democrat. 
Republican. 
Republican. 
Republican. 


Sixth 


Seventh .... 


Total Votes 


33,000 


. l6,000 





In this case 33,000 Republicans would have only three represent- 
atives while 16,000 Democrats would have four, that is less than a third 
of the voters in the seven districts would elect a majority of the repre- 
sentatives. 

Mr. Cridge gives still another illustration of seven districts each 
with 7000 voters but divided among three parties, as shown on page 16. 

Here we again have 49,000 voters in seven districts. The Popu- 
lists with 12,000 — less than a fourth of the whole — would get a ma- 
jority of the repiesentatives, while the Democrats with 17,000 votes 
get none. Mr. Cridge says : 

(l It may be claimed that the cases represented are extreme. But 
there are other factors, of which we have so far taken no cognizance, 
that will still further increase disparities. It is practically impossible 
for voters in a mass to control party management ; and a very small 
minority in the party not only can, but do, not only do, but must, 



i6 



MISREPRESENTATION. 





VOTERS. 


REPRESENTA- 


DISTRICTS. 


REPUBLICANS, ! DEMOCRATS. ; POPULISTS. 


TIVES ELECTED. 


First 

Second 

Third 

Fourth 

Fifth 


2,000 2,000 
2,000 2,000 
2,000 2,000 
2.000 2,000 

4.000 3?ooo 
4,000 3,000 
4,000 3?ooo 


3,000 
3,000 
3,000 
3,000 


Populist. 

Populist. 

Populist. 

Populist. 
Republican. 
Republican. 
Republican. 


Sixth 

Seventh 


Total Votes. . . 


20.000 17,000 12,000 





control the nominations, so that the option (not choice) of the voter, 
in most cases, is to vote for one man that does not represent him in 
preference to voting for another that would misrepresent him. If his 
party wins, he is therefore misrepresented : if it loses he is misrepre- 
sented." 

It will thus be seen that the results of elections depend very much 
upon how districts are divided. Politicians have not been slow to 
avail themselves of this means of influencing and controlling the re- 
sults of elections. Such division of districts, for the advantage of one 
party over another, is an evil inherent in the present system of elect- 
ing representatives, and has long been known as gerrymandering, and 
is defined in Webster's dictionary as " the division (of a state) into 
districts for the choice of representatives, in an unnatural and unfair 
way. with a view to give a political party an advantage over its oppo- 
nent."* 



*The following description and illustration of the origin of this term is taken from 
the American Law Review for January, 1 872 : 

"The term Gerrymander, as it is well known, dates from the year 181 1, when 
Elbridge Geny was Governor of Massachusetts, and the Democratic, or, as it was then 



MISREPRESENTATION. 



17 



In the report on Representation Reform made to the United States 
Senate in 1869, of which Mr. Buckalew was chairman, it was said : 

" Single districts will almost always be unfairly made. They will 
be formed in the interest of party and to secure an unjust measure of 
power to their authors, and it may be expected that each successive 
district apportionment will be more unjust than its predecessor. Parties 



termed, the Republican party, obtained a temporary ascendency in the state. In 
order to secure themselves in the possession of the government, the party in power 
passed the famous law of Feb. 11, 1812, providing for a new division of the state into 
senatorial districts, so contrived that in as many districts as possible the Federalists 
should be outnumbered by their opponents. To effect this all natural and customary 
lines were disregarded, and some parts of the state, particularly the counties of Wor- 
cester and Essex, presented singular examples of political geography. It is said that 




Gilbert Stuart, seeing in the office of the Columbian Centincl an outline of the 
Essex outer district, nearly encircling the rest of the county, added with his pencil a 
beak to Salisbury, and claws to Salem and Marblehead, as shown in the engraving 
exclaiming " There that will do for a salamander. " " Salamander," said Mr. Russell, 
the editor, " I call it a Gerry-mander. " The mot obtained vogue and a rude cut 



15 MISREPRESENTATION. 

will retaliate upon each other whenever possible. The disfranchise- 
ment suffered through one decade by a political party may be repeated 
upon it in the next with increased severity, but if it shall happen to 
have power in the legislature when the new apportionment for the state 
is to be made, it will take signal vengeance for its wrongs and in its 
turn indulge in the luxury of persecution. ' ' 

In a speech made in Philadelphia in 1867 he said what is probably 
just as true now that ' ' at this moment, from the British possessions 
on the northeast to the Golden Gate of the Pacific, there is probably 
not an honest apportionment law for members of Congress, and you will 
scarcely ever have one, unless in an exceptional case where one politi- 
cal interest shall have control of the upper branch of a legislature and 
another of the lower, holding each other in check, and compelling 
some degree of fairness in the formation of law. " 

As Prof. Commons in a paper on this subject said, " public opin- 
ion cannot stop the gerrymander, because public opinion rejoices in 
this kind of tit-for-tat. The fact that one party has unfavorably cut 
up the state is good reason for the other party to retrieve itself when it 
gets the power. If Congress should take the matter out of the hands of 
the state legislature, it would be simply to do its own gerrymandering, 
while state and municipal gerrymandering would still go on as before." 

But it is not alone by gerrymandering that injustice is done through 
our present system of electing single members by a majority of votes in 
each district. The literature on this subject is full of glaring examples 
of unfairness and violation of the principle that a Majority of Qualified 
Voters should Rule. 

The language used by President Garfield in the course of a remark- 
able speech before the House of Representatives, in 1870, in support 



of the figure published in the Centinel, and in the Salem Gazette, with the natural 
history of the monster duly set forth, served to fix the word in the political vocabulary 
of the country. So efficient was the law that at the elections of 1812, 50,164 Dem- 
ocratic voters elected twenty-nine senators against eleven elected by 51,766 Federalists; 
and Essex county, which, when voting as a single district, had sent five Federalists 
to the Senate, was now represented in that body by three Democrats and two Fed- 
eralists. It was repealed in 1814, and the death and burial of the monster were 
celebrated in prose and verse throughout the country." 



MISREPRESENTATION. 1 9 

of a motion for the election of congressmen by the cumulative vote 
has often been quoted. He then said : 

" When I was first elected to Congress in the fall of 1862 the State 
of Ohio had a clear Republican majority of about 25,000, but by the 
adjustment and distribution of political power in the state there were 
fourteen Democratic representatives upon this floor and only five Re- 
publicans. The state that cast nearly 250,000 Republican votes as 
against 225,000 Democratic votes was represented in the proportion 
of five Republicans and fourteen Democrats. 

" In the next Congress there was no great political change in the 
popular vote of Ohio — a change of only 20,000 — but the result was 
that seventeen Republican members were sent here from Ohio and 
only two Democrats. 

" We find that only so small a change as 20,000 changed the rep- 
resentatives in Congress from fourteen Democrats and five Republicans 
to seventeen Republicans and two Democrats. 

" Now, no man, whatever his politics, can justly defend a system 
that may in theory and frequently does in practice, produce such re- 
sults as these." 

Again he said : 

' ' In my judgment it is the weak point in the theory of representa- 
tive government as now organized and administered, that a large por- 
tion of the people are permanently disfranchised. There are about 
30,000 Democratic voters in my district, and they have been voting 
for the last forty years without any more hope of gaining a representa- 
tive on this floor than of having one in the Commons of Great Britain." 

In an Address to the Public, which the American Proportional 
Representation League issued at the time the Proportional Representa- 
tion Congress was held in Chicago last summer (1893), it is said : 

' ' Twenty-three years have been added to the forty and still the 
Democrats of that district maintain the forlorn hope. Iowa with 
219,215 Republican votes and 201,923 Democratic votes at the election 
of 1892, sent ten Republican congressmen and one Democrat to Wash- 
ington. Every 21,921 Republicans of that state has a representative, 
while the whole 201,923 Democrats have but one. In Kentucky the 
case is reversed. The Democrats have a congressman for every 17,436 



20 MISREPRESENTATION. 

votes, while the Republicans have one for 122,308. In Maine the 
vote was 65,637 Republicans and 55,778 Democrats, but the Republi- 
cans got all the four congressmen. In Maryland the vote was 91,762 
Republicans and 113,931 Democrats, but the latter got the six congress- 
men. The Republicans of Texas have not had a representative in Con- 
gress since 1882. The Democrats of Kansas have not had a representa- 
tive since the state was admitted to the Union, though they have 
polled from a third to two-fifths of the vote of the state during that 
time. ' ' 

To show further how the majority system works in practice an 
ordinary district in the State of New York in which a member of the 
legislature is to be elected may be taken as an illustration. We will 
select the vote for member of Assembly at the election in 1892 in Herki- 
mer county, New York, where 6140 Republican, 5629 Democratic and 
402 Prohibition votes were cast. The Republican candidate of course 
was elected, and the 6140 voters of that faith were represented, whereas 
the 5629 Democrats and 402 Prohibitionists were unrepresented. That 
. is, the Republicans in that county had some one in the legislature to ad- 
vocate those views and measures concerning which they differed from theii 
political antagonists, whereas the Democrats and Prohibitionists had 
not. To show the relative proportion of the votes of the two parties 
clearly the Republican vote is represented by the parallelogram or area 
R in Fig. 1, shaded with diagonal lines, and the Democratic vote by 
the black area D. The Prohibitionist vote is shown by the small area 
indicated by the letter P, and which is shaded by cross lines. The 
horizontal length of these areas represents correctly to a scale the mag- 
nitude of the respective votes. 

In Montgomery county a similar condition of things existed, 5590 



Fig. 2 



Fig. 1 

Democratic voters, represented by the shaded area D in Fig. 2, elected 
three candidates, and 5587 Republican votes, shown by the black area 
R, and 377 Prohibition votes, P were unrepresented. It will be seen 
from the diagram and also from the figures that in this latter case the 
Republican and Prohibition votes addea together exceed those of the 



MISREPRESENTATION. 21 

Democrats, so that a minority of the voters in this county elected the 
candidate. 

To show the extent to which the qualified voters in the State of 
New York were unrepresented, after the election held in 1892, a dia- 
gram, Fig. 3, p. 22, has been drawn, in which the magnitude of the 
votes cast by the different parties in each district is represented by 
parallelograms as in Figs. 1 and 2. These are correctly drawn to 
a scale, the successful votes being represented by the areas shaded with 
single diagonal lines and the unsuccessful votes by the black areas. 
The scattering votes are shown by the small areas, on the ends of the 
black areas, and which, as in Figs. 1 and 2, are shaded by cross lines. 
The relative proportion of the successful votes — which are represented 
in the legislature — to the unsuccessful vote — which is not represented, 
is thus shown graphically at a glance. 

The total vote for members of the legislature in the city of New 
York at that election was 277,835 of which the Democrats cast 170,352 
and elected all the members of the assembly. Although the Repub- 
licans had over 100,000 votes they had not a single representative in 
the assembly, senate or in the board of aldermen in the city. 

Numberless other examples of the injustice of our present system 
of voting could be cited from elections in every part of the country. 

As John Stuart Mill* has justly said, "democracy as hitherto 
practiced is the government of the whole people by a mere majority 
of the people exclusively represented. 

" That the minority must yield to the majority, the smaller number 
to the greater, is a familiar idea ; and accordingly, men think there is 
no necessity for using their minds any further, and it does not occur 
to them that there is any medium between allowing the smaller number 
to be equally powerful with the greater, and blotting out the smaller 
number altogether. In a representative body actually deliberating, 
the minority must of course be overruled ; and in an equal democracy 
(since the opinions of the constituents, when they insist on them, 
determine those of the representative body), the majority of the peo- 
ple, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over the 



Considerations on Representative Government," American edition, p. 145. 




DIAGRAM SHOWING THE VOTE FOR ASSEMBLYMEN IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK IN 1892. 

The areas shaded by diagonal lines represent the votes of the parties having a 
majority or plurality in the different districts; the black areas the votes of the minority 
parties and the small areas shaded with cross lines the scattering votes. 



Fig. 4. 




VOTE FOR MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS IN 1892. 

In Illinois three Representatives are elected from each district and each voter can 
cast three votes for such representatives. He can distribute these as he likes ; that is, 
he can give all of them to one candidate, or one and a half to one and one and a half 
to another, or one to each of three, and the three candidates in each district '■'■highest 
in votes'''' are elected. In the above diagram the areas shaded with diagonal lines rep- 
resent the votes for the three members who were elected in each of the different Districts. 
The areas shaded with horizontal lines represent the voles for candidates who were not 
elected, and the black areas the scattering votes. 



24 MISREPRESENTATION. 

minority and their representatives. But does it follow that the min- 
ority should have no representatives at all ? Because the majority 
ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all the 
votes, the minority none ? Is it necessary that the minority should 
not even be heard ? Nothing but habit and old association can recon- 
cile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. In a really equal de- 
mocracy, every or any section would be represented, not disproportion- 
ately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always 
have a majority of the representatives ; but a minority of the electors 
would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man, 
they would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, 
there is not equal government of inequality and privilege : one part of 
the people rule over the rest : there is a part whose fair and equal share 
of influence in the representation is withheld from them, contrary to 
all just government, but above all. contrary to the principle of democ- 
racy, which professes equality as its very root and foundation." 

There is no other political maxim more firmly fixed in the minds 
of Americans and more implicitly believed in than " majorities should 
rule." and yet it often happens, as it did in Seneca and in other 
counties of Xew York in 1892. that a minority elects and the majority 
are unrepresented. The same thing occurred in the 1st and 4th 
districts in Albany, in Chemung, Clinton, Columbus, the 2d district 
of Dutchess, the 6th of Erie, Greene, the 16th district of Kings, Mont- 
gomery, both districts of Oneida, 1st of Onondaga, Ontario, Otsego, 1st 
district of Queens. 1st district of Steuben, 2d district of Ulster, 3d of 
Westchester and in Yates counties. It is true that the representatives 
in the State of Xew York were elected by the aggregate majority of the 
voters, but the black areas in the diagram show at a glance how large 
a proportion of the votes in the State of Xew York were unrepre- 
sented in the assembly after the election of 1892. 

It must be remembered that the unrepresented were voiceless and 
voteless in the assembly. Consequently the powers of government 
were exercised by a majority of the members elected. These may and 
often do represent the views and interests of only a minority of the 
voters, so that democracy as it is now constituted often fails to accom- 
plish its ostensible purpose. To quote again from Mill : 



MISREPRESENTATION. 25 

i( All principles are most effectually tested by extreme cases. Sup- 
pose, then, that in a country governed by equal and universal suffrage, 
there is a contested election in every constituency, and every election 
is caused by a small majority. The parliament thus brought together 
represents little more than a bare majority of the people. This 
parliament proceeds to legislate, and adopts important measures by a 
bare majority of itself. What guarantee is there that these meas- 
ures accord with the wishes of a majority of the people ? Nearly half 
the electors, having been outvoted at the hustings, have had no in- 
fluence at all in the decision ; and the whole of them may be, a major- 
ity of them probably are, hostile to the measure, having voted against 
those by whom they have been carried. Of the remaining electors, 
nearly half have chosen representatives who, by supposition, have 
voted against the measures. It is possible, therefore, and even prob- 
able, that the opinion which has prevailed was agreeable only to a 
minority of the nation, though a majority of that portion of it whom 
the institutions of the country have erected into a ruling class. If de- 
mocracy means the certain ascendancy of the majority, there are no 
means of insuring that, but by allowing every individual figure to tell 
equally in the summing up. ' ' 

The principle that the majority of the qualified voters should rule 
is not questioned. If all of them were represented in proportion to 
their numbers, then a majority of the representatives would rule and 
they would represent a majority of the qualified voters. Under exist- 
ing conditions the majorities in our governing bodies often do not rep- 
resent majorities of voters. 

In his book on Proportional Representation the late Hon. Charles 
R. Buckalew of Pennsylvania said : 

' ' It may be assumed that the average rate of virtual disfranchise- 
ment of voters in our contested popular elections is fully two-fifths of 
the total vote. This startling fact is the first one to be considered, and 
considered attentively, in any intelligent examination of the great sub- 
ject of electoral reform in the United States ; for all schemes for the 
amendment of popular representation in government must be insuffi- 
cient and illusory, which ignore it or underrate its enormous signifi- 
cance. For it means that popular elections are unjust ; it exposes the 



26 



MISREPRESENTATION. 



principal causes of their corruption, and it may instruct us, if we duly 
consider it, concerning those measures of change which will most cer- 
tainly impart health, vigor and endurance to our political institutions. ' ' 

At present a majority in any district, although it be a majority of 
only one vote may determine who shall represent the people in that 
district. When parties are of about equal strength, as is nearly al- 
ways the case in ordinary times in free republics, the really influential 
vote is not that of the mass of the citizens of one or the other party, 
but of a small faction, the * ' balance of power party " as it is some- 
times called. In a very forcible article in the Nineteenth Century for 
February, 1884, Mr. Robert H. Hayward calls attention to the baneful 
consequences of this instability of the representation caused by the 
shifting of small majorities in nearly balanced constituencies. He says : 

' ' If the beam of a balance be supported at a point very near to 
its centre of gravity, the shifting of a small weight determines its in- 
clination to this side or that. The system of majority voting has an 
analogous action ; it balances those of the electors who have serious 
political convictions and hold them strongly — the steady Liberals 
against the staunch Conservatives ; and then, if their weights are 
nearly equal, the inclination of the beam of the political balance is 
entirely at the mercy of a small body of electors, whose political views 
are determined at best by some ephemeral cry, some clever catchword, 
some panic fear, or some class interest, or in too many cases by those 
baser considerations which it may be hoped the Corrupt Practices Act 
of last session will have done something to restrain." 

This condition has been jocosely designated as the " Scales of In- 
justice ' ' and has been represented by the following engraving * in 




THE SCALES OF INJUSTICE. 



Proportional Representation," By Alfred Criclge, San Francisco. 



MISREPRESENTATION. 27 

which the ' ' Balance of Power ' ' is supposed to be adjuster by the 
"influence" of the "floating vote." In other words, elections in 
districts, counties, cities, states, and even in the whole nation are at 
times, and perhaps not seldom, decided by the most corrupt portion 
of the voters in the community. Our municipal, state and national 
government then become illustrations of the Sovereignty of Bribery, 
Spoils and Patronage. As an English writer has said * " the tyranny 
of the majority is a sufficiently serious matter ; but the tyranny of a 
comparatively few variable, not to say venal, votes, is an unmitigated 
evil." 

The same author says still further in commenting on our institu- 
tions : 

" That government by a chance, or manipulated, majority of a part 
of the people should not only claim to be popular in the true sense, 
but should, practically, be recognized as such, tacitly, if not avowedly, 
would seem to be an unavoidable consequence of American democratic 
institutions. Whether unavoidable in fact, or, possibly, only an acci- 
dent, such is the actual position of affairs. ' ' 

Going on still further this writer says in explanation of this condition 
of things : 

' ' But, surely, if the right of suffrage be the mark of sovereignty, 
and that sovereignty be the prerogative of the people, then those who 
possess the right also possess the sovereignty, and those to whom the 
prerogative belongs must be the people. If the logic is faulty, the 
conclusion remains true ; since the voters are, in the United States, to 
all intents and purposes the people. That is to say, that their will as 
expressed by their votes constitutes what is called popular govern- 
ment. ' ' 

The real difficulty is that under our present system the will of the 
people does not secure full expression through their votes. Unpalatable 
as it may be, many of us cannot help recognizing the truth in the fol- 
lowing picture of our institutions, which has been drawn by this same 
writer : 

"This, then," he says, "seems to be, under present conditions, 



F. W. Grey, Westminster Review. 



25 MISREPRESENTATION. 

the ulfana ratio of American Popular Government. The People is a 
term equivalent to the majority of the votes for the time being ; that 
majority, from the nature of the case, since the masses greatly outnum- 
ber the classes, must, in only too many instances, consist of those least 
fitted to exercise the right of suffrage. They hold, at any time, and 
under all circumstances, the balance of power, their interest, in any 
given election, being confined to the strongest of all possible motives 
— self-interest. Moreover, being exploited by the professsional poli- 
ticians, whose long and varied experience has taught them the full 
value and utmost possibilities of such material, they are better organ- 
ized than any other of the many elements that constitute the sovereign 
people. That the professional politician, with unlimited money, per- 
fect machinery, long training, and a sufficient supply of venal votes, 
should be master of the situation — ' boss the whole show ' — is only the 
natural effect of the adequate cause. ' ' 

This incisive critic points out too that Government of the People, 
by the People, and for the People has often come to mean Government 
of the Politicians, by the Politicians, and for the Politicians — and for 
their privileged employes. He leaves the question whether these 
evils be inseparable from democratic institutions or only accidents due 
to local causes unanswered. It is though a very serious one to all 
American citizens. To believe that these evils are inseparable from 
onr institutions is to despair of reform or improvement in our govern- 
ment. 

In the phraseology of Guizot — "the grand concern of society is that 
the power of reason, justice and truth, which is dispersed among the 
individuals who compose society, should be collected from all sides and 
concentrated into one focus and called to the occupation of power and 
be organized into an actual government," and — as that distinguished 
author says — " what we call representation is nothing else than a means 
to arrive at this result, it is * * * but a natural process by 
which public reason, which alone has a right to govern society, may 
be extracted from the bosom of society itself. ' ' 



CHAPTER III. 

THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 

And now as a writer in the Nineteenth Century* asks — "what 
does majority representation mean? It means " — he answers — " that 
the majority shall have everything and the minority nothing. It 
means that, whether the number of members to be elected by each 
constituency be large or small, the whole of the representation shall be 
monopolized by that party which polls one more than half the votes and 
that party which polls one less than half the votes shall have no repre- 
sentation at all. ' ' 

Going back to the history of the evolution of civil liberty and what 
do we find — always that good government is a sequence to a fair and 
just representation of the people in the administration of public affairs 
and the exercise of political power. Our misgovernment comes from 
the fact that the people who are adjudged qualified to take part in 
governmental affairs are not fairly represented. In the city of New 
York every voter at elections must practically choose between two 
candidates in voting for aldermen, members of the legislature or mem- 
bers of Congress. He has no choice of nominees excepting for those 
whom the politicians choose to give him. If the majority in his dis- 
trict is against him he is left without a representative. This condition 
of things is not peculiar to New York City or New York State but 
exists nearly everywhere, and grows out of the system of electing, by a 
majority of votes, single representatives from districts in cities, 
counties and states. This condition of public affairs was described 
with great clearness and force in the article on The Machinery of 
Politics and Proportional Representation, f from which quotations have 
already been made, and in which it is said : 

-x- a Proportional vs. Majority Representation." By Albert Grey, M. P., in the 
Nineteenth Century for December, 1884. 

f This appeared in the American Law Review for January, 1872. The author- 
ship is not known to the writer. 

29 



30 THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 

"The unsatisfactory symptoms are everywhere much the same. 
The character of the political machinery everywhere in use is such 
that a great amount of preliminary work is needed to set it a going, — 
caucusing and canvassing, pulling of wires and greasing of wheels, — 
a work that from its nature must needs be performed by a small knot 
of experienced workmen. It is inevitable that in this state of things 
there should arise political ' rings, ' small coteries of political mana- 
gers with every opportunity to control and direct the course of party 
politics to their mutual advantage. Their injurious influence is felt 
both by the public man and by the private citizen. Public life as a 
career becomes practically closed to men of marked character and 
independent views. The private citizen feels himself to be a tool in 
the hands of his political advisers, and, finding the more obscure and 
irksome of his public duties — the attendance upon primary and nomi- 
nating caucuses — not only distasteful, but futile, abandons them in 
disgust. Nor does he find more satisfaction in the exercise of the suf- 
frage itself. Though nominally free to vote for whom he pleases, the 
knowledge that his vote is thrown away unless it is given for the 
regular candidates, that is, that he may as well not vote at all as not 
obey his political advisers, binds him hand and foot. He finds him- 
self practically obliged to choose among candidates for none of 
whom he probably cares a farthing, so that indifference to his more 
public duties follows fast upon his distaste for the more obscure. He 
soon cares as little to go to the polls as to go to the caucus. And 
indeed he has everything to foster this indifference, for he knows that 
if he belongs to the majority party his vote will probably not be 
needed ; if to the other, that it will be of no avail. 

"But if the preliminaries of an election are thus injurious and 
demoralizing both to public and private citizens, the results of an 
election are a positive injustice. Our elections fail in their chief pur- 
pose, — that of furnishing a fairly representative body. It would seem 
that a deliberative assembly, standing in the place of the whole body 
of citizens, to discuss and decide in their behalf all matters of public 
moment, should as nearly as possible resemble in its composition the 
political community for which it stands, and that whatever varieties of 
interest and opinion exist in the constituency should find adequate 



THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 3 I 

expression among their representatives. The ideal method of elections 
is certainly the one that would thus make the elected body a perfect 
epitome of the body politic, giving to every political party large or 
small, its fair share of members in the proportion of its numerical 
strength. The fair and just system of representation would be a 
system of proportional representation. 

" How far the present system of voting is from producing any such 
results, and how unjustly and unfairly it works, is notorious. A politi- 
cal contest is a struggle, not for a fair share of the representation, but 
for the whole. The outvoted electors are reduced to political slavery ; 
they have no voice whatever in public affairs. Their rights of repre- 
sentation are taken from them, and are appropriated by their con- 
querors. It is a war without quarter, and it is a contest in which the 
sacrifices of the victors are hardly less serious than the losses of the 
defeated party. Everything has to be yielded for the sake of victory, 
and as eligibility becomes necessarily the prime quality in a candidate, 
it naturally follows that, as we have said, men of mark give place to 
men of no mark, and the representative assembly comes to be com- 
posed for the most part of second-rate men, mere standard-bearers in 
party warfare, hardly better known or more acceptable to the men who 
voted for them than to their opponents. 

"These evils, — the disfranchisement of minorities and the con- 
sequent tyranny of majorities ; the tyranny of political managers over 
their followers, and the consequent helplessness and indifference of the 
electors ; the tyranny of these same managers over public men, and the 
consequent withdrawal from public life of men who are seeking an hon- 
orable and independent career, — these evils are co-extensive with rep- 
resentative institutions, and are mainly attributed, by those publicists 
who have undertaken to trace their causes, to the natural working of 
an objectionable electoral machinery. The scheme of majority voting, 
as almost everywhere practised, is not only vicious in principle, since 
it excludes from representation a large fraction of the electors, but it is 
so crude and defective in its operations that it needs, as we have said, 
a special force of trained engineers to make it work at all. It is natural 
that these men should make it work to suit themselves." 

In another article on Proportional Representation, published in 



32 THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 

Putnam' s Magazine as long ago as June, 1870, the writer described 
the evils of our present system of representation in the following 
words : 

' ' Our practice contravenes the fundamental principle of republican 
government, which is that the majority must rule. This principle is 
essential to the idea of such government. When the power resides in 
all the citizens, the voice of the greater number must prevail, or the 
minority will rule. This principle, carried to its legitimate result, re- 
quires that every question shall be decided by the majority of those in 
whom resides the ultimate power. As all citizens are equal in rights, 
the consent of the larger number must necessarily overbear the consent 
of the smaller number. * * * If the electoral machinery is such 
as to express only the choice of a majority of the city's voters, the 
minority is lost. In other words, all the persons concerned in a ques- 
tion and having the right to decide it should be heard in person or by 
representation. 

* *7* ?f, sf* 2jc yf* 

"Under the false pretences of party, the elector is cheated or 
seduced into voting for one of two men, neither of whom he likes or 
would trust in the management of his private affairs. He is reduced 
to a choice of evils, and he makes it under the pressure of party discip- 
line. We all know that it is the custom for two conventions, suppos- 
ing, as is generally the case, the division of the electors into two par- 
ties, to select each a candidate, and for the voter to choose between 
the two, or lose his vote altogether. This is the system in its best 
estate, which supposes the primary meetings to contain only voters of 
the party, and the delegates to be fairly chosen, and these in their 
turn to discharge fairly their own duties of nominating candidates. 
* * * But since there is no legal or- adequate provision for the 
regulation of primary assemblies or nominating conventions, they are 
in other districts carried by fraud or violence, so that it may be said 
of not a few that the scheme then established is for two bodies of in- 
competent or ill-intentioned men to put up each a man, and for the 
rest of the community to take their choice between the two. 

"A choice of bad men is, however not the only evil of the system. 



THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 33 

The good men who find their way into our legislatures are crippled by 
it. Their influence is weakened and their independence menaced. 
When one of them opposes a favorite scheme of the party managers of 
his district, he is sure to receive warning as well as a remonstrance. 
Thus the representative and the constitutent are both demoralized. 

' ' These evils do not spring from a corrupt community. The ma- 
jority of the people are not debauched. The fault lies in a vicious 
electoral system, which produces a representation neither of parties 
nor of the general public, which constrains the majority, and stifles the 
voices of large portions of the people. 

' ' The importance of representation, or rather the evil of nonrepre- 
sentation, is measured by the value of popular government. By leav- 
ing a large number of citizens without voice in the state, we not only 
lose the benefit of their counsel and cooperation, but we make them 
discontented. The fraud and falsehood of the system beget other 
frauds and falsehoods, and lower the moral tone of the whole commun- 
ity. The vast power and patronage of government often depend upon 
a few votes. Need we wonder that force and fraud should both be 
used to procure them ? Parties are themselves deceived by their pre- 
ponderance in legislatures, without considering how far it rests upon 
a like preponderance out of doors. The opinions and wishes of large 
portions of the people are disregarded. They see measures of great 
significance adopted which they disapprove, but are powerless to pre- 
vent, while they are unable to procure a consideration of others which 
they think indispensable to the general good. If we can devise a 
remedy, if we can by any means procure an electoral system, by which 
the wishes of the whole people will be made known, and the votes of 
their real representatives taken, on all measures of legislation, we shall 
have saved the state from the danger which seems now to be impend- 
ing over it." 

The objections to elections by a majority were also presented very 
clearly in an article by Mr. Leonard Courtney, published in the 
Nineteenth Century of July, 1879. 

These he said are that : * ' You cannot trust any exclusive party to 
act with justice to those who are wholly in their power, and whose cause 
cannot be pleaded before them. If the minority have not some one to. 



34 THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 

speak up for their feelings and desires, the majority will act with injustice 
towards them ; and this not so much from any set purpose to be unjust 
as from the natural incapacity of men to understand the wrongs of 
their neighbors. This is the case whether we consider the action of 
employers towards workmen or of workmen towards employers ; of men 
towards women ; and, if women were the rulers to the exclusion of 
men, no doubt it would be very much the same of women towards men. 
No party caiT-be trusted to exercise justice to an excluded party. No 
one possesses the intelligence and imagination necessary before he can 
put himself in' the position of another so as to understand what another 
wants. As the old proverb says, ' No one knows how the shoe pinches 
except him who wears it.' A man who wore sandals could not 
very well understand the wants of the man who wore shoes. There 
would, again,. be no .living connection between the ruling body and 
the excluded body. " There is no connection between the excluded 
minority and the, ruling, majority. If men obtain no share in the 
representation which constitutes the authority of a country, their po- 
litical energies die away and disappear. They have faculties and 
political feelings, but < they assume a rudimentary character, they 
become unenergetic, and so their energies entirely pass away. ' ' 

The same writer described the effect of the present system on can- 
didates by saying : 

' ' Under the old plan the primary object is generally this : ' We 
must have a man to keep the party together. We want a man who 
will not lose the support of any section of the party. ' This last was 
the great point held in view. You must keep the party together ; 
therefore your candidate must have in him nothing that will drive 
away any- members of the party from adhering to the choice of the 
few. In order to do that you must have a man who will offend no- 
body—who will be far from all tendency to kick over the traces ; 
whether in thought or in action, he must keep well within the party 
lines. If he will vote steadily and pledge himself to support the leader 
for the time being, he has the best chance of success. That is the way 
in which the mass of members have been chosen, and candidates have 
always been obliged to bear this in mind. The first duty of a candi- 
date is to be prudent — not to offend anybody — to subdue his mind as 



THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 35 

far as possible to the lowest level compatible with any life at all, and 
to be careful not to disturb the prejudices of any section at all. That 
is the necessity of getting a majority of any constituency. The result 
is to produce a candidate with the gift of mediocrity. You would not 
find a majority of your constituency to go together for a man who is 
pronounced in his opinions, or in his character, or in the force of his 
thought ; and the result is, that the strongest man has to be put aside 
in order that the moderate man may be run, because the moderate man 
has the best chance of winning. If this is anything like an accurate 
representation of the facts, the result must be a degradation of the char- 
acter of your candidates, and of your electoral body. If you get in- 
different materials to work with, you cannot do good work ; and if 
you send into the legislature such men as I have described, you will 
not make a brilliant assembly out of them." 

This picture is as true of practical politics in this country as it is of 
the condition of public affairs in England which it was intended to de- 
scribe. An American writer has pointed out that in this country the 
voter : ' i Though nominally free to vote for whom he pleases, the 
knowledge that his vote is thrown away unless it is given for the regu- 
lar candidates binds him hand and foot. He finds himself obliged to 
choose among candidates for none of whom he probably cares a far- 
thing, so that indifference to his more important public duties follows 
fast his distaste for the more obscure (/. e., attendance at primary 
meetings and nominating caucuses). He soon cares as little to go to 
the poll as to go to the caucus, and thus the political energies of large . 
sections of the community are condemned to atrophy and extinction, 
for, unless men know that their vote can be made effectual, the right 
to vote is not appreciated, and the so-called privilege of citizenship 
assumes in their opinion the appearance of a bitter mockery. ' ' 

These evils are so great and are so apparent that many who have 
the true interests of their country, their state and locality very much 
at heart often feel and speak bitterly and in a more or less despairing 
tone of the future. Thus Mr. Simon Sterne in his book on Represen- 
tative Government says : 

"The process of creating a majority demoralizes most of those 
who compose it j it demoralizes them in this sense, that it excludes 



36 THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 

the action of their higher moral attributes, and brings into" operation 
the lower motives. They are compelled to disregard all individuality 
and therefore all genuine earnestness of opinion ; to discard their po- 
litical knowledge ; their deliberate judgment : their calm and con- 
scientious reflection, all must be withdrawn, or brought down to a 
conformity with those who possess the least of these qualities. $ . * . * 
Wherever the majority is not held in check by a minority of almost 
equal strength, it becomes a despotism and a despotism not founded 
on the sentiments or traditions of a people can only perpetuate and 
consolidate its power by intrigue and fraud." 

Mr. Buckalew in a speech made in Philadelphia in 1869 said : 
'•Look at your existing political action and see whether it is not 
a struggle for power instead of a struggle for justice ; whether it is not 
a struggle by each interest to obtain all it can and retain all it can, 
and to keep away from an opposing interest anything like a fair dis- 
tribution of power or fair treatment. ' ' 

That despair often takes the place of discouragement we all know 
and perhaps sometimes feel, and when we hear of men as distinguished 
as Dr. A. P. Peabody saying in a Baccalaureate Sermon at Harvard, 
that ••' instead of a government by the people, we are threatened, if 
the threat be not already fulfilled, with an oligarchy of demagogues, 
for which a decent constitutional monarchy would be welcome," — we 
feel that there may be reason for anxiety for the future if not for de- 
spair. Perhaps few of us have yet descended to the depths from which 
Herbert Spencer has so recently renounced his faith in free institu- 
tions, which, he says, •'•' originally was strong (though always joined 
with the belief that the maintenance and success of them is a question 
of popular character), has in these later years been greatly decreased 
by the conviction that the fit character is not possessed by any people, 
nor is likely to be possessed for ages to come. A nation of which the 
legislatois vote as they are bid, and of which the workers surrender 
their rights of selling their labor as they please, has neither the ideas 
nor the sentiments needed for the maintenance of liberty. Lacking 
them, we are on the way back to the rule of the strong hand in the 
shape of the bureaucratic despotism of a socialistic organization, and 
then of a military despotism which must follow it : if, indeed, some 
social crash does not bring this last upon us more quickly. ' ' 



THE EVILS- OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 37 

Matthew Arnold says : " Sages and saints are apt to be severe, it is 
true ; apt to take a gloomy view of the society in which they live, and 
to prognosticate evil of it. But then it must be added that their prog- 
nostications are very apt to turn out right. Plato's account of the 
most gifted and brilliant community of the ancient world, of that 
Athens of his to which we all owe so much, is despondent enough. 
' There is but a very small remnant, ' he says, ' of honest followers of 
wisdom *■•■*■"■* * who have tasted how sweet and blessed a posses- 
sion is wisdom, and who can fully see, moreover, the madness of the 
multitude, and that there is no one, we may say, whose action in pub- 
lic matters is sound. ' 

" Perhaps you will say," Mr. Arnold continues, " that the major- 
ity is sometimes good ; that its impulses are good generally, and its 
action is good occasionally. But it lacks principle, it lacks persist- 
ence ; if to-day its good impulses prevail, they succumb to-morrow ; 
sometimes it goes right, but it is ,very apt to go wrong. Even a pop- 
ular orator, or a popular journalist, will hardly say that the multitude 
may be trusted to have its judgment generally just, and its action gen- 
erally virtuous. It may be better, it is better, that the body of the 
people, with all its faults, should act for itself, and control its own 
affairs. * * * But still, the world being what it is, we must surely 
expect the aims and doings of the majority of men to be at present 
very faulty, and this in a numerous community no less than in a small 
one. * * * Admit that for the world, as we hitherto know it, 
what the philosophers and prophets say is true : that the majority are 
unsound. Even in nations with exceptional gifts, even in the Jewish 
state, the Athenian state, the majority are unsound. But there is the 
remnant. Now the important thing as regards states such as Judah 
and Athens, is not that the remnant bears but a small proportion to the 
majority : the great thing for states like Judah and Athens is, that the 
remnant must in positive bulk be so small, and therefore so powerless 
for reform. To be a voice outside the state, speaking to mankind or 
to the future, perhaps shaking the actual state to pieces in doing so, 
one man will suffice. To reform the state in order to save it, to pre- 
serve it by changing it, a body of wr,rkers is needed as well as a leader 
— a considerable bod)' of workers, placed at many points and operating 



$8 THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 

in many directions. * * * In our great modern states,, where the 
scale of things is so large, it does seem as if the remnant might be so 
increased as to become an actual power, even though the majority be 
unsound. Then the lover of wisdom may come out from under his 
wall, the lover of goodness will not be alone among the wild beasts. 
To enable the remnant to succeed, a large strengthening of its numbers 
is everything." 

One of the main objects of the reform which is advocated in this 
volume and which has been variously designated as minority represen- 
tation, proportional representation and personal representation is to 
give what Matthew Arnold calls ' ' the righteous remnant ' ' or the 
minority a chance to succeed arid to exercise its due influence and 
power. It, of course, would be optimistic to assume that minorities are 
always righteous but it would be safe to assert, and be quite true, that 
the righteous remnant is always a minority. What is proposed and 
intended by minority representation is to give to each minority a share 
of the members in the representative body proportional to its share in 
the electoral body, along with such influence as it may be able to obtain 
by the opportunity for statement and discussion of its opinions in the 
legislative assembly. This ought not to be confounded, as it very 
often is, with government by a minority. Its purpose and effect would 
be to give a more perfect representation to every considerable and 
influential body of opinion in the whole electorate, and thus a more 
perfect representation of all, and therefore of the real majority. Such 
representation would include the ' ' righteous remnants. ' ' It would give 
us a system under which the electors as a whole, and not merely a 
majority, would be represented ; under which minorities would always 
have a hearing, while the majority would be sure of their just prepon- 
derance. 

In this view of the case some reformers believe that a better method 
of electing representatives for our national, state and municipal gov- 
erning bodies may be, and in fact has been, found and adopted and 
which will be explained. 

It has been pointed out, and most voters have had occasion to 
experience, that they have little or absolutely no power of choice in 
the selection of candidates who are chosen. These — to use the vernac- 



THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 39 

ular of the practical politicians — are ' ' fixed ' ' by the managers of the 
political primary meetings and organizations in which the independent 
voter generally can have little or no voice. In voting he must 
nearly always accept one of two candidates in the nomination of neither 
of whom has he had any influence. If he votes with the minority he is 
— at any rate so far as his opinions and interests differ from those of 
the opposing party and its candidate — unrepresented. 

That such a system should fail ' ' to call to the occupation of power 
the scattered and incomplete fragments of reason, justice and truth — 
or " the righteous remnants" which exist in society ought perhaps 
not to surprise us. Instead of government of and for the People by 
those who are qualified it has given us in too many cases government 
of all the People for and by Political ' ' Bosses. ' ' Free, full, and 
JUST representation of the people, qualified to exercise political 
power, is the fundamental principle on which all just republican gov- 
ernment is dependent and it is by the adoption of this principle that 
liberty has always been achieved and maintained. 

There is abundant evidence to show that under our existing sys- 
tem representation is not Free, nor full, nor JUST. How can we 
secure more liberty in the choice of our representatives, how can we 
have our own views and interests more completely represented, how 
can we have fair play in elections ? 



CHAPTER IV. 



THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 



Those who have seen and felt the injustice and the evils of our 
present method of electing representatives have proposed various ex- 
pedients by which the evil may be, in a greater or lesser degree, miti- 
gated. These schemes all have the one feature in common, that of 
uniting or grouping neighboring districts together and electing more 
than one representative from each of the consolidated districts. It 
should be clearly understood that such an enlargement of districts by 
consolidating a number of small ones, does not imply an increase in 
the total number of representatives to be elected. It only means that 
instead of electing one representative in each of say three small dis- 
tricts that these districts shall be united so as to form one larger one, 
and the three members will then all be elected from it, and each voter 
will be given the privilege of voting for any or all of these different 
candidates. The plan contemplates the consolidation of small dis- 
tricts into larger ones, and apportioning the present number of repre- 
sentatives among the enlarged districts. 

Some method is then provided by which the voter can either vote 
for a number of candidates or can concentrate his voting power on one 
or two. 

To make this quite clear it may be explained that in the State of 
New York, and most other states, only one member of the legislature 
is elected from each district. Usually there are then only two candi- 
dates in each district, one Republican the other a Democrat, and often 
neither of them fit men for the office, and not infrequently both dis- 
reputable. Notwithstanding this the voter has no other choice — he 
must vote for either one or the other or lose his vote. 

In the State of Illinois, to provide, in a measure, against these evils 
what is called " cumulative voting " has been adopted. Under this 
system the districts have been so formed that three members of the 

40 



THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 4 1 

House of Representatives are elected from each district and the con- 
stitution of that state provides . that ' ' each voter may cast as many 
votes for one candidate as there are representatives to be elected, or may 
distribute the same, or equal parts thereof, among the candidates as he 
shall see fit, and the candidates highest in votes shall be declared elect- 
ed. ' ' In other words a voter may cast three votes for one candidate, 
or one and a half for one and one and a half for another, or one each 
for three candidates. Representing three candidates by letters and the 
votes by numerals, they may be given in any of the three following ways : 

A — 3 votes 



A — \y 2 votes 


A — 1 vote 


b— iy 2 « 


B— 1 " 




C— 1 " 



These votes may, of course, be given to any candidates the voter 
may select. To show the working of this, it will be assumed that in 
some district of Illinois there are 9680 Democratic and 4920 Republican 
voters. Having estimated their numbers before the election, the 
Democrats knowing that they had a majority would nominate two 
candidates and each Democratic voter could cast 1 j4 votes for each 
candidate. They would then each receive 14,520 votes. The Republi- 
cans being in a minority would nominate only one, and they would 
each cast three votes, or " plump " for him, as it is called, so that he 
would receive 14,760 votes. It will thus be seen that both parties in 
this district were represented, the Democrats being in a majority elect 
two candidates and the Republicans one. 

The party having a bare majority can always, under this system, 
elect two candidates, and if the minority have more than a fourth as 
many votes as their antagonists they can elect one member. This 
system thus gives not only a representation to both parties, under the 
conditions named, but it also gives much greater freedom to the voters 
than the old system of electing single members from the different dis- 
tricts does, and it has therefore been very properly called by its chief 
advocate, the late Senator Charles R. Buckalew, free voting. Its 
freedom consists in this, that the voter can vote for any one or all 
of three candidates, any or all of whom may be elected. Under the 
ordinary system only one candidate can be elected in a district. 



42 THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 

Next, if the voter has a preference for any candidate over others, 
he can give all his votes for the one, for two, or for three if he chooses. 
It thus facilitates independent voting. If unfit candidates are nomi- 
nated, it gives very much greater opportunities of success to a revolt- 
ing, bolting or independent party, because the bolters can concentrate 
their votes on one candidate. As has been explained, any candidate 
may be elected if he gets all the votes of more than a fourth of the 
voters. That is, by uniting a fourth of the voters -{- i in any district, 
they can always elect a representative of their own. Thus in most of 
the districts in southern Illinois, the Democrats have large majorities. 
Under the ordinary system, of electing single representatives from each 
district, the Republicans in that part of the state would not be rep- 
resented, but under the method of cumulative or "free " voting, which 
has been established in that state, if the Republicans in any district 
have more than a fourth of the voters, they can elect a repre- 
sentative. In the northern part of Illinois the reverse condition of 
things exists. There the Republicans predominate, and if there was 
no freedom of voting, most of the Democrats from that section would 
be unrepresented. 

The system of free voting thus gives both parties a representation 
proportionate to their numbers. It has the advantage that it gives a 
7inmber of voters much smaller than a majority the power to elect their 
own representative. In most sections of the country the labor party 
has no representatives, for the reason that there are comparatively few 
or no districts in which they have a majority of the votes. Under the 
system of free voting which prevails in Illinois, if the party can control 
more than a fourth of the votes in any district they could elect a can- 
didate. The same is true of any other class of people. If those "who are 
most intelligent, who have been industrious, frugal and prudent, and 
who have consequently accumulated property, and who pay the taxes, 
fear God and love righteousness, desire a representative it is within their 
power to elect one if they unite, and if they can control the requisite 
fourth of the votes plus one or more. In other words, it gives any 
class of voters exceeding one-fourth of all in any district, the power of 
electing their own representative. 



CHAPTER V. 

CUMULATIVE OR ' ' FREE ' ' VOTING. 

The system of cumulative or " free ' ' voting which has been described 
was adopted in the constitution of the State of Illinois in 1870 and has 
been in use ever since 1872. There has therefore been abundant op- 
portunity of ascertaining its merits and demerits from practical experi- 
ence. In order to get the testimony of persons in different parts of that 
state who have had opportunities of observing the working and the re- 
sults of this system, a circular of inquiry was prepared by the writer 
and sent to persons interested in public affairs in different parts of Illi- 
nois. The following is a copy of that circular : 

New York, November 25, 1893. 
Dear Sir-. 

A Convention has been called and delegates have been chosen at 
the recent election in the State of New York for the revision of its 
constitution. In view of this a number of persons in the city of New 
York are considering the advisability of recommending the adoption 
of provisions for some form of cumulative voting, for the election of 
members ot our municipal and state legislative bodies, similar to the 
system by which the members of the House of Representatives in the 
State of Illinois are now elected. Under it, as you are doubtless 
aware, three representatives are elected from each district and ea( h 
voter may cast as many votes for them as there are representatives to 
be elected, which he may distribute as he likes. Some of the persons 
here who are interested in this subject desire very much to get infor- 
mation with reference to the practical working of cumulative voting 
in your state, and it is with that object in view that this circular is 
sent to you, and to others who have opportunities of judging of the 
merits and demerits of the system referred to. You will be doing a 
favor to some of the friends of good government and giving that cause 
valuable assistance by answering the following inquiries and giving 
any other information concerning the operation and effects of cumu- 
lative voting in your state, which may throw light on that subject. 

1st. Does the system of cumulative voting which has been adopted 

43 



44 CUMULATIVE OR "FREE VOTING. 

in Illinois for the election of representatives to the legislature accom- 
plish the object for which it was intended ; that is, does it give the 
minority party in your district, whichever it may be, a representative 
in the legislature? 

2d. What effect does it have on the nomination of candidates for 
office? In other words are better and more intelligent candidates 
nominated and elected than were chosen under the old system of 
electing one member from each district ? 

3d. Is there any practical difficulty in the operation of the system, 
either through the ignorance of voters, or of inspectors of election, in 
counting the votes or in any other way ? 

4th. Is there more or less opportunity under this than under the 
old system for bribery and corruption, false or erroneous counting ? 

5th. It has been objected to this system that if a very popular man 
is nominated that an undue proportion of the votes in his district may 
be concentrated on him and that the remaining two candidates might 
thus be elected by a small minority — in your experience is this often 
or ever the case? 

6th. Do you consider the system a fair and just one, to all parties 
concerned; does it promote good government, or is the old system 
now in use in all other states, of electing only one representative from 
each district and giving each voter only one vote to be preferred ? 

7th. Would it be advantageous to increase the size of the districts 
so as to elect five, seven or more representatives from each, and give 
the voter the privilege of casting as many votes as there are representa- 
tives to be elected, and cumulate them as he chooses ? 

8th. In your opinion would there be any advantage in adopting 
the cumulative system for the election of members of Congress or mem- 
bers of boards of aldermen in cities? 

9th. Can you suggest any other system or method of electing rep- 
resentatives which in your judgment would secure the election of better 
men or improve legislation ? 

10th. The parties making the inquiries request that you will add 
below any further comments or suggestions as will aid them in getting 
full and correct information concerning the advantages and disad- 
vantages of cumulative voting, as it has been adopted in your state. 

Name, 

Sign here, 

Address, „_ _ 



Partv Politics. 



CUMULATIVE OR "FREE VOTING. 45 

When replies to the above inquiries have been written enclose this 
circular and. mail it in the envelope addressed to 

M. N. Forney, 

47 Cedar St., New York City. 

Copies of this circular of inquiry were sent to the editors of papers 
in all parts of the State of Illinois, and additional copies were also en- 
closed in stamped blank envelopes with the request to the editor that 
he should address the envelopes to persons in his district who are in- 
terested in public affairs, and who would likely give intelligent replies 
to the inquiries. In all about 150 replies were received, which of 
course represented a wide range of opinion and of varying degrees 
of intelligence. 

The answers to the first question : 

Does the system of cumulative voting which has been adopted in Illi- 
nois/or the election of representatives to the legislature accomplish the 
object for which it was intended ; that is, does it give the minority party 
in your district, whichever it may be, a representative in the legislature ? 
were almost unanimous in the opinion that the system of cumulative 
voting does give the minority party representation. The following are 
a few of these answers received from Democrats, the residence of the re- 
spondent being given in italics : 

" It does. In my judgment it is one of the best laws ever en- 
acted, and prevents dangerous majorities. Minorities always are rep- 
resented." Dem. Mattoon. 

" Yes. And in every other district in the state, thus distributing 
party representation throughout the state, instead of consolidating the 
respective party representation in localities. ' ' Dem. Austin, Cook Co. 

" Yes. It meets all expectations. There have been but two or 
t^ree instances in the whole State of Illinois since 1870, when the con- 
stitution was adopted where any district has had more than two of the 
three members of the House from the same party. ' ' Dem. Charleston. 

" It does almost always. Sometimes the minority is so smallthat the 
dominant party in a district nominates and elects the entire number 
required, but this happens infrequently. " Dem. Chicago. 

"We are here in the 47th Senatoral District ; since the cumulative 
system of voting has been adopted the two leading parties (Democratic 



46 CUMULATIVE OR ' ' FREE " VOTING. 

and Republican) have made it a practice to place only two candidates 
each in the field. The Democrats are in the majority but the Republi- 
cans never fail to secure one representative. ' ' Dem. East St. Louis. 

'•Yes, the majority party has found it impossible after several 
attempts to elect their candidates." Dem. 'Chester. 

* ' Yes, except on extraordinary occasions. ' ' Dem. Monmouth. 

" Yes, when the guess of the minority and the guess of the majority 
in nominating conventions are correct." Dem. Chicago. 

' ' Yes, it gives one representative to the minority but sometimes at 
the expense of the majority which is traded or bought. ' ' Dem. Flora. 

" It does. Still w r hen the vote between the parties is very close 
each party having two candidates and three to be elected it results that 
some popular candidate draws from his running mate and the minority 
party elects two of the three representatives. ' ' Dem. Carlyle. 

' ' Yes. We the Democrats always have our tickets printed i j4 votes 
for each candidate and always nominate just two candidates and elect 
them, only giving the Republicans one representative. " Dem. Carlyle, 
Clinton Co. 

' ' Yes. It has very seldom been attempted by any one party to 
elect all the representatives in a district and w T hen tried it has failed. ' ' 
Dem. Pontiac. 

1 ' In my district the minority party as shown by the election of 
1892 elected two representatives and the majority party but one. This 
was caused by the tidal wave of that year. The district when formed 
was largely Republican and the Democrats named but one man, hence 
the above result. ' ' Dem. Evanston. 

"I can't say that it fully accomplishes the intended result. It 
gives the minority party one representative, and at one election the 
third party elected one man — only once though." Dem. Hava?ia. 
The following replies were received from Republicans : 

"Yes, as a whole. The longer it is in force the better the people 
understand it and the smoother it works. " Rep. Collinsville . 

" It does fully, and has never failed I believe in giving the minority 
a representation. ' ' Rep. Dixon. 

' ' In all districts where the minority party have one-third of the 
votes they seldom, or never, fail to get one representative. I am in a 



CUMULATIVE OR "FREE" VOTING. 47 

part of the old 34th district. We Republicans never failed to get one 
member against an odds of 2000 majority." Rep. Havana. 

"The minority in this district never has failed to elect a member 
under our present system of legislative voting. I never have known it 
to fail in any case in the' state. ' ' Rep. Champaign. 

' ' It does except in districts where the minority party has less than 
one fourth of the entire vote. ' ' Rep. Ottawa. 

"It does. This district is so strongly Democratic that without it 
the Republicans could have no representative. As it is the Republicans 
always elect one of the three representatives, thus the minority of our 
district is heard. ' ' Rep. Beardstown. 

' ' It does. In this district the Democrats are very much in the 
minority but by casting the three votes alone each voter (one for each 
representative) for their own nominee he is elected." Rep. Elgin. 

' ' Yes ; and by reason of the temptation to plumping — that is 
cumulating three votes on one canditate — it frequently enables the 
minority party to elect two of the three members." Rep. Chicago. 

"Yes. It always gives the minority one and sometimes two. 
All accidents result in favor of the minority, Avhich not infrequently 
elects two members because of an unequal division of the majority 
vote between two candidates. ' ' Rep. Springfield. 

' i Under the cumulative system the minority party has always had a 
representative, and sometimes two, when there was more ' plumping ' 
on one side than on the other." Rep. Warsaw. 

' ' It does. Sometimes, though rarely, it gives a third and weaker 
party a representative instead of the party second in strength. ' ' Rep. 
Bushnell. 

"Yes, invariably. The Republicans might elect three, if every 
voter cast one vote straight for each candidate, but they always concede 
one candidate to the opposite party for prudential reasons. ' ' Rep. 
Naperville. 

" It does, and may give two if the stronger party do not put up 
good men. ' ' Rep. Beardstown. 

' ' Yes, it does in every district in the state. At the first election 
held under the law there was one district so strong Republican that 
they elected all three representatives." Rep. Effingliam. 



48 CUMULATIVE* OR " FREE " VOTING. 

To show from the election returns what effect this system has 
on an election in the whole state and to compare the results with those 
in the State of New York the returns of the election of members of the 
legislature in 1892 in Illinois have been plotted in a diagram, Fig. 
4, p. 23, which is similar to Fig. 3, which represents the vote in 
the State of New York, in the* same year. Inasmuch as each voter 
in Illinois has three votes, the votes cast for each candidate have been 
divided by three in order that the diagram may be "comparable with 
Fig. 3, which represents the results of the New York election. 

Before comparing the two diagrams a little further explanation is 
needed. In those districts in Illinois in which the two prominent parties 
are nearly equal, it happens often that each is sanguine enough to think 
that they can elect two candidates to the House of Representatives, and 
consequently they each put two in the field. As only three can be 
elected of course one of the four must be defeated. This was the case 
in the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th districts. In each of the first two, 
two Democrats were elected and one Republican, and in the third two 
Republicans and one Democrat. In the 1st and 2d districts a Repub- 
lican was defeated in each, and in the third a Democrat. Now in the 
first two it cannot be said that the Republicans were not represented. 
They had one member for each district, but were not fully represented 
according to their numbers. This is also true of the Democrats in the 
3d district. The areas A, B, and C, Fig. 4, which represent the 
votes cast for the unsuccessful candidates, are therefore shaded with 
dark horizontal lines, and show the voters who were only partially 
represented. The small black areas represent the scattering voters 
who cast their votes for Prohibition, Populist and Labor party candi- 
dates, none of whom were elected. 

A comparison of the two diagrams, Figs. 3 and 4, the one rep- 
resenting the vote in the State of New York under the old system of 
single representatives from each district, and the other that in Illinois 
under free voting, shows very distinctly the relative number of voters 
who are unrepresented in the two states — the black areas in both cases 
indicating the unrepresented, or practically disfranchised, and the dark 
areas in Fig. 4 those who were only partially represented. By com- 
paring these two diagrams, the black areas show at a glance how very 



CUMULATIVE OR "FREE VOTING. 49 

much greater the number of unrepresented voters was in the State of 
New York, under our present system of electing one representative 
from each district, than it was in Illinois when three representatives 
are elected by a system of free voting. 

The observations of John Stuart Mill again serve our purpose best 
in commenting on the kind of injustice which the diagram shows, 
resulted from the election in New York. The only answer he says 
"which can possibly be made is, that as different opinions predomi- 
nate in different localities, the opinion which is in a minority in some 
places has a majority in others ; and, on the whole, every opinion 
which exists in the constituencies obtains its fair share of voices 
in the representation. * * * The constituencies to which 
most of. the highly educated and public-spirited persons in the 
country belong, those of the large towns, are now in great part 
either unrepresented or misrepresented. The electors who are on 
a different side in party politics from the local majority are mis- 
represented. Of those who are on the same side, a large propor- 
tion are misrepresented, having been obliged to accept the man who 
had the greatest number of supporters in their political party, though 
his opinions may differ from theirs in every other point. * * * 
Speaking generally, the choice of the majority is determined by that 
portion of the body who are the most timid, the most narrow-minded 
and prejudiced, or who cling most tenaciously to the exclusive class 
interest." 

In addition to what Mill has so forcibly said it may be added 
that it is but a slight satisfaction for a Republican merchant or banker 
in New York City, who is denied representation in the state legisla- 
ture, to know that a rural member from St. Lawrence or Chemung 
county, who belongs to the same party, will vote to levy taxes or 
legislate on financial affairs for him ; nor will a Democrat in Catta- 
raugus feel compensated for the defeat of his party in his own county, 
by the knowledge that his views and interests will be looked after at 
Albany, by a Tammany heeler from the slums of New York City. 
Under a system of free voting the Republican merchant or banker of 
New York could help to elect a member who would coincide with his 
views and opinions and who would understand and could and would 



50 CUMULATIVE OR "FREE VOTING. 

represent his interests, and the Democratic farmer in Chautauqua could 
help to send some one to the assembly who was sound on the oleo- 
margarine and other rural questions. Free voting permits minorities 
in all sections to be represented, and thus gives to every body of men 
who cannot appear in the legislature in person, the right claimed by 
Franklin, ' ' to appear by an agent. ' ' 

From the almost unanimous testimony of many witnesses in all 
parts of the states who replied to the circular which was sent to them, 
and who gave their answers quite independently of each other, and 
also from the returns of the state election in Illinois in 1892 which 
have been plotted in Fig. 4 it is shown conclusively that the system 
of cumulative or free voting which has been adopted in that state, does 
give the minority party, in every district in which it has more than a 
fourth of the votes, a representative in the legislature. As a matter of 
fact there was not a single district in Illinois in 1892 in which one 
party elected all three of the representatives, although that might and 
has happened when the minority party had less than a fourth of all the 
votes in some districts. 

Whatever may be thought of the cumulative system it must be 
conceded that through it minorities are represented. Is this a desirable 
result or is it not? 

In a report to the U. S. Senate made on March 2, 1869, Mr. Buck- 
alew from the Select Committee on Representative Reform said : 

" By the free vote the whole mass of electors are brought into di- 
rect relations with government, and particularly with that department 
or branch of government which makes the laws. All will participate 
really in choosing representatives, and all will be represented in fact. 
Now, the beaten body of electors choose nothing, unless it be mo7'tifica- 
tio?i, and are not represented at all. For the theory that they are rep- 
resented by the successful candidates against whom they have voted — 
that these candidates when installed in office represent them — is plainly 
false. An elected official represents the opinions and the will of those 
Avho choose him, and not of those who oppose his selection. As to 
the latter he is an antagonist and not a representative ; for his opinions 
are opposed to theirs, and their will he will not execute. And this 
must always be the case when political parties act upon elections and a 



CUMULATIVE OR "FREE VOTING. 5 1 

majority or plurality rule assigns to one party the whole representation 
of the constituency. ' ' 

Testimony regarding the working of the system of free voting in 
Illinois, which will be quoted later, make the following extract from a 
report made to the British Parliament by Lord Cairns, to show the 
advantages which would be gained by having minorities represented, 
appear prophetic. In that report he said : 

' ' You will have from the same constituency two members repre- 
senting the majority and one representing the minority, communicating 
freely with each other, and without the slightest tinge of jealousy or 
apprehension that the interests of one would jar or conflict with the 
interests of the other in the constituency. * * * Again, with 
regard to the constituency itself — and this is one of the most impor- 
tant views of the case — observe the advantages which would be gained : 
First, I believe that you would gain the greatest possible local satisfac- 
faction ; there is nothing so irksome to those who form the minority of one 
of those large constituencies as finding that from the mere force of num- 
bers they are virtually excluded from the exercise of any political power; 
that it is vain for them to attempt to take any part in public affairs ; 
that the elections must go in one direction, and that they have no po- 
litical power whatever. On the one hand the result is great dissatisfac- 
tion, and on the other it is disinclination on the part of those who form 
the minority to take any part in affairs in which it is important they 
should take a prominent and conspicuous part. ' ' 

Mr. Calhoun, who was a profound student of our institutions and 
who foresaw some of the dangers in store for as, said * : 

" The right of suffrage is, indeed, the indispensable and primary 
principle ; but it would be a great and dangerous mistake to suppose, 
as many do, that it is of itself sufficient to form constitutional govern- 
ments. To this erroneous opinion," he adds, "may be traced 
one of the causes why so few attempts to form constitutional govern- 
ments have succeeded ; and why, of the few which have, so small a 
number have had a durable existence. It has led not only to mistakes 
in the attempt to form such governments, but to their overthrow, when 
they have, by some good fortune, been correctly formed. So far from 

*" A Disquisition on Government." 



5 2 CUMULATIVE OR " FREE " VOTING. 

being of itself sufficient — however well guarded it might be, and how- 
ever enlightened the people — it would, unaided by other provisions, 
leave the government as absolute as it would be in the hands of irre- 
sponsible rulers, and with a tendency, at least as strong, towards op- 
pression and abuse of its powers. * * * * The dominant party 
for the time," he repeats, '-would have the same tendency to op- 
pression and abuse of power which, without the right of suffrage, irre- 
sponsible rulers would have. No reason, indeed, can be assigned why 
the latter would abuse their power, which would not apply with equal 
force to the former. The dominant majority for the time would in 
reality, through the right of suffrage, be the rulers — the controlling, 
governing, and irresponsible power — and those who make and execute 
the laws would for the time in reality be but their representatives and 
agents. ' ' And he proceeds to show that the abuse of the power which 
would thus be acquired could only be counteracted by giving to each 
division, or interest, through its appropriate organ, a concurrent vote. 

The American Proportional Representation League, in an address 
issued in the first number of its Quarterly Review says : 

' ' Thoughtful, earnest citizens are confronted with the fact that 
wherever reform must be obtained through political action, that action 
is delayed, if not prevented, by a system of representation which fails 
to accomplish the purpose for which it was intended. The various 
reformers, as they approach the law making bodies, whether they be 
city councils, state legislatures or national congresses and parliaments, 
find that that branch of government which should reflect in miniature 
the whole country, instead mirrors the opinions of only a privileged 
few. Though these reformers may number a considerable part of the 
body politic, they find it impossible to secure representation in the 
halls of legislature. 

"The effect of this state of affairs has been to create a feeling of 
recklessness on the part of some men and of apathy on the part of 
others. Some propose to right their grievances by force ; others give 
up the fight and withdraw from the field in disgust. All are prone to 
despair when they realize the Herculean task of securing a hearing of 
the so-called representatives of the people. ' ' 



CHAPTER VI. 

FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 

In propounding a system of free voting as a remedy for some of 
the evils which have been described the objection is often made by 
those who have little or no knowledge of any such systems that 
they are all "theoretical," "impracticable," or "academic," and 
are altogether unworkable, and as a climax to such arguments 
those who use them call all who advocate any such system ' ' doc- 
trinaires. " Practical politicians and chronic objectors, who are igno- 
rant of the fact that this system has been in successful use in Illinois, 
and elsewhere, for more than twenty years, tell us with great assump- 
tion of superior wisdom that such schemes are all very well in theory, 
but in practice they will not work, and have a great deal to say about 
ignorant voters, corrupt election inspectors, wily politicians and gen- 
eral popular stupidity. Fractional votes are especially objected to, on 
the ground that ignorant voters could not comprehend them, and that 
stupid inspectors of election could not count them ; and that such a 
system of voting would open the door to much corruption, and would 
facilitate and lead to miscounting. For the reason that such objec- 
tions are so frequently made and in order to get some testimony with 
reference to the practical difficulties encountered in the operation of 
the system, the third question in the circular of inquiry was pro- 
pounded. This was as follows : 

3d. Is there any practical difficulty in the operation of the system, 
either through the ignorance of voters, or of inspectors of election, in 
counting the votes, or in any other way ? 

To this a very large majority of those who replied answered it 
with a simple negative, and gave testimony that there was no practical 
difficulty in the operation of the system, and only a very small pro- 
portion of those who answered spoke of any trouble at all. The fol- 
lowing are a few of the answers received : 

" Was at first, as with all new rules, but none are now experi- 
enced." Rep. Beardstown. 

53 



54 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 

"I think not. It is easily learned and used, and the inspectors 
learn to count such votes readily. ' ' Rep. Naperville. 

' ' None to speak of. Voters sometimes wish to change their votes 
and ask for instruction. In my experience for eight years as a town 
officer do not remember of a lost vote. ' ' Rep. Carrollton. 

•' ' No ; the difficulties feared with regard to counting of votes under 
the various systems proposed by reformers are about wholly imaginary. ' ' 
Dem. Chicago. 

" No ; I have served on many boards — no trouble at all." Dem. 
Charleston. 

' ' Not in this state. The tickets being printed thus — if three repre- 
sentatives, two on majority and one on minority. The majority tickets 
give i Yo votes to each candidate, the minority 3 votes to its candidate. ' ' 
Rep. Virden. 

" None. ij4 votes each are placed on the ballots opposite the 
majority candidates' names, and 3 votes opposite the name of the mi- 
nority candidate." Rep. Manchester. 

" None whatever. All understand it and everything works like a 
charm. Tickets are printed i}4 votes for A and B each and 3 votes 
for C and thus there is no trouble." Rep. Joliet. 

" It has always been very simple at our place as the majority party 
get two out of three representees, they print their tickets : 
John Jones, i}4 votes. 
Frank Link, i}4 votes." 

Rep. Paris. 

" No difficulty in either point or in any respect. The central com- 
mittee generally has one vote for each of three candidates printed on 
the ticket, ij4 if two, or three votes if only one candidate." Rep. 
' Naperville. 

" If strict party ticket is voted by electors, no difficulty. In off 
years under the Australian ballot system some difficulty is experienced 
by ' scratchers ' and there is the mischief to play often. ' ' Rep. East 
St. Louis. 

• * Under the Australian system the ignorant or timid voter votes the 
ticket as printed, whereas if they had intelligence or confidence they 
would plump on one candidate. Counting is no objection." Joliet. 



FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 55 

" None upon which any opposition to the system could be based. 
There is certainly some difficulty inasmuch as it taxes the attention of 
election clerks more severely than a simpler system." Dem. East St. 
Louis. 

A few — not exceeding a half dozen — of those who have replied to the 
inquiries in the circular say that there is some difficulty in working cumu- 
lative voting with the Australian ballot system, or was, when the latter 
was first introduced. A few more of the respondents say that some- 
times inspectors of election have difficulty in counting up fractional 
votes, but the general tenor of the testimony collected from all parts of 
the state shows in the most indisputable way, that there is no practical 
difficulty at all in the operation of this method of voting. It may be 
"theoretical," it maybe "academic," and not in accord with the 
tenets or interests of " practical politics," nevertheless it works with 
little or no friction, and it only needs the lubrication of the good will 
of those who believe in justice and righteousness as principles which 
should control the adminstration of government to make it work satis- 
factorily anywhere. To those who recklessly stigmatize the system as 
' ' impracticable ' ' and ' ' unworkable, ' ' and who generally belong to 
that large class of people who deem it superfluous to consider whether 
any measure is right or wrong, wise or unwise before condemning it, it 
may be said that twenty-two years of favorable experience with this 
system, in a great state like Illinois, is strong testimony to prove that 
at least it \?> practicable, and to the charge that it is " unworkable " it 
maybe answered that it does wo?'k and has worked successfully and sat- 
isfactorily for nearly a quarter of a century, in communities differing as 
widely in their characteristics as the rural districts of ' ' Egypt " * do 
from the cosmopolitan society of Chicago. 

To get the general opinions of people familiar with the working of 
cumulative voting in Illinois, of the merits and advantages of that sys- 
tem as exemplified by its operation in that state, the following question 
v/as included in the circular of inquiry : 

6th. " Do you consider the system (of cumulative voting) a fair and 
just one to all parties concerned ; does it promote good government, or is 



The southern part of Illinois is jocosely called " Egypt. " 



50 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 

the old system, now in use in all other states, of electing only one rep- 
resentative from each district and giving each voter only one vote to be 
preferred ? ' ' 

One hundred and thirty-six replies were received to the circular. 
Of these 68 came from Republicans, 43 of whom were decidedly in 
favor of the Illinois system of cumulative voting, 20 were opposed to 
it and 5 were doubtful. Of the 58 Democrats who answered 43 were 
in favor of, 9 were opposed to, and 6 were doubtful concerning its 
merits. Four Prohibitionists were in favor and 1 opposed to it \ the 
3 independents and 2 Populists were all in favor of it. The opinions 
therefore as expressed by respondents to the circular, who were scat- 
tered all over the state, were 95 in favor, 30 opposed to and 11 doubt- 
ful about the merits of cumulative or free voting. 

Quotations from some of the answers received to the question last 
quoted will be a tolerably good indication of the opinions of people 
in Illinois with reference to the advantages and disadvantages of the 
system of voting and electing representatives in their state. A con- 
siderable proportion of those who answered the question simply ex- 
pressed their preference of the cumulative plan to the old method of 
electing single representatives. The following replies will, however, 
give some idea of how it is regarded by persons interested in the ad- 
ministration of public affairs in that state : 

4 i All things considered, it is a good system. It keeps both parties 
alert in every corner of the state, and the minority gets its deserts 
rather better than it otherwise could. " Independent. Chicago. 

il It helps in that it prevents a big party majority. For instance, in 
the Illinois senate Democrats have a good working majority. In the 
House they have so little that the members must all attend. ' ' Mug- 
wump. Decatur. 

1 ' All are satisfied apparently with the law and its workings. ' ' Pro- 
hibitionist. Bunker Hill. 

"It is better than the old plan, but not so effective nor just and 
wise as the quota system would be. There are no objections to the Illi- 
nois law that could not be remedied by an extension of the idea, so as to 
give minority parties representation in law-making bodies, and at the 
same time do entire justice to majorities." Populist. Joliet. 



FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 5/ 

" In my opinion it is the best and fairest system ever devised to 
obtain a representation of all parties. I was a member of the Consti- 
tutional Convention which adopted the minority plan in 1870, and I 
have also served as a member of the state senate in 1877 and 1879, 
and have had an opportunity of seeing the practical working of the 
scheme, and I have found that the best members of the lower house 
were formed of the minority members, and that the best character of 
the legislation was favored by them and enacted into laws through their 
efforts and influence. Through them corrupt legislation and the efforts 
of the ward politicians of cities, of the majority party who break into 
the legislature by party strength can be checkmated and prevented." 
Dem. Carmi. 

' ' I think our system a fair one and that it is here to stay. The 
cumulative system of voting has the distinct advantage of being an ob- 
stacle in the way of gerrymandering and other schemes of professional 
politicians." Dem. Havana. 

' ' I think our way the better. It is a good law because it permits 
the minority party to have a representative to look after their interests 
and introduces measures beneficial to that party. It causes the masses to 
take more interest in legislation and this is the only hope of our country. 
Every party should be able to invite investigation. ' ' Dem. Jerseyville. 

" I have had doubts on the subject, but I believe I would not favor 
a change from the present mode. By cumulative voting both parties 
in each district are pretty certain to be represented in the legislature, 
so that the whole people of each district is more likely to take an interest 
in the legislature than if a portion of such people had no representative 
of their political faith. . The representatives themselves will be in con- 
sultation with the people and work up this interest which I deem ben- 
eficial. People like to consult representatives of their own political 
faith." Dem. East St. Louis. 

" I prefer the cumulative system as used in this state. Our several 
tickets are printed on one sheet of paper, Dem., Rep., Peo. and Pro. 
A voter can cast three votes for any of the candidates, or can vote one 
vote for three candidates, or one-and-a-half votes for two candidates. 
In my opinion it is an excellent system or method of voting." Dem. 
Augusta. 



58 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 

' ' We think the system a fair one and to be preferred to the old 
system. In districts close politically each party is compelled to select 
wisely as to men and to urge an equal divide in voting, or suffer for 
failure to do so. In other districts poor material and the conduct and 
result of campaign cannot be said to be improved by our Illinois 
method." Dem. Murphy sb or 0. 

" I think it is the best system that can be adopted all things con- 
sidered. In this state it gives the minority a chance to be heard m 
the legislature and if they but send good men then they can accomplish 
much. I am decidedly in favor of the system as in vogue here and 
would not consent to a change back to the old way. We certainly get 
as good and as intelligent representatives, and in every district in the 
state the system gives the minority party an opportunity to be repre- 
sented. My advice is to adopt it in every state." Dem. Joliet. 

1 ' I consider the system fair and better than the old system. I 
have had a great deal of actual experience in cumulative voting, hav- 
ing been elected to our General Assembly five times. It gives both 
parties a representative from all sections of the state. It insures the elec- 
tion of better men, as they are compelled to run over a large district, 
and must of necessity be men of standing at home and acquaintance 
abroad. It is usually the unpopular candidate on the ticket that runs 
ahead, as he may induce his friends to cast three votes for him, while 
the popular candidate will urge an equal division of the votes. ' ' Dem. 
McLanesboro. 

li It is fair and just as far as it goes, and an improvement on the 
old system and is better than the old, but it makes party lines too 
close. We do not get a perfectly representative body. The ' quota ' 
system gives a perfect representative body and in addition does away 
with the gerrymander." Dem. Elgin. 

' i I think the system fair and it operates to make a change of controc 
easier to accomplish.''' Dem. Decatur. 

"I prefer our system as it insures the minority a representation 
large enough to criticise with effect." Dem. Alton. 

" It is a most fair system to all, and much preferable to the old 
method. Get a copy of the Illinois law and adopt it as it is together 
with the Australian svstem of voting;." Dem. Mattoon. 



FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 59 

" Yes ; I think the minority system is the better, for under it nei- 
ther party ever obtains an overwhelming majority in the legislature. 
Its merit is that each party has nearly the same representation in the 
General Assembly, the majority for either being small." Dem. Austin, 
Cook Co. 

" I consider the system a fair one for all parties, as it gives all a 
chance to secure representatives in the legislature." Dem. Chester. 

" It is a good plan in the right direction — not perfect but to be 
progressed. The old system is certainly not to be preferred. All the 
people should be represented in all legislative assemblies. The system 
as to minority representation and cumulative voting in Illinois has 
produced good results and is in the right direction, though not yet 
perfect in details of operation." Tariff Reform Dem. Chicago. 

" I like the minority plan. Its sole merit is that it gives all the 
people everywhere a representation, that it more nearly voices the 
people than the majority plan." Dem. Carlyle. 

' ' Yes ; prefer the Illinois system, think it promotes good govern- 
ment." Dem. Pontiac. 

' ' I can conceive of nothing better or fairer in the way of repre- 
senting the people in the popular branch of a state legislature, and 
think it far better than the old one of electing one member from each 
district. One advantage, in my opinion, is the tendency to lessen the 
expenditure of money in the canvass preceding election. To some 
extent this expenditure is made in the primary canvass, but the evils 
resulting from it are not nearly so great or perceptible." Dem. Jack- 
sonville. 

" I feel sure that I am right in saying that the voters of our state 
would not consider a proposition to change the law. After a trial since 
1870, I feel sure that it is universally satisfactory. There is always a 
good minority representation, which is surely a good thing for the 
people." Dem. Monmouth. 

"The system is fair, and is to be commended more on account of 
giving all classes representation than for any other cause." Dem. 
Metropolis. 

"Think it somewhat to be preferred, as giving minorities in cities 
and counties a hearing, it does not greatly change political com- 



60 TREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 

plexion of our legislature, but parties have representatives from all 
parts of the state, instead of from the strongholds only." Dem. 
Quincy. 

" I consider the system far superior to the old and believe that the 
people are thus better represented. " Dem. Macomb. 

• • Yes ; it makes the parties careful to nominate stronger men, than 
they would if one party had a big majority, and yet very shallow men, 
as a rule, run for the House." Dem. Charleston. 

1 ' I think that this system combined with the Australian ballot sys- 
tem gives the people an opportunity to choose the best men nominated 
regardless of party politics. Any man with an objectionable record, 
placed in nomination by either party, would be minus votes at the final 
count of ballots. Dem. East St. Louis. 

The following are answers received from Republicans. 

• •' It is eminently fair and just to all parties, and tends to promote 
good government because it gives all views of respectable following a 
chance to be heard, and, from a non-partisan view is to be preferred. 
It insures a fair representation of the minority in spite of gerrymander- 
In the districts where the strength of the parties is not equally 
divided and the strength of neither party will justify placing three 
candidates on their ticket, the majority party usually nominates two 
and the minority but one candidate ; the fight having been settled 
in the primaries. If nearly even, each party puts up two and the 
unpopular or unfit candidate must go. The same when the strength is 
such that one party puts up three and the other two candidates, thus 
forcing the selection of good men. Put up a good man and a bad one 
on the same ticket, if his party gives the good one three votes it will 
defeat the bad one." Rep. Carmi. 

" There is room for more than one opinion here, but as a general 
thing the plan is satisfactory. I think the objections to the plan come 
from the majority party as the law works to the advantage of the min- 
ority, giving them better representation." Rep. Shelbyville. 

" I consider the system fair and just and lias a tendency to promote 
good government. I know that it is better than the old system. ' ' Rep. 
Altamont. 

"The system is beneficial locally in eliminating partisan bitterness. 



FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 6 1 

As all three of the candidates are sure of election there is no tempta- 
tion to make a fight against them." Rep. White Hall. 

• • The system seems to work well in our state, since we have got 
used to it. Take a large section of country where heretofore one party 
took all. It is now divided which seems to give better satisfaction. 
Rep. Paris. 

" I think the present system in Illinois is far preferable to the old 
system, as in this portion of the state we never had a Republican rep- 
resentative under the old system, but now always have. So when per- 
sons have business before the legislature they have some one of their 
own party to transact their business." Rep. Effingham. 

" We like our system very much indeed." Rep. Elgin. 

" Generally I consider that the cumulative system is productive of 
the best results. Everything considered, in my opinion, the cumula- 
tive system, as used in this state is the best that could be adopted. ' ' 
Rep. Lockport. 

' ' After twenty years of experience I heartily endorse minority rep- 
resentation. If in a district of 20,000 voters the majority is 200 the 
two majority men would represent 10,200, the one minority man 
would represent 9800 voters. I think it is the best system, as far as I 
have had opportunity to observe that has ever been in practice, for it 
makes no difference how large a majority there is the minority is sure 
of a representative."* Rep. Brooks, Madison Co. 

1 ' I think the cumulative system is as fair a way as an assembly can 
be chosen. I much prefer it to the old way of electing members. ' ' 
Rep. Urbana. 

'Tarn confident that the system works generally to the satisfaction 
of cur people. ' ' Rep. Molinc. 

" I like the system, think it the best. Its tendency is good — it 
causes thought and care in presenting candidates. ' ' Rep. Beardstown. 

' ' The system is fair and just. I have never heard a wish among 
intelligent men to return to the old system. ' ' Rep. Dixon. 

" The system is a good one. I believe in minority representation 
and this secures it. It is a great improvement over the old system. 

* A minority must have more than a fourth of the votes to be sure of a representa- 
tive. 



62 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 

Because I have the power i?i belonging to a majority party is no reason 
why I should disfranchise my neighbor who belongs to a minority 
party. ' ' Rep. Joliet. 

"I consider our system a very just one, from the fact that the 
minority party has from all parts of the state a representation, and 
small and independent parties have the same chance as in other sys- 
tems." Rep. Carrollton. 

" The cumulative system is good because it induces party organi- 
zation in each district ; hence each side is more or less watched. Also 
it gives representation to all shades of opinion from every part of the 
state. The more country representatives in the legislature the better. ' ' 
Rep. Beardstown. 

1 ' I have served in the Illinois senate over forty years ago in the 
same district with Abraham Lincoln in which he was elected to the 
House during my term. The system is eminently fair and just, es- 
pecially to minorities, insuring representation to parties that are in bare 
minority, and double representation to the majority." Rep. Havana. 

' ' Yes ; I think it is preferable to the old system, for the reason 
that the minority party has a representative from each district. ' ' Rep. 
Virden. 

' ' I much prefer our present system. I consider the same fair and 
just to all parties concerned. In our legislative district (which is 
largely Republican) we elect a Republican senator and two Republi- 
can representatives, while the Democrats elect one representative. If 
it were not for our present system the Democrats would not be rep- 
resented in our district at all. The Republican convention nominates 
two and the Democrats one representative. The reverse of this is true 
in Democratic districts. " Rep. Napei'ville. 

" Yes, it is fair and just and it makes a better government, as the 
majority is more careful in making laws, as the majority necessarily is 
small and the minority keeps them in check. It has given entire satis- 
faction in our state, and I regard it as a big improvement over the old 
plan." Rep. Bushnell. 

" I prefer the minority system. It is good from this point of view ; 
the parties are more evenly balanced or divided in the legislature and 
it renders them more careful in legislation." Rep. Alton. 



FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 63 

" When the system was adopted the southern half of Illinois was 
decidedly Democratic and the northern counties were just as pro- 
nounced Republican. On that account the cumulative system was 
particularly beneficial, as it gave both sections a better representation 
than under the old system." Rep. Dixon. 

" Objections to the system come only from strong partisans who 
belong to the majority party and who want everything in the way of 
office which they can get. Until something better can be devised we 
had better cling to this and extend it as widely as possible. ' ' Rep. 
Joliet. 

' ' It seems to me the tendency of the system of cumulative voting 
is an educational element — it gives power to the weak, hope to reform, 
clips the wings of party domination, gives the minority a voice in 
legislation and has a tendency to put better men before the people. ' ' 
Rep. Beardstown. 

From the testimony which has been presented it may then be fairly 
claimed for the system of voting adopted in Illinois : 

1. That it gives voters three candidates to choose from, all of 
whom can be elected, instead of only one as in the old method of elect- 
ing single representatives from each district. In other words it gives 
more freedom and i?idependence in the choice of candidates. 

2. It secures representation to minorities, which include more 
than a fourth of the voters in a district, and who unite on a candidate. 

3. There is little or no difficulty in the practical operation of 
the method of voting, either on the part of the voter in giving all his 
votes to one candidate or in dividing them equally between two 
or three candidates, or in counting the votes when thus divided. 

4. It is an obstacle in the way of, and lessens the evils and chances 
of gerrymandering. 

5. It leads the people generally to take more interest in public 
affairs, because all can have a part in legislation and the conduct of the 
government. 

6. It makes a change of representation easier to accomplish and 
"clips the wings of party domination." 

7. It gives a minority in the legislature large enough to criticise 
with effect and influence and hold in check the action of the majority. 



64 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 

and by dividing the representation more equally, makes all more care- 
ful in making laws. 

8. It is claimed that the minority representatives are generally abler 
and better men than those elected by the majority, but the testimony 
relating thereto is conflicting and to some extent contradictory. 

9. By giving a more just representation to the two or more parties 
in each or most districts it lessens party bitterness. 

These results are certainly of very great importance in promoting 
good government. The advantages gained thereby will be more 
fully discussed later on. There is however an obverse side to this as 
there is to all questions, which will be referred to in the next chapter. 



CHAPTER VII. 

OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

Experience in Illinois has indicated some objections to the system of 
cumulative voting as adopted and practiced there and while the prepon- 
derance of public sentiment is strongly in its favor it is not unanimous. 
Each voter as has been explained, has three votes and can give all 
three of them to one candidate or i^ to one and i^ to another or i to 
each of three. He must designate on his ticket how his votes are 
to be distributed. This distribution is generally determined by an 
estimate of the strength of the parties by the party managers. If it is 
thought that either party has a decisive majority, that party usually 
nominates two candidates and the other nominates one. If the parties 
are nearly equally divided they each nominate two. In the former 
case, the nomination is generally equivalent to an election. In the 
last if either party has more votes than its opponents and if those votes 
are equally divided between its two candidates they will both be 
elected. Thus suppose the Republicans have 3637 votes and the 
Democrats 3636 and the former nominate A and B as candidates and 
the democrats nominate C and D — now if the Republicans all cast 1 j4 
votes for A and ij^ for B they will each have 5455^2 votes. If the 
Democrats do the same thing for Cand D they will each have 5454 
votes, and both Democrats will be elected and one Republican. If 
however two of the Republicans should ' ' plump ' ' for A — that is give 
all three of their votes to him — then A would have 5458^ votes, 
B 5453^2, C5454, and D 5454. Consequently A and Cand D would 
have the highest vote and B would be defeated. In other words only 
one of the Democrats and both of the Republicans would be elected. It 
will thus be seen that where there is any doubt about which party has 
the largest vote a candidate may secure his election easier by taking 
votes from and defeating his colleague than to get them from his op- 
ponent. It therefore may become and often is a contest between 
colleagues instead of between political antagonists. That this actually 
does occur is abundantly shown by the replies received to our fifth en- 
quiry which was as follows : 

65 



66 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

5th. It has been objected to this system that if a very popular nian is 
nominated that an undue proportion of the votes in his district may be 
concent?'ated on him and that the remaining two candidates might thus be 
elected by a minority — in your experience is this often or ever the case ? 

A Republican correspondent graphically describes what sometimes 
occurs under the circumstances. He says : 

* • When a district is very nearly equal in political strength but two 
men are usually nominated on each side. A very popular candidate is 
liable to gather votes from his running mate, and thus put them so far 
apart that their two adversaries will run in between them, especially if 
they are well matched and run well together or in a bunch, and it hap- 
pens in every campaign in this state, that a majority candidate is 
slaughtered, and although it seldom affects the result politically, for 
the reason that such accidents come to both sides, yet it leads to bad 
blood and open accusations of bad faith. 

" The system puts a nominating convention on its good behavior 
when it comes to nominating candidates. They must see to it that 
their candidates are well yoked and well matched for running ; for to 
win they must keep neck and neck. If the city population preponder- 
ates in the district it is poor policy to put a city and country candi- 
date in the same team. A stampede would put the farmer far in the 
lead. In a manufacturing district a labor man with a farmer or a law- 
yer or merchant makes a poor team to manage. A churchman and 
a sport won't work. A kid and an old man is no better. A native 
and a naturalized person is sure defeat for one or the other in a close dis- 
trict. In making nominations the convention must find pairs with 
respect to all the usual and ordinary elements entering into a hot polit- 
ical campaign. A candidate that runs too far ahead is just as danger- 
ours to his party as the man who runs far behind, which is not the 
case in the old system. Under the latter the man runs ahead does so 
at the expense of his adversary, but under the cumulative system it is 
at the expense of his colleague. His best friends and admirers, politi- 
cally, plump three votes, which takes y 2 from his colleague and that, 
too, when it is not necessary to elect him, The fear that he might get 
left induces his friends to plump, just to keep him abreast with his col- 
league. 



OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING., 67 

"A great deal of plumping is done in every election, but if it is 
caused by .natural causes, such as location, trade, profession, nation- 
ality, colcr or social standing, the candidates come out even if they 
both are on an equality and evenly matched. If both are from the 
country or from the city, each will receive about the same number off' 
plumpers in his locality. If both are mechanics the labor unions will, 
divide fairly between them. If both are German, Irish, or natives, » 
their several clans will deal fair with them. 

' ' Whatever advantage or disadvantage there is in the system, it 
will accrue to both parties alike; and I can't see why if one party 
should be for it the other should be against it. 

' ' The weak point in the system is that it breeds suspicion, jeal- 
ousy, and bad blood between the candidates, and sometimes leads to 
an open rupture among political friends. With two candidates on a 
side and only three seats to fill, one candidate will be left. Undue 
zeal or popularity on the part of one may defeat his colleague. A 
stampede which both sides are working for may produce the same re- 
sult." Rep. Ottawa. 

Other correspondents confirm this testimony, as will be seen from 
the following answers received to the 5th question : 

" Probably the greatest objection to be urged against the system is 
* plumping,' which sometimes defeats one of the majority candidates, 
as it is found both could have been elected if the voting had been 
fair." Dem. Henry. 

' ' The difficulty in the cumulative voting is that the friends of can- 
didates will 'plump,' and thus it has happened that the majority 
party would only elect one out of three, by the friends of the success- 
ful candidates plumping, who would thus receive many more votes 
than enough to elect." Rep. Motine. 

" One of my objections is that it hinders a fair stand-up fight be- 
tween parties and candidates. It is as frequently as not a fight between 
two candidates on the same ticket rather than between candidates on 
opposing tickets. It is easier for a candidate to gain his election at 
the expense of his colleague than at the expense of the opposing party. ' ' 
Dem. Freeport. 

"It has frequently happened that the majority party, with plenty 



68 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

of votes to elect its two candidates, has elected but one, because his 
friends ran him far ahead to make it appear that he was very popular, 
or for other personal reasons, and the party entitled to but one repre- 
sentative secured two. * * * l n the close districts, where each 
party names two candidates, its working is always uncertain and leads 
to attempts at all kinds of trickery. In the safe districts the majority 
party never names more than two candidates, and thus insures their 
election, and the minority usually names but one, so that the voters 
really have no choice, as these then are sure to be elected." Rep. 
Springfield. 

" The plan in Illinois has been the means of provoking a great 
deal of ' bad blood ' between the friends of a successful candidate and 
those of one who was defeated on the same ticket, resulting in fre- 
quently giving the minority two representatives. Again with two can- 
didates in the field, one a good and capable man, the other incapable 
and perhaps disreputable, the disposition of party leaders is to make a 
hard fight for the latter, who is deemed the weaker, in order to save 
party supremacy, and not infrequently with the result that the good 
man is defeated and the unworthy candidate elected." Rep. Warsaw. 

' ' I think it has become the universal custom in Illinois for each 
party to nominate but two candidates and in this and other counties, 
where one party is in a hopeless minority, it is a growing custom to 
nominate but one, as the fight between two men on the same ticket, 
when only one of them can be elected, leads to divisions and feuds 
which weaken the whole ticket." Rep. Springfield. 

"A popular man overbalances his running mate and" thus gives to 
the minority party two out of three representatives ; sometimes the best 
electioneerer causes the same result." Rep. Warsaw. 

" The popular man is most likely to ' get there ' by a large major- 
ity ; the less popular may be left entirely or merely slip in. The cen- 
tral committee tries to regulate that but does not always succeed." 
Rep. Naperville. 

' ' This sometimes is the case and to my notion is the worst feature 
in the system." Rep. Alton. 

" Yes, this occurs rather frequently and is the real objection to the 
system. Selfish men use it to their advantage and a popular candi- 



OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 69 

date will, by no fault of his own, defeat his colleague on the same 
ticket." Rep. Springfield. 

' ' The massing of the vote on one candidate may and does, often 
defeat a worthy colleague. " Rep. West Mc Henry. 

" In some instances the friends of a candidate will become scared 
and ' plump ' three votes for him, defeating his running mate. ' ' Rep. 
Moline. 

' ' When the district is considered to be close, then the temptation 
of the candidate's particular friends to 'plump' for him is strong. 
By this means the minority sometimes secures two members." Rep. 
Chicago. 

" Often a good man on the majority side is sacrificed by ' plump- 
ing ' for the other candidate on the ticket with him." Rep. Cham- 
paign. 

11 More opportunity I think as the plumping of three votes for one 
candidate may elect the worst one of four candidates." Rep. Austin. 

" When the vote between the parties is very close, each party hav- 
ing two candidates and three to be elected, it results that some popu- 
lar candidate draws from his running mate and the minority party 
elects two of the three. ' ' Dem. Carlyle. 

11 It is usually the unpopular candidate on the ticket that runs ahead, 
as he may induce his friends to cast their votes for him, while the pop- 
ular candidate will urge an equal division of the votes." Dem. Mc 
Leansboro. 

" It has quite frequently occurred that the best man of one or the 
other party was defeated by his competitor on the same ticket who 
urged his friends to give him three votes as he otherwise would be 
beaten. ' ' Dem. Freeport. 

" ' Plumping ' three votes for one man is common. I have known 
two members of the minority party to be elected in a district because 
a candidate of the majority party pulled to himself more than his share 
of the party vote. " Ind. Chicago. 

"In 1890 in two districts of this state, the 12th and 16th, which 
were very close the Democratic party lost one candidate in each district 
because both the leading parties had nominated two candidates each 
and one of the candidates got his friends to ' plump ' for him and he 



70 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

ran away ahead, while the other man with him was defeated when the 
two combined had many more votes than the two Republican candi- 
dates. " Dem. Havana. 

1 ' It is not unusual for the minority to get two of the representatives 
because of the more popular man on the majority ticket running ahead 
of his mate. This is liable to happen in close districts." Rep. 
Pontiac. 

" This has happened once in this, the 47th district." Dem. Belle- 
ville. 

" This is often the case, and then when the man comes up for re- 
election every one says, well, so and so is all right, see how many 
votes he got at the last election — we will just help the weak man, and 
I have known the really strong man to be defeated in the endeavor to 
elect both men — it has happened in this district several times. ' ' Rep. 
East St. Louis. 

" I have seen this same trouble in our district several times." Rep. 
Waukegan. 

" There is danger of this unless great precautions are taken by party 
managers. This has occurred here. ' ' Rep. Elgin. 

" This happened in Iroquois or Kankakee county in 1890." Dem. 
Peoria. 

' ' When a third party has a candidate it sometimes happens that one 
of the two majority candidates plays the other false and through his 
1 workers ' has three votes cast straight for himself and the third 
party man may slip in instead of his majority party colleague. ' ' Dem. 
Shelbyville. 

" Not often, but is sometimes; not always because the man is popu- 
lar, but that he is active, and works. This is a very serious objection 
to my mind. ' ' Rep. Moline. 

' '• This is an objection undoubtedly. ' ' Dem. Carthage. 

" Does not give third and fourth minority candidates a chance. It 
is very unsatisfactory in its results because very often good men are de- 
feated by too many votes being cast for one man of the two usually 
nominated by the two old parties. * * * The only practical diffi- 
culty is that a voter cannot tell when he is casting more votes than a fav- 
orite candidate needs. ' ' Pop. Joliet. 



OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 7 1 

That the direct evils resulting from ' ' plumping ' ' however are not 
very serious is indicated by the fact that in 1892 there was but one dis- 
trict (Fig. 4, p. 23) in which a minority party elected two representa- 
tives and the majority only one. This occurred in the sixth district, 
when the Democrats cast 61,637 votes and elected only one representa- 
tive, and the Republicans with only 51,685 votes elected two. It will be 
noticed that correspondents mention some other cases which occurred 
at other elections, but such instances appear to be comparatively infre- 
quent, and about two-thirds of those who answered the inquiry say 
that it seldom or never occurs that the minority party in a district 
elects a majority of the representatives. One Populist in Joliet says : 
' ' It has happened three or four times in fifteen years. ' ' The worst 
evil resulting therefrom is probably the sense of injury or injustice 
produced in the minds of persons with a strong feeling of party fealty 
or allegiance. As one of the correspondents says : "It breeds sus- 
picion, jealousy and bad blood between the candidates, and sometimes 
leads to open rupture among political friends." Others say: "It 
leads to all kinds of trickery " ; and " to divisions and feuds which 
weaken the whole ticket." The instance mentioned by the corre- 
spondent from Warsaw indicates how a good man may be sacrificed by 
party leaders for another candidate who is incapable and perhaps un- 
worthy. The whole matter is summed up by the correspondent from 
Joliet who says that " the only practical difficulty is that a voter can- 
not tell when he is casting more votes than a favorite candidate needs." 
and another points out that the Illinois system " gives the minority 
party representation when the guess of the minority and the guess of 
the majority in nominating conventions are correct. ' ' 

Any element in a system of electing representatives which makes 
the results depend — even to a limited extent — on correct guessing or 
chance will not commend itself to those who want good government. 
It will be shown later on that the uncertainty in the working of cumu- 
lative voting due to such causes would be very much greater if the 
number of representatives to be elected from each district was 
increased, so that more than three were elected in each district. The 
reason for increasing the number by enlarging the districts will be 
pointed out later, but without doing so now it will be apparent that if, 



72 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

say seven representatives are elected from each district, voters would be 
more perplexed to know whether to give all their votes to one candi- 
date or divide them between two, three, four or more, than they would 
be if only three are elected, when usually the only question to be de- 
cided is whether to give all their votes to one man or divide them 
between two candidates. If this difficulty of cumulative voting could 
be overcome the perplexity of the voter and the objection which has 
been made to the system, that there is an element of uncertainty and 
some chance involved in the result, would both be obviated, and by 
removing the fortuitous feature the voter could exercise his privilege 
with more knowledge and freedom. 

It sometimes happens though that the character of a man or a 
measure are indicated by the enemies he or it makes. The opposition 
to cumulative voting may possibly be indicative of its merits as well as 
of its demerits. The testimony elicited by the circular of inquiry may 
perhaps throw some side light on the subject. Thus a Republican 
says : 

" I think the objections to the plan come from the majority party 
as the law works to the advantage of the minority, giving them better 
representation." Rep. Shelby ville. 

Another Republican from Rock Island says : 

' ' From the standpoint of minority representation it is very satis- 
factory ; from a partisan standpoint it is an advantage to the Demo- 
cratic party, as it gives them a larger representation in the House than 
they would otherwise have. The northern two-thirds of Illinois is 
mainly Republican and the southern end ( ' Egypt ' ) Democratic, and 
the larger population is north. ' ' 

' ' I think the system a fairly good one. Objections to it come only 
from strong partisans who belong to the majority party and who want 
everything in the way of office which they can get." Rep. Joliet. 

As Illinois is ordinarily a Republican state it can perhaps be under- 
stood why some persons of that faith are inclined to oppose a system 
which lessens their political influence and power. To those who are 
inclined towards the side of justice and righteousness, in the ad- 
ministration of political affairs, the objections of these opponents of 
cumulative voting become arguments in its favor. 



OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 73 

But it has also been objected to the Illinois system that under it 
it is difficult if not impossible for third or independent parties to elect 
candidates. The following is some of the testimony of correspondents 
with reference to that point : 

" Our system is called minority representation but never but once 
has a third party candidate been elected from this, Will county, in 
twenty years." Populist. Joliet. 

' ' From the standpoint of the two parties it does, but when a third 
party is a factor, unless aggregating a given number of votes it does 
not, I think." People's Party. Abingdon, Knox Co. 

" I believe that the quota system in some form would improve 
matters and at least give the minorities, now virtually disfranchised, a 
voice in government. ' ' Prohibition. Geneva. 

In the election in Illinois in 1892 not a single third party member 
was sent to the House of Representatives, although the Prohibitionists 
had 24,684 votes and the People's Party 20,108 out of a total of 
872,948. The quota which should have elected a member of the 
legislature was 5705, so that if those parties could have concentrated 
their votes the one could have elected four and the other three mem- 
bers. There is no report that any candidate was elected in opposition 
to the two dominant parties. It will thus be seen that in Illinois there 
is only a limited amount of freedom in voting. The remedy for this 
and some of the other evils which have been pointed out is to increase 
the size of the districts and the number of representatives to be elected 
from each, as will be more fully shown farther on. 

Another objection to the system of cumulative voting, in use in 
Illinois, has been pointed out by persons familiar with its operation in 
that state. The following quotations bearing on this objection are 
given from the answers received to the circular of inquiry. A Demo- 
crat in Chicago says : 

"The party in majority usually puts up two candidates, the 
minority one, very rare that either puts up three. Under these con- 
ditions the nomination settles the election — the people practically 
have nothing to do with the matter. Instead of giving the voters more 
control of the legislature the opposite result is achieved in so far as any- 
thing is accomplished — which is not considerable." Dem. Chicago. 



74 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

* ' The certainty of election which follows the nomination as made 
under this system, leads, sometimes I fear, to the election of ' machine 
politicians ' by small political rings. ' ' Dem. Chicago. 

' ' A nomination is often looked upon as being equivalent to an 
election, and the result is inferior men are frequently elected. If the 
district is very close and two men are nominated by each of the two 
leading parties good men are usually named by both. ' ' Dem. Evan- 
ston. 

" There is no contest here only for the nomination. After that the 
successful candidate has nothing to do but pay his share of the campaign 
expenses. ' ' Dem. Hillsboro. 

" A nomination under this system is equivalent to an election, and 
nominations are fought for by men who would not dare run under the 
old system." Dem. Jacksonville. 

" The only objection is that in districts where there is a large 
majority either way that nominations on both sides are equivalent to 
election, because the dominant party will nominate two and the minor- 
ity one, and of course all are elected." Rep. Havana. 

" The effect on the nominations and the elections is bad, the two 
candidates of the majority party and one from the minority are gener- 
ally elected no matter who they are nor how they got the nomination." 
Dem. Freeport. 

" The nomination of the minority candidate being equivalent to 
an election, thus the people in convention seeking to put its best men 
f o r ward . " Rep . Virden . 

"It does not secure better men, but perhaps the reverse, for the 
nominations being equivalent to election are more likely to be con- 
trolled by rings and politicians and there is no incentive to put forward 
the best men. This is especially true of the minority. ' ' Rep. Pontiac. 

1 ' In nine cases out of ten nomination is equivalent to an election 
and it is only necessary for candidates to pack the caucuses when they 
can bid defiance to the voters." Prohibition. Geneva. 

' ' Since a nomination is under ordinary circumstances equivalent 
to an election it becomes a chase of the politicians for nomination. ' ' 
Rep. Moline. 



OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 75 

"Apolitical 'boss' secures a minority nomination and prevents 
a second nomination by his party, thereby insuring his own election 
without contest. Unless party pressure is strong nominations are made 
of three candidates for three offices, the whole being cut and dried." 
Ind. Chicago. 

" Nominations nearly always mean election and the result is evil.' 
Rep. Jacksonville. 

"In a district where nomination means election it might be easier 
to ' get there ' by corrupting the convention than by corrupting the 
people. Yet it has not been our lot to be troubled by corruption in 
the convention or elsewhere so far as I know. ' ' Rep. Naperville. 

" In this district nomination is equivalent to election. Two Re- 
publicans and one Democrat being sure of election — other minority 
parties have no chance." Dem. Elgin. 

" There is no more opportunity for bribery and corruption and less 
occasion, since there are usually only three candidates nominated — all 
of whom are sure of election. ' ' Prohib. Geneva. 

The evil indicated in the testimony which has been quoted it must 
be admitted, is a serious one, but is one which might have been and 
was anticipated by those who had studied the subject carefully. The 
reason for this will be apparent if it is observed that more than a fourth 
of the voters under this system can always elect a candidate, if they 
concentrate their votes on him, no matter how their opponents may use 
their votes and the latter if they have a bare majority, by dividing their 
votes equally between two candidates can always elect them both. 
Consequently under ordinary circumstances, the party in the majority 
would nominate two candidates, and the minority would nominate one. 
If either should nominate more they would endanger the success of their 
ticket. Therefore, if by means of party organization, or other means 
the proportion of the voters named can be influenced, so as to 
give their votes for the respective party tickets, then the two nominees 
on the one ticket and the one on the other would be sure of election. 
If the parties are nearly equally divided then each would probably 
nominate two candidates. One of them would of course be defeated. 
With three candidates all of them will be quite certain to be elected. 
With four only one will be defeated. 



76 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

Is the evil which has been pointed out by our respondents in Illi- 
nois and was foreseen by Mr. Sterne, and others, inherent in the sys- 
tem of minority representation or is it only a defect in the method 
adopted in that State which is remediable ? The tyranny from which we 
are all suffering, majorities, minorities and individuals alike, is that 
of parties, party managers, caucuses, " machines ' ' and " bosses. ' ' Ap- 
parently the voters in Illinois have in some respects, but little more free- 
dom from party domination than voters have where cumulative voting 
does not prevail. 

To ascertain what influence, if any, the Illinois system of cumula- 
tive voting exerted in the selection of men for office the following 
question was propounded in the circular of inquiry : 

2d. What effect does it (the Illinois system.) have on the nomina- 
tion of candidates for office ? In other words, are better a?id more in- 
telligent candidates nominated and elected than were chosen under the old 
system of electing one member from each dist7'ict ? 

About two-thirds of those who replied said that they could not see 
that it had any influence on the selection of candidates, or that better 
men were selected now than under the old method of electing single 
members from each district. About a quarter of the respondents said 
there was a decided improvement in the character of the candidates 
nominated, and about a tenth of the replies expressed the opinion that 
the men chosen for representatives under the present Illinois system 
were worse than those who were formerly selected. 

The following are some of the optimistic answers : 

' ' The minority candidates are usually more capable men than were 
selected under the old plan. ' ' Rep. White Hall. 

" In my opinion it has so operated. The nomination of the minor- 
ity candidate being equivalent to an election, thus the people in con- 
vention seeking to put its best men forward." Rep. Virden. 

"This system perhaps has the effect of giving us better men than 
the other, but the best men do not go to the legislature under either 
system." Rep. Spring-field. 

" In close districts it has a tendency to make the party which or- 
dinarily has the small majority nominate two strong candidates for 
fear one may be beaten. While stronger candidates are not always 



OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 77 

better and more intelligent in the long run they probably would be. ' ' 
Rep. Springfield. 

" In the rural districts I am satisfied we get better candidates as a 
rule — that is, the minority does. " Rep. Shelbyville. 

" In this particular, no effect, except where the majority is small." 
Rep. Quincy. 

"The minority party generally puts up a good man. Having 
lived in a locality a long time where the majority party takes every- 
thing, if the minority get a chance they generally select the best ma- 
terial, as it is their first opportunity to get a man in." Rep. Paris. 

' ' It compels good nominations in all districts where the minority 
party has more than forty per cent, of the vote. A poor nomination 
by either side would lose a seat to the majority, and it would destroy 
all chance of winning a seat to the minority. ' ' Rep. Ottawa. 

" The action of the law compels parties to be very careful in their 
nominations and usually the best of men are selected for candidates." 
Dem. Matt 00 11. 

" Usually so. The most available candidate is sometimes selected 
but usually the best and most intelligent are put forward." Dem. 
Jottet. 

1 ' If it has any effect at all on ^nominations its tendency is to bring 
out the best from each party, as a nomination, except in very close dis- 
tricts, where four are made, is about equivalent to an election, and this 
fact tends to make the contest for nomination more active, thus inter- 
esting a larger number of people in the respective parties." Dem. 
Jacksonville. 

"The minority party generally sends a good man — the majority, if 
small, usually selects two popular men fearing the other party will nom- 
inate two and elect. In such cases there is some improvement over the 
other system." Rep. Havana. 

" I think we select better men. The reason is that we have a larger 
territory to select from." Rep. Effingham. 

"I believe that the minority party of a district is more apt to nom- 
inate a better man than under the old system. It certainly has no bad 
tendencies in that regard." Rep. Dixon. 

" Without doubt better men are nominated. The parties cannot 



78 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

afford to put up a bad man as the independent vote would reach him. ' ' 
Rep. Collinsville. 

" I have not perceived that it causes any better or more intelligent 
men to be nominated than under the old system. The minority mem- 
ber, however, is frequently an able man, and superior to the majority 
members of his district in ability and intelligence." Rep. Chicago. 

"Yes ; especially is this true of the minority candidates, and gen- 
erally as to both or all party candidates having a chance of election, 
the reason partly that good men will not accept nomination for 
office when there is no chance of election. It frequently happens 
that only enough candidates are placed in nomination to fill the three 
places." Rep. Car mi. 

" It induces the strong party to be careful to bring out good men, 
at least popular ones, or the minority may secure the election of the 
majority of candidates by running the most popular candidates. ' ' Rep. 
Beardstown. 

The following are some of the opinions of pessimistic respondents 
to the question asked. 

"It is very unsatisfactory in its results because very often good 
men are defeated by too many votes being cast for one man of the two 
usually nominated by the two old parties. I would not advise New 
York or any other state to follow the Illinois law. Proportional Rep- 
resentation is the only true basis to work on. The Gove or any feasi- 
ble application of the principle of quota or proportional voting." 
Pop. Joliet. 

" Sometimes yes, sometimes no. It frequently has this effect: A 
political ' boss ' secures a minority nomination and prevents a second 
nomination by his party, thereby insuring his own election without 
contest. Unless party pressure is strong nominations are made of three 
candidates for three offices, the whole being cut and dried." Ind. 
Chicago. 

" Makes this matter much worse. Leads directly to deals between 
politicians of both (opposing) parties. This occurs particularly in 
cities. The minority party puts up only one candidate of course, and 
the i gang ' runs the primaries. The ' gang ' does not belong to one 
party, but is made up of the 'active' men of both." Dem. Chicago. 



OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 79 

"A nomination under this system is equivalent to an election, and 
nominations are fought for by men who would not dare run under the 
old system. My opinion is that the candidates under this system are 
not so good as under the old." Dem. Jacksonville. 

"Not having lived in Illinois under the old system I can only 
compare it with other states and see no advantage. Think the tend- 
ency is the other way, since in nine cases out of ten nomination is 
equivalent to an election, and it is only necessary for candidates to 
pack the caucuses when they can bid defiance to the voters. ' ' Prohib. 
Geneva. 

' ' I believe the effect on the nominations and the elections is bad ; 
the two candidates of the majority party and one from the minority are 
generally elected, no matter who they are, nor how they got the nom- 
ination." Dem. Freeport. • 

It will be apparent though and was pointed out by Mr. Sterne and 
others that if the districts were made large enough, so that small minor- 
ities could have representation, there would be a corresponding increase 
of freedom to the voter. Obviously the voter will be freer to choose, 
if he can select from five or seven candidates to be elected in a large 
district, than he would be if his choice is limited to one or three to 
be elected from a small one. If for example five members are elected 
from a district, then one-sixth of the voters -\- i can always elect a 
candidate by the cumulative plan, whereas if only three are elected, it 
will require one-fourth of the votes -f i to succeed. If there are 
seven then one-eighth -J- i can elect. In other words it is plain 
that a smaller fraction of all the voters in a district are required to 
elect if there are many candidates, than if there are only a few. It has 
been pointed out before that it will be easier to influence a sixth of the 
voters in a large district than a quarter or a half in smaller ones. 
With five members to elect the majority party might have three and 
the minority two — if seven were elected they could be divided into 
groups of four, and three, or some other proportion. This would give 
very much greater freedom of choice, not only within the parties but 
also to independent voters, and it is also certain that if it were possible 
for a fourth, a sixth, or an eighth of the voters in a district to nom- 
inate and elect a candidate party managers would be cautious about 



80 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

presenting men who are obviously unfit and this would lead to the 
selection of better candidates. 

In other words the larger the districts, and the greater the number 
of members elected from each of them, the freer will be the choice of 
the electors, and the larger the number of members elected by each 
party in each district, the greater the freedom and independence of 
choice within the parties. Different sections, shades of opinion, in- 
terests, views and principles, in the same party, may then each have 
their representatives, under such a system, and at the same time with a 
greater freedom of choice it might not be necessary for any to surrender 
allegiance to their common party flag, but they could elect a member 
of their own party who would satisfactorily represent the special views 
and interests of those who are not satisfied with other nominees. 

It should, perhaps, be made perfectly plain here again that an in- 
crease of the number of members to be elected from each district 
does not necessarily imply an increase in the total number to be 
elected, but only an increase in the size or a consolidation of existing 
districts. Thus in the State of New York, there are at present 128 
assembly districts. If it should be determined to elect five members 
from each district, the present ones could be consolidated into say 
twenty-six, making the total number of assemblymen 130; or if it 
should be decided to elect seven from each, they could be consolidated 
so as to form say twenty districts, which would give 140 members. 

To ascertain the views of persons in Illinois familiar with the 
working of cumulative voting in that state with reference to the ad- 
visability and practicability of enlarging the districts in that state the 
7th question was asked in the circular of inquiry : 

7th. Would it be advantageous to increase the size of the districts so as 
to elect five, seven or more representatives fi'om each, and give the voter 
the privilege of casting as many votes as there are represe?itatives to be 
elected, and cumulate them as he chooses ? 

A very large majority of those who replied to the circular were 
opposed to any increase in the size of districts and the number of 
representatives to be elected from each and say they can see no 
advantage in such a change. A few who have been students of the 
principles of proportional representation were, however, decidedly 



OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYS.TEM OF VOTING. 8 1 

in favor of such, an increase. Evidently the majority of the cor- 
respondents regarded such a change as an innovation for which they 
saw no good reason. The arguments urged against it were that it 
would make the system of voting more cumbrous, complicated and 
confusing. One or two thought that it would facilitate bribery, add . 
to the cost of the campaign, and one correspondent wrote: "The 
districts are large enough. A voter, too far away from his candidate, 
is apt to stay in his corn-field, and not go out at election. ' ' An in- 
crease in the number of members to be elected would undoubtedly 
add to the difficulties of conducting elections by cumulative voting, 
but these difficulties it is thought would be entirely obviated if the 
Burnitz system of counting votes, which will be explained, was 
adopted, as will be shown farther on. 

There are however some other difficulties which will be encountered, 
with any system, if the districts are enlarged, and there are some limita- 
tions and restrictions which appear desirable and should be placed on 
the number of representatives to be elected from each. 

In the first place, if too many candidates are presented, electors 
will not take an interest in all whom they must select from. The aver- 
age voter may be concerned in the qualifications, characters, opinions 
and political principles of two or three candidates to be voted for, and 
may extend that interest to five or seven, but when required to look 
into the antecedents of a dozen or twenty men, the duty will likely be 
performed in a very perfunctory manner. Ordinary men are soon 
wearied by public duties, and will give but little time or thought or 
labor to them. 

There can be no doubt too, as has already been pointed out, that the 
larger the number of candidates elected from each district by the 
cumulative system, the greater will be the difficulties of assigning, dis- 
tributing and counting votes. Under that system, as has been shown, 
parties must estimate their strength before the elections, and must be 
guided by such estimates in determining how many candidates to nomi- 
nate and how to distribute the votes which they can control. With 
three members to be elected, it is usually only a question whether to 
nominate one or two candidates, and the distribution of the votes is 
correspondingly simple, but if there are five candidates it would be a 



8 2 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

question for each party whether to put one, two, three or four in the 
field, and if there were seven to be elected the difficulty would be still 
greater, and voters would be perplexed and uncertain in determining 
how many candidates to vote for and how many votes to cast for each . 
Even in Illinois, as has been shown, with only three members to elect 
from each district, owing to improper distribution of votes it happens 
at times that votes are wasted and the minority party elects two candi- 
dates and the majority only one. An example of this, which has been 
referred to, occurred in the sixth district in 1892 At that election 
the Democrats cast 61,637 votes for their candidate and the Repub- 
licans gave 25,957 for one and 25,728 for the second one and 
thus elected both, although the Democrats had very nearly 10,000 
more votes than their successful antagonists. Although this does not 
occur often in Illinois, yet it can be seen that if greater freedom were 
given to voters by enlarging the districts and increasing the number of 
representatives to be elected from each, the liability to such misadven- 
tures would be much increased, and it would be correspondingly dif- 
ficult for parties and individuals to know how to distribute their votes. 
Thus with seven members to elect and only two parties in the field, 
even if there was no very great disparity in their respective numbers it 
would — especially where there was much political agitation — be difficult 
to know whether either party could elect three, four or five members, 
and in case of a political revolt, it would often be impossible for the 
independents or the ' ' regulars ' ' to know whether to run one, two, 
three or more candidates. A miscalculation might mean total defeat, 
and the impossibility of knowing how votes should be distributed would 
often result in their waste. 

Most of these difficulties, which are inherent in the system of cumu- 
lative voting, as already stated, have been anticipated and commented 
on by writers and students of this subject. Thus Mr. Sterne in his 
admirable book, to which the public generally owe so much, says : 

" If we make the districts large enough * * * and thus 
give, by the cumulative plan, a representative to any small minority in 
the community, there can be no opposition to the plan proposed, ex- 
cept its cumbersomeness ; but with small districts electing but three 
members it has the disadvantage that, while it gives to the minority 



OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING 83 

one representative, it does not get rid of, but on the contrary makes 
permanent, party action and party machinery, and, in making a nomi- 
nation equivalent to an election, removes the corruption from the 
election to the nominating conventions. The residents of New York 
have seen such a plan work very badly in the election of their boards 
of supervisors. ' ' 

Prof. Ware in an article in The American Law Review for Jan- 
uary, 1872, said of this branch of the subject: 

"The task which it [the cumulative method of voting] imposes 
upon the elector of dividing his suffrages among his candidates, is one 
which it is difficult to perform intelligently. In point of fact, it must 
in most cases be done at haphazard, or upon some arbitrary or fanciful 
principle, thus giv r ing an arbitrary element a material influence on the 
result. ' In the different practical trials which this reform has met, ' 
says M- Naville, ' two things have been recognized, — the excellence of 
the new principle, and the defective nature of the processes by which it is 
applied, — processes which impair the liberty of the voter and the justice of 
the results.'' 

< < * * * The- system is liable to produce most unexpected and 
undesired results through a waste of votes, and this can only be 
remedied by a rigid discipline which destroys the freedom of the elec- 
tor, and practically places the election in the hands of party mana- 
gers." | 

Mr. S. Dana Horton * states the objection " that the more popu- 
lar the candidate the less chance is there of proportional representa- 
tion. The people's favorite will get plumpers in profusion, many 
votes will be wasted, and so large a plurality may elect no more offi- 
cers than a minority. * * * In districts electing three represen- 
tatives, the special dangers of this, but at the same time also the advan- 
tages of any system are reduced to a minimum. The lai-ger the district 
the more dangerous the peculiarities of this system. Were it tried on 
such a scale as that of congressional elections in Ohio, anything like 
fairness or proportionality would at first be impossible." 

Cumulative voting was adopted for the election of members of 



Article on Proportional Representation. Perm Monthly, for June, 1 873. 



84 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

English school boards in 1870. The rule as it stands in the Elemen- 
tary Education Act of that date is as follows : 

' ' At every such election every voter shall be entitled to a number of votes equal to 
the number of members of the school board to be elected, and may give all such votes 
to one candidate, or may distribute them among the candidates as he thinks fit. ' ' 

Some interesting testimony with reference to the practical working 
of this method of electing members of English school boards has been 
given. 

Commenting on it, Mr. G. Shaw Lefevre, an opponent of minority 
representation, in an article on that subject in the Contemporary Review 
for May, 1884, says : 

< ' The effect of the system adopted has been to give undue weight 
to small sections. Majorities and the more powerful sections of the 
electors have not been able to secure a representation in proportion to 
their numbers. The difficulties of organizing their voters so as to pro- 
duce their maximum effect when the members to be elected are many, 
ranging from five to fifteen, are insuperable, and have deterred them 
from putting forward candidates in proportion to their real strength. 

" There has, therefore, been in recent contested elections a waste- 
ful accumulation of votes upon the successful candidate of the more 
powerful sections, and small groups and sections have consequently 
been able to secure the return of members, when their numbers did not 
really entitle them to it. Men have been returned upon boards in this 
way who have proved to be a power only for mischief. This evil has 
become more apparent as experience has been gained, and as candi- 
dates have found that by obtaining the cumulative votes of a group 
or section they could be returned without difficulty. ' ' 

In an article by John Westlake, Q. C, in the Contemporary Review 
for March, 1884, on Proportional Representation, in which the author 
advocates that principle, he says that its "application to school board 
elections is well established, but needs reform in detail ' ' and expresses 
the hope that " the spectacle of its working must influence the contro- 
versy as to the parliamentary application. ' ' 

Continuing, he says : 

' ' Let us turn now to what the rudimentary cumulative vote has 
failed to do. Each shade of opinion held by a numerous body of elec- 



OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 85 

tors, though represented, has not had its proportional representation. 
It is evident that a party which runs more candidates than in propor- 
tion to its numbers risks returning fewer candidates than in proportion 
to its numbers, and not only has this, risk been often realized, but often 
also the fear of it has prevented a party from running, its. due number 
of candidates. Again, even when the due number, and that only, has 
been run, all have not been returned, because the votes, of their sup- 
porters have not been evenly divided among them. 7/ would seem as 
if those who established the cumulative vote had greater faith in the power 
of organizing than the event has justified. I will give a few instances of 
the waste of votes, drawn from the last two general elections for the 
London School Board, because nine years' practice had preceded even 
the first of the two, and it may therefore be supposed that the power 
of organizing had reached as full a development as can be expected. 
In order to appreciate them thoroughly, it is necessary to explain what 
is meant by a quota. If 10,000 votes are given at an election, and 
three members are to be elected, the proportional principle requires 
that any candidate who has received 2501 votes should be elected, be- 
cause the remaining 7499 votes cannot be so distributed as to give as 
many as 2501 to more than two others. A little reflection on this 
example will show the truth of the following rule : Divide the number 
of votes given by the number of members to be elected, plus one; the 
quotient, plus one, is the quota, that is, the member of votes which on 
the pj'opoi'tional principle will entitle a candidate to be elected. If the 
quotient is fractional, the quota is the next higher integer. 

" Now, in the city of London, in 1879, there were four members 
to elect and 23,591 good votes were given. Therefore the quota was 
4719; but the highest on the poll got 7153 votes and one member 
was elected with 2089, or considerably less than half the quota. 

" In the Hackney division, in 1879, there were five members to 
elect and 60,992 good votes were given. Therefore the quota was 
10,166 ; but the highest on the poll had 13,727 votes and one mem- 
ber was elected with 4728, or again less than half the quota. 

"In the Lambeth division, in 1882, there were eight members to 
elect, and 153,142 good votes were given. Therefore the quota was 
17,016, but the highest on the poll had 34,896 votes, or more than 



86 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 

twice the quota, while two members were elected with 8888 and 8190, 
or about half the quota. 

' * It is important to observe that the wasteful accumulation of votes 
on some candidates leads to the election of others with a very small 
number of votes, because this is the second point in which the work- 
ing of the actual school board system is open to objection. It is de- 
sirable that each shade of opinion held by a numerous body of electors 
should be represented, but it is not desirable that very small bodies 
should have the power of returning candidates. If a very small group 
is composed of the partisans of a real shade of opinion, their exclusion 
will not shake public confidence in the representative assembly, as 
that of a large group would do, and they can still propagate their 
views in the press and at meetings. More often, however, a very small 
group is composed of the partisans of a candidate ; and he, again, is 
often one whose personal qualifications have not recommended him for 
selection to the great body of those with whom his opinions, so far as 
he has any, would connect him. Now few who know anything of the 
working of assemblies will doubt the importance of keeping bad mem- 
bers out. if possible. Their power for mischief is increased by their 
election ten-fold more than the power of an average candidate for good 
is increased by his election, while an exceptionally good candidate 
can generally impress himself on a large body of supporters. It is 
therefore an additional evil, incidental to the wasteful accumulation of 
votes on some candidates that it facilitates the success of small com- 
binations in favor of others. * * * Many worthy candidates, who 
represented considerable bodies of opinion, have been left with small 
fractions of quotas through the undue accumulation of votes on other 
representatives of the same opinions ; and in the instances I have 
quoted I have had no reference at all to the worthiness or otherwise of 
the persons concerned. I have selected them only to show, by strik- 
ing examples, that election by too few votes is the necessary accompani- 
ment of election by too many : and then I leave it to every one's 
knowledge of human nature to assure him that, among the elections 
made by too few votes, many must be such as he would regret. 

•• The direction then, in which the actual school board system of 
election has to be improved is that of giving some assistance to the 



OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 87 

power of organizing, which has been found insufficient, while adding 
as little as possible that is novel to a system which has the great 
advantage that all are now familiar with it." 

Notwithstanding the objections to cumulative voting which have 
been pointed out, it is nevertheless believed, that, even in the somewhat 
imperfect form of the Illinois plan, it has very great advantages 
— the particulars of which have been set forth in the preceding 
pages — over our present system of single member districts. Even with 
the difficulties which have been pointed out it is thought that if the 
number of members to be elected in each district, by cumulative votes,, 
were increased to say five or seven, the additional freedom which would 
thereby be acquired by the voter, would greatly outweigh the disadvan- 
tages resulting from the uncertainties and perplexity which he would 
encounter in the distribution of his votes. In other words the election 
of three members from each district by cumulative voting is better than 
our present system of electing only one by a majority of the votes ; the 
election of five would be still better and seven or a greater number 
would probably be still more advantageous. The disadvantages in this 
system, it is believed, though, may be entirely overcome by a very 
simple method of voting and counting cumulative votes, the principles 
of which will be explained in the next chapter. 



CHAPTER VIII. . : 

THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 

Many different plans and methods of voting have been devised and 
proposed for giving representation to , minorities and -to voters the 
greatest amount of freedom, independence and certainty in the results 
of the exercise of the franchise. . 

No attempt will be made now to describe or explain all of them. 
Some of them are very complicated and when they were brought up for 
consideration in the British Parliament they provoked the remark from 
John Bright — with which perhaps some persons interested in the sub- 
ject may sympathize — " that they have this disadvantage, that scarcely 
any one can understand them. ' ' 

For the present, what will be said will be confined to an in- 
quiry into the principles which ought to control cumulative voting if 
it is to be entirely /ree, and to the means of complying with such prin- 
ciples. 

With this purpose in view it will be supposed that three candidates 
are to be elected from a district and that " each voter may cast as many 
votes for one candidate as there are representatives to be elected, or 
may distribute the same or equal parts thereof among the candidates as 
he shall see fit," as provided in the Constitution of the State of Illinois. 
For purposes of illustration it will be assumed that we have a district 
in which say the Republicans are in a minority. In that event they 
would nominate and run only one candidate, and if the party is well 
disciplined each voter would cast all his votes for this candidate, who will 
be designated as A. If the Republicans were sure of a majority of voters 
in the district they would then know that they could elect two candi- 
dates, say A and J3, and the voters would all be instructed to give i y 2 
votes to each of them. If they had three-fourths of the votes then 
they could elect all three candidates, and under effective party manage- 
ment all the electors would be instructed to srive one vote to each of 



THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 89 

three candidates, A, B and C. It will be seen then that a voter can 
vote in any of the three following ways : 

First. - Second. Third. 

A — 3 votes. A — 1 y 2 votes. A — t vote. 

B — 1*4 votes. B — i vote. 

: C — 1 vote. 

It has been assumed that in determining how to vote he is to a cer- 
tain extent sure of the number of votes which will be cast for the Re- 
publican candidate. This would, however, seldom be the case. There 
would always be more or less uncertainty whether his party can elect 
one, two or three candidates. It would therefore be desirable that in 
case all his votes are needed to elect the candidate whom he prefers to 
any of the others, or his first choice, that they should all be counted 
for that one. If, however, two candidates of the party with which the 
voter is identified can be elected, by dividing all the votes of the party 
equally between them, then he would ordinarily desire that his votes be 
so apportioned between the two, whom he or his party would select in 
preference to a third. If three candidates could be elected by an equal 
division of the votes among them then the voter would naturally give 
one vote to each of three. 

The voter in other words, should have " the power of expressing his 
approbation of a considerable number of candidates, by naming them 
as successors to his vote, without damaging the chances of those who 
stand highest in his preference."* In other words he should be able 
to express by his vote in substance this : " I prefer A, the candidate 
whose name I have placed or marked first on my voting paper or ticket, 
who is my first choice ; and if they are needed for his election all my 
votes are to be counted for him. If there are a sufficient number of 
persons belonging to my party, or holding the same opinions or having 
the same interests as mine, and who vote as I do, to elect two candidates 
in this district, then I want my votes to be equally divided between A 
and B, the latter being my second choice, and his name is placed or 
marked second on my ticket. If there are a sufficient number of voters 

* From a Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference of members of the 
Reform League of England and others on Mr. Hare's scheme of representation, held 
28th February, and 7th and 21st of March, 1868. 



90 THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 

who vote as I do to elect three candidates then C is my third choice 
and is so indicated in my ticket and my votes are to be divided equally 
between A, B and C" 

To fulfill these requirements a system of voting must have what 
engineers and mechanics call automatic action. It must have an in- 
herent power of adaptation to the condition which may exist at any 
election and effect a distribution of votes among all the parties and in- 
terests that may manifest themselves in the ratio of their numerical 
strength. This should be effected too with the smallest possible 
sacrifice of the elector's personal liberty of choice. 

This it is thought can be accomplished by adopting a very simple 
way of counting cumulative votes, similar to that proposed by Dr. 
Gustav Burnitz and Dr. George Varrentrapp in a pamphlet * published 
in Frankfort on the Main in 1863. A translation of this pamphlet is 
published in appendix B in this volume, to which the reader is referred. 
Without considering in detail the theories and methods contained in 
that pamphlet, the principle proposed by its authors may be illustrated 
by applying it to the vote of the hypothetical elector, the possible dis- 
tribution of whose votes was printed in tabular form on page 89. 

Assuming that his first choice of the candidates is A, the second 
B, and the third C, then, as pointed out, his votes may be given in 
either of the three ways indicated in the table. If all of them are 
given to one candidate then they should of course all three be counted 
for him ; if they are divided equally between two candidates then, obvi- 
ously, his second choice would get only half of the voter's votes. In 
fact if he votes for a second choice candidate, it implies that he has 
divided his three votes between two candidates, and therefore a second 
choice candidate cannot receive more than half as many votes as one who 
is a first choice. If the votes are distributed equally among three 
candidates, then the third could get only one third of the elector's 
votes. It is therefore obvious that a third choice candidate cannot 
get more than a third as many votes as one who is first on the list. 

Supposing though, that instead of one Republican voter, that 
there are a thousand, all of whom have the same preferences as our 

*" A Method of Assuring to the Majority as well as the Minorities, at all Kinds of 
Elections, the Number of Representatives Corresponding to their Strength." 



THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 



91 



hypothetical elector has, — that is, the first choice candidate of all of 
them is A, their second B, and their third C. It is plain that if they 
all give their three votes to A, that he will have 3000, but if they 
divide them equally between their first choice candidate A, and a 
second choice B, then B could only get 1500, or half as many votes 
as A co«ld get if they were all given to him. In other words, on this 
system, a second choice candidate can get only half as many votes as a 
first choice would receive if they are all concentrated on him. If the 
votes are divided among three candidates then it is also obvious that 
the third can get only one-third as many as the first may have if the 
voters should plump for him. 

As each of the 1000 voters has three votes, the total number is 
3000 which may all be given to the first choice candidate if the whole of 
them are needed to elect him. If they are divided equally between two 
candidates then the second choice cannot get more than 1500, or half 
as many as the first, and if divided among three the third will get 
only 1000, or one -third 2^ many as the first. 

To determine the maximum number of votes therefore which each 
candidate can have, all first choice votes should be divided by 7, all 
second choice by 2, all third by 3. This is the fundamental principle 
underlying Drs. Burnitz and Varrentrapp's system, the simplicity of 
which will recommend it. 

Let it be supposed further that the Democrats also nominate three 
candidates, D, E and E, and that they have 1 200 voters who can cast 3600 
votes and that the preference of these voters is expressed in the order 
in which the candidates are named, that is, D is their first choice, E 
the second and F the third. Then obviously the greatest number 
of votes which D could get would be 3600, E could get 1800 and 
7^1200. Arrange these figures in tabular form and they will be as 
follows : 

Republican. Democratic. 

1st choice, A, 3,000 votes. D, 3,600 votes. 

2d " B, 1,500 " E, 1,800 " 

3d " C, 1,000 " F, 1,200 " 

As " the three candidates highest in votes shall be declared 
elected " it is plain that A, D and E will have the highest number in 



92 THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 

whatever way the votes can be counted. If they are needed to elect the 
first choice candidates 3000 votes can be counted for A and if they are 
required to elect E>he has 3600 to elect him. If the votes are equally 
divided between the first and two second choice Republican candi- 
dates A and B, then'.Z? will have only half as many as A, or 1500, 
while if the Democratic votes are divided equally between D and E, 
E would then have 1800 or half as' many as D. The vote would 
therefore be as follows : 

A— 3,000 votes. D — 1,800 votes. 

' ' v - •' E— i ? 8oo " 

No other division of the votes can give any of the candidates more 
than E has if the Democratic votes are equally divided between D and 
E. Obviously then A, D and E are elected. 

The principle which underlies this division of votes and which has 
been explained, is that if a voter divides his votes equally between two 
candidates he can give only half as many for his second choice candi- 
date as he could for one alone, and if he divides his votes equally be- 
tween three he can give only one-third of them to his third choice — , 
in other words, second choice votes count for only half as much as 
first choices do, and third choice votes for only one-third as much as 
those for first choices. Without elucidating the subject any further now 
we may deduce the following very simple rule or law for this method 
of free voting which for the sake of explicitness will be called the 
Burnitz system which is applicable to the election of any number of 
representatives in Congress, state legislatures or municipal or any other 
legislative or corporate bodies or associations. 

RULE FOR VOTING. 

Each voter may give on his ballot, the names of not exceeding * 



candidates for whom he votes, and may indicate his preferences for such 
candidates by ordinal numbers marked opposite their names ; or, in the 
absence of such numbers, the order in which the names are inscribed on 
his ticket shall indicate the order of his preference, and as many votes 
shall be counted for each name as there are candidates to be elected. 

It will be seen that this rule does not require the voter to do any- 
• * The number to be elected, which, in this example, is three. 



THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 93 

thing which he is not obliged to do under the present system of voting. 
He is now compelled to have the name of a candidate whom he pre- 
fers written or printed on his ticket. That is all that is required in 
the proposed plan. It is true that under the new system a voter has 
the privilege of voting for more than one candidate if he chooses, but 
he need not exercise that privilege unless he wishes to do so. If he 
does vote for more than one, his preference or choice will be implied 
by the order in which the names of the candidate are arranged. 

If this method of voting was adopted it is probable that the dif- 
ferent parties would then, as now, have tickets printed and would ar- 
range the names in some order which would comply with the views of 
the party managers. This arrangement the voter could accept if he 
likes it, but if the arrangement adopted by the party is not satisfactory 
to him he could change it by simply writing a number opposite the 
name of each or any candidate. The candidates names on the tickets 
might or would be printed somewhat as follows : 
Choice for assembly. 



Henry Gladstone. 



Dennis O'Connor. 



Julius Bismarck. 



Voted in this way it would mean that Gladstone was the voter's 
first choice, O'Connor his second, and Bismarck his third. If this 
order was not in accordance with the preference of the voter he might 
take a pencil or a pen and mark i opposite his first choice, which it 
will be assumed is O'Connor, 2 opposite his second choice which 
might be Bismarck, and 3 opposite his third choice, so that his ticket 
would then be as follows : 

Choice for assembly. 



3d 


Henry Gladstone. 


I St 


Dennis O'Connor. 


2d 


Julius Bismarck. 



94 



THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 



Now at the risk of repeating what has already been said the reader 
will be asked to observe : 

1. The voter need not vote for more than one candidate unless he 
chooses to do so. 

2. He can vote for as many as he likes not exceeding the number to 
be elected. 

j. He need not indicate his preferences if he has none, or does not 
want to do it. 

4. If the order in which the names are inscribed on the ticket does 
not represent his preferences, he can change it by simply placing a number 
opposite to any or all the names. 

5. He can put a paster over any of the names or erase it if he does 
not want to vote it or desires to substitute some other name. 

Surely any voter who can exercise the franchise now could do so 
if this method of free voting was adopted, for the obvious reason that 
he would not be required to do anything then which he is not doing 
now when he avails himself of the glorious privilege of taking part in 
the government of our country. 

But it will be said that if a voter is permitted to divide his votes 
among as many candidates as he chooses, the difficulty will be not in 
casting but in counting the votes. Let us see what this difficulty will 
be. 

In the first place under the proposed system the inspectors and 
registers of election must count and record how many first, how many 
second, and how many third choice votes are cast for each candi- 
date. This, of course, implies some little extra labor and a little 
additional time. To do this when the polls are closed, the ballots 
can be assorted first according to the first choice votes — that is, it may 
be assumed, all those on which A is the first choice are sorted together 
in a pile, then those on which B is the first choice, and those of C, 
D, E and F, and the ballots in each pile are then counted and the 
number of first choice votes for each candidate are entered in a blank 
somewhat like the following : 



THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 



95 



RETURN OF VOTES CAST IN THE 



ELECTION DISTRICT. 



Choice. 


CANDIDATES. 


A 


B 


C 


D 


E 


f 


ISt 












2d 














3d 















When this is done the ballots are reassorted according to the sec- 
ond choice, counted and entered, and afterwards the process would 
be repeated for the third choice. When the votes cast are entered in 
the blank it would appear somewhat like that shown below. This, 

RETURN OF VOTES CAST IN THE FIRST ELECTION DISTRICT. 



Choice. 






CANDIDATES. 






A 


B 


c 


D 


E 


F 


ISt 


2750 


201 


49 


3333 


166 


IOI 


2d 


189 


2726 


85 


184 


3 2 74 


142 


3d 


108 


285 


2607 


97 


374 


3129 



or a copy of it, would then be sent to the district canvasser or board 
or other authority appointed for making the final count of the dis- 
trict, who would enter the returns on a blank somewhat like that on 
page 96, in which the number of the election district would be entered 
in the first column, the number of 1st, 2d and 3d choice votes cast for 
A would be entered on the same horizontal line, as the number of the 
district, and in the appropriate columns below the candidates' names, 
where the returns belong, as indicated by the headings. The same 
would be done with the votes for the other candidates, and the re^ 



96 



THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 





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THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 97 

turns from all the other election districts. When the returns from all 
the districts are entered the votes in each vertical column would be 
added up, which gives the total number of ist, 2d and 3d choice votes 
cast for each candidate in the whole assembly or other district. 

Now to count these votes in accordance with the principles which 
have been explained the following rule has been formulated : 

RULE FOR COUNTING THE VOTES. 

The first, second and third preference votes for the different candidates 
shall each be counted separately ; the total number of first preferences, 
for each candidate, shall be divided by 1, the second preferences by 2 and 
the third by j. The quotients thus obtained for each candidate shall be 
added together and their sum will be his elective quotient. The three 
candidates having the highest elective quotients shall be declared elected. 

To make the final determination or summation of the votes a blank 
somewhat like that shown on page 98 could be used. The sums from 
the returns in the table like that on page 96 would be carried to the appro- 
priate column in the table on page 98. Next to the column headed 
' ' votes' ' is another headed ' ' quotients. ' ' Then in accordance with the 
rule for counting, the first choice votes for each candidate are divided 
by 1 , and the quotient is carried into the adjoining column headed ' 'quo- 
tients" or what is the same thing the entire number of first choice votes is 
carried into this column. The second choice votes are then divided by 
two and the quotients carried into the column of quotients, and the 
third choice votes are divided by three and the quotients are transferred 
to column of quotients. In the table on page 98 such division has been 
made with imaginary figures. When this has been done for the votes 
of all the candidates the columns of ' ' quotients ' ' are added up and 
the sums are the "elective quotients " and "the three candidates hav- 
ing the highest elective quotients shall be declared elected." Striking 
out the lowest election quotients until three only are left makes it 
obvious that A, D and E are elected. 

Considerable objection has been made to cumulative voting on 
account of the difficulty of counting fractional votes which must be 
employed if voters are permitted to divide their votes equally among 
different candidates. In Illinois voters can divide their votes into 



THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 



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THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 99 

halves. A few of the respondents to the circular of inquiry on this 
subject say there is sometimes difficulty in counting fractional votes of 
as little vulgarity asa ^. If more than three candidates should be 
elected from a district it would be necessary to add up halves, thirds, 
quarters, fifths and perhaps other fractions still more vulgar. That 
ignorant inspectors and registers of election might find difficulty in 
doing this is quite probable. Especial attention is called to the fact 
that with the system which is proposed here inspectors have no other 
duty to perform than to count and record the votes cast in the district. 
They must count three classes of votes for each candidate instead of 
one — when three are elected. This is the only addition to the amount 
or the complexity of their work. 

Neither are the duties of the district canvassers increased in com- 
plexity further than to require that the ist, 2d and 3d votes cast for each 
candidate shall be divided by 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Other than 
this, the only mathematical qualification required for the performance 
of their duties is the ability to add up columns of figures representing 
the votes cast and that intellectual equipment they must have now. 
The fractional votes which are so much dreaded by some do not appear 
at all excepting perhaps as final quantities in the quotients when the 
total votes are not susceptible of equal division by the ordinal numbers 
which represent the preferences of voters. It should be observed : 

1. That the voter need not do anything which he is not required 
to do now. 

2. All that the inspectors of election, poll and ballot clerks in the 
local districts must do which is not required of them at present is 
to count and record several classes of votes for each candidate, instead 
of one class for one candidate. 

3. The complexity of the general district canvassers duties and the 
amount of work which they must do are increased only by the require- 
ment of recording and summing up three classes of votes for each 
candidate, instead of one class for each and dividing the sums by 1, 2 
and 3, and summing up the quotients. 

There is nothing in the proposed method of voting which requires 
any additional mental effort greater than the voter must now exert. If 
there be anything which affords a pretense of foundation for the charge 



IOO THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 

of complexity, it is the appropriation of the votes after the ballot or 
polling is over ; and this is to be performed by properly instructed and 
responsible officers, under careful and scrupulous control, and subject 
to the critical inspection of the parties especially concerned. But even 
if there is some slight addition to the duties of the officers of elec- 
tions and to the complexity of the methods of counting the votes it 
may be answered that " the object of government is justice and not 
simplicity. ' ' 

But those to whom this improved system is proposed may very 
properly ask what advantages will it have over the Illinois method of 
cumulative voting ? 

To this it may be answered that it will obviate entirely that prac- 
tical difficulty pointed out by the correspondent from Joliet which is 
that ' ' a voter cannot tell when he is casting more votes than a favorite 
candidate needs. ' ' It will remove entirely the motive and inducement 
for " plumping " when there is no need for it and the evils which re- 
sult therefrom and which have been indicated by 1 some of the respon- 
dents to the inquiries which have been made concerning the working 
of the Illinois system. It will give to each or any party a number of 
representatives proportionate to its votes and make it unnecessary for 
the party managers or the voters to estimate the strength of their party 
in order to determine how many votes to cast for respective candidates. 
It would in effect say to voters, — "you can select the candidate who is 
your first preference and cast your vote for him. If all your votes are 
required to elect your first choice they will all be counted for him. If, 
however, there are enough votes cast for the candidates both of your 
first and second choice then your votes will be divided between those 
two or if it is possible to elect the three preferred by you then your 
votes will be divided equally between those three. ' ' The system is 
' ' automatic ' ' and adapts itself perfectly to the varying strength of par- 
ties and to the wishes, intentions and preferences of voters and gives 
them the utmost freedom in assigning their votes to whoever will repre- 
sent their views and interests most satisfactorily. It enables the voter 
at the polls to declare in substance this — which has been expressed 
before — "If required to elect the candidate whom I have indi- 
cated as my first choice I hereby direct that all my votes be given 



THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. IOI 

to him if they are needed to elect him. If there are a sufficient 
number of votes cast for him and for the candidate I have designated 
as my second preference then I direct that my votes be divided equally 
between the two. If enough votes are cast to elect both of these 
candidates and the one whose name I have selected as my third choice 
then my votes are to be divided equally between all three. ' ' 

This system is equally well adapted to the election of a larger num- 
ber of representatives than three as it is to that number, and its advan- 
tages become more marked, when the number is increased as will be 
shown farther :on. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

Notwithstanding the fact, as was said by a writer in the Nation, 
" that when properly stated, the correctness of the principle of minority 
representation forces admission," and that the principle has been 
before the world and has been earnestly discussed and advocated by 
some of the ablest minds in Europe and this country, it must be 
admitted that, nevertheless, it has made comparatively little advance. 
The adoption of cumulative voting in Illinois, nearly twenty-five 
years ago, and the election of members of the legislature in that state 
ever since by that system, its application to the election ot school 
boards in England, and of the members of the governing bodies in 
some cities and corporations here, the adoption of the principle of pro- 
portional representation in Denmark and some of the cantons of 
Switzerland, is about all the advance that has been made. 

As long ago as September, 1886, the editor of the Nation began 
an article in that paper with the remark that "For several years 
past the question of ' personal, ' or ' proportional, ' or ' minority ' 
representation, which at one time attracted a good deal of attention, 
has been tacitly dropped out of sight. ' ' One of the reasons given 
for the disappearance of the subject from public discussions was that 
' • the reform of the civil service was more imperative, and the cham- 
pions of reform in administrative methods wisely concentrated all 
their efforts for the time upon the one principal issue. But," this 
writer continues, "the chief reason for the loss of interest in it was 
undoubtedly the want of any thoroughly satisfactory scheme of propor- 
tional representation. ' ' 

Most persons who are at all familiar with the subject, and the dis- 
cussion of it, during the past twenty-five years or more, will, it is 
thought, agree that this reason for the loss of interest in the subject is 
probably the true one. 

One of the purposes of this compilation has been to show the re- 



THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. I03 

suits and the advantages and disadvantages of the system of electing 
representatives by cumulative voting in the State of Illinois. It is 
thought that the evidence submitted has shown that a distinct gain in 
the promotion of good government has resulted there from that method 
of election although the experience of more than twenty years has 
shown some serious defects in it, which have been pointed out and are 
now recognized. Cumulative voting is therefore not a "thoroughly 
satisfactory scheme, ' ' although in justice to the advocates of minority 
representation, it should be said that the defects of the Illinois system 
were anticipated at the time, or very soon after it was adopted. In 
view of this experience, and of the fact that nowhere in the world 
has there been any general adoption of the principles of minority 
representation, notwithstanding that it has been advocated by some 
of the most eminent public men in this and in European countries, 
those in whose minds the justice and righteousness of its principles 
have " forced admission," may be expected to have an answer to the 
question whether now, after twenty or thirty years, or more, of dis- 
cussion and experience with various systems of cumulative and other 
kinds of voting, there is any one which in the words of the writer in 
the Nation, is ' ' thoroughly satisfactory. " It is true that such a demand 
seems somewhat inordinate. The adoption of minority representation 
in our elections implies a peaceful revolution in the methods by which 
power is conferred on those who are to govern us. To expect that a 
scheme which would be thoroughly satisfactory would be evolved by 
comparatively a few years' experience, is to expect a result seldom 
attained in methods of government. A scheme which is satisfactory 
to the extent only of being an advance over the old method of elec- 
tions of single members in each district, by a majority of the voters, 
— and this may rightly be claimed for cumulative voting — is about all 
that can be reasonably expected at the present juncture. 

It remains to show that the system of voting and of assigning and 
counting votes, which has been explained, will overcome the difficulty 
which voters would encounter under the cumulative plan, of knowing 
how many candidates to vote for and of dividing their votes equally 
among them, and of counting the votes, if the districts are enlarged 
and the number of members to be elected from each is increased. 



io4 



THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 



To do this it will be supposed that A, B, C, D and E are candi- 
dates of one party in a district where rive members are to be elected. 

A voter, if he divides his votes equally among different numbers of 
candidates could distribute them in any of the five following ways : 

4 1-5 



A, 5 votes. 



A, 2; 

B, 2, 



A, I % votes. 

B, i% " 

C, i% « 



A, I j^ votes, 

B, IX " 

c, ix " 



A, i 

B, i 

C, i 

D, i 

E, i 



If there were seven candidates then the votes could be divided in 
the following seven different ways : 

12345 



A, 7 vt. 



A, Z% vt. 

B, 3X " 



A, 2/ vt. 

B, 2/ « 

C, 21/ « 



A, IX 

B, IX 

c, iX 

D,iX 





5 


A, 


Ifvt. 


B, 


T 2 << 
1 5 


c, 


If " 


D, 


T 2 (( 


E, 


j2 << 







A, 


6 
1/ vt. 


B, 


1/6 " 


c, 


1^ " 


D, 


1/6 « 


E, 


1^ u 


F,- 


1/6 " 



A, I vt. 

B, 1 « 

C, 1 " 

D, 1 » 

E, 1 " 

F, 1 " 

G, 1 » 

It can readily be seen how great the difficulty would be for electors 
and for parties which influence or control them, to know how under 
such conditions to distribute their votes. Besides this perplexity there 
is also the ignorant voter and stupid election inspector and poll clerk 
whose incapacity must be considered. It would probably be quite be- 
yond the mathematical attainments of even average voters to divide 
five votes equally between three or four candidates, and to distribute 
seven equally among three, four, five or six would drive them to dis- 
traction, or the inaction of non-voting. Then in the counting of votes 
it is very doubtful whether ordinary inspectors of election and ballot 
clerks would be able to add up correctly columns of figures including 
halves, thirds and quarters, and if complicated with fifths and sixths it 
would be hopeless to expect correct results. 

It has been explained that in three member districts a voter is not 
required by the proposed system of voting to vote or make up his 
ballot any differently than he must at present. That is, he can vote 
for a single candidate in exactly the same way as he does now, but 
he has the privilege of voting for more than one, not exceeding the 



THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 



J 5 



whole number to be elected if he chooses to avail himself of that priv- 
ilege. His preferences for the different candidates may be indicated 
by the order in which the names are arranged on his ticket. If this 
order does not accord with his preferences it is provided that he can 
change it by simply inscribing ordinal numbers opposite the names of 
the candidates. It is repeated that the voter need not do anything 
more in voting than he does now but he has the additional privileges 
which have been explained. Now in applying this method to the 
election of five or seven, or any number of representatives, the 
principle and the practice so far as the voter is concerned is identical 
to that employed in electing three members excepting that he has the 
privilege of voting for more candidates, that is, as many as there are 
members to be elected, and can indicate his preferences in the 
same way as before. An illustration of its application to a five mem- 
ber district may make this a little clearer. 

To do this it will be supposed that each of the dominant parties, 
the Democratic and Republican, nominate as many candidates as there 
are members to be elected ; and that the following represent the re 
spective tickets of the two parties : 



Republican Ticket. 



Choice. 


For Assembly. 




James Allen. 




David Foster. 




Alexander Pratt. 




Robert Booth. 




Lyman Wheeler. 



io6 the burnitz system of election. 

Democratic Ticket. 



Choice. 


For Assembly. 


3 


Frank Campbell. 


2 


Josiah Weeks. 


4 


Allen Bush. 


i 


Dennis Flannigan. 


5 


Aaron Goldberg. 



These would be printed as they now are under the existing laws 
and regulations prevailing in the different states. If a Republi- 
can voter was satisfied with the ticket as printed and provided by 
his party managers, he would vote it just as it is represented. 
By doing so he would be declaring his preference for the candi- 
date — James Allen — named first in the list, who would be his first 
choice. His second choice would be the one — David Foster — who 
stands next on the list, and his third choice would be Alexander Pratt, 
and so on. But supposing that a voter was not satisfied with the order 
of preference in which the candidates are named — for instance, if the 
first choice of a Democratic voter was not Frank Campbell but Dennis 
Flannigan, in order to express this preference in his vote all he would 
be obliged to do would be to inscribe a figure i in front of Flannigan' s 
name as shown. If Josiah Weeks was his second choice he would 
mark his name accordingly, and would also mark the other candidates 
in the order of his preference as shown. As remarked before, there is 
nothing in the proposed method of voting which requires any mental 
effort greater than that which a voter must exert at present. 

Let it be supposed though that the independent Democrats in the 
district are dissatisfied with the ticket nominated by the regulars, and 
that they think they can elect a candidate who will represent them 
more acceptably. They therefore conclude to nominate a ticket of 
their own, but are uncertain whether they can elect more than one 



THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. I07 

candidate, and being reasonably well satisfied with the third of the 
regular Democratic nominees, they conclude to make him the second 
candidate on a ticket headed by Thomas Tiffany, an "anti snapper," 
we will assume. 

This ticket would then be as follows : 

Independent Democratic Ticket. 



Choice. 


For Assembly. 




Thomas Tiffany. 




Allen Bush. 



Each voter can now vote one of the regular tickets if he chooses to 
do so, or he can scratch out any name he likes, or if they are not ar- 
ranged in the order of his choice he can change it by placing an or- 
dinal number opposite any name which will designate which candi- 
date is his 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th or 5th choice, as has been explained. In 
other words he has the utmost liberty in voting. If he chooses he can 
vote for one candidate, just as he does now, or for two, three, four or 
five. If the names have been inscribed by the party managers in the 
regularly printed tickets in the order of the voter's preference, he votes 
it as printed. If their order is not in accordance with his preferences, 
he indicates the latter by marking ordinal numbers opposite the names 
which will express it. He is not obliged, as in Illinois, to indicate on 
his ticket how many votes he will give to each candidate. What he 
expresses in effect is — " I will give all my votes to my favorite candi- 
date, who is my first choice, if they are needed to elect him, or I will 
divide them between as many of my two, three or more favorites as 
can be elected." Whether they can be will be determined by the 
counting of the votes. 

The independents it will be supposed are in revolt. The regular 
Democrats have — as they often do — placed an unfit and unsatisfactory 
candidate at the head of their ticket, which determines some of the 



108 THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

voters to make an independent nomination, and run an independent 
ticket. They select Thomas Tiffany, a man, it will be assumed, of 
marked ability and integrity and with the qualifications demanded by 
the independents to represent their views and interests — and place him 
at the head of their ticket. They then agree by a canvass of the dis- 
trict to vote for him as their ist choice. 

The counting and return of the votes to the district canvassers from 
the different election districts would then be exactly the same as has been 
already described and made in a blank similar to that on page 95, ex- 
cepting that there would be the names of more candidates on it. These 
returns would be entered on a blank similar to the one on page 96, but 
with columns for ist, 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th choice votes instead of three 
only. When all the returns are received and tabulated and the votes 
in each column are added up the sums at the foot of the columns would 
be carried to the appropriate places in a blank similar to the one on 
page 98, but with five horizontal lines for the five classes of votes. 
The sums thus entered in this blank are then divided by the ordinal 
numbers and the quotients carried into the columns with that head- 
ing. It is assumed that the figures in the last blank represent the 
results of an election in a district in which three members are to be 
elected. The quotients for each candidate are then added up, and the 
lowest one is crossed out. This operation is continued until only five 
quotients, which are the highest, are left. The candidates for whom 
these were cast, being " the highest in votes," are elected. 

This system can be applied to the election of seven, nine or any 
number of representatives from a district and will always give a repre- 
sentation proportioned to the number of any body of electors who may 
vote for the same candidate or candidates. 

In order to make the practice which exists in Illinois and the sys- 
tem which has been explained here more nearly parallel, it has been 
assumed in the explanation of the latter that when three members are 
to be elected, that each voter can give three votes for each candidate, 
but in the final count those cast for the second choice candidate are to 
be divided by 2 and those for the third choice by 3. To carry out 
this parallel, if five members are to be elected then each voter should 
be allowed to give five votes for each, those for the second, third, 



THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION, IO9 

fourth and fifth choice candidates to be divided by 2, 3, 4, and 5, as 
has been explained. 

It does not matter so far as the result is concerned whether each 
voter gives five votes to each candidate or whether he gives one to 
each, which may be divided into five parts. It is only a difference 
in the method of expressing and representing the fact that the voter 
has a certain amount of voting power or potency, all of which may be 
given to one candidate, or a half to another, or a third to another, and 
so on. It is a mere verbal distinction to call the voting power which 
an elector can give to one candidate five votes, or to call it one vote 
divided into five parts. As there undoubtedly is more or less popular 
prejudice against allowing a voter to cast more than one vote for a single 
candidate, it would seem to be better if " a system of free voting is 
adopted" to call each person's voting power one vote, and permit it to 
be divided and distributed in equal parts thereof among different can- 
didates. As explained this would not affect the final result in any way. 

Owing to the prejudice referred to, it therefore seems in every way 
desirable that the votes of electors should be limited to one for each of 
as many candidates as he chooses to vote for, not exceeding the num- 
ber to be elected in the general district. It is therefore recom- 
mended that each voter simply give the names of the candidates he 
prefers in his ballot and that one vote be counted for each, the votes to 
be subject to the division in the final count, which has been explained. 

The number of representatives elected in each district should how- 
ever always be an odd one, that is three, five or seven and not four, 
six or eight. The reason for this may perhaps be made plain easiest by 
an illustration. Let it be supposed that the Democrats in a district 
have 36,360 voters and the Republicans 48,470, and that six members 
are to be elected. If each of the two parties runs three candidates and 
all the voters cast one* vote for each candidate, in the manner 
which has been explained and recommended, then on the final divi- 
sion and count, the result would be as follows : 



* In practice there would of course be more or less scatteiing of votes, that is, some 
voters would select one candidate for their first, second third, etc. , choices and some 
would choose others ; it is not likely that all would vote in the same way as has been 
indicated in the table for the purposes of this illustration. 



THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 



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THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. Ill 

Striking out the lowest elective quotients beginning with 6060 and 
successively 7272, 8078-?, 9090, 9694 and 12,117*- until there are 
only six such quotients left and it will be seen that A, B and C, 
on the Democratic ticket and G, H and / on the Republican would be 
elected. That is the Republicans with only 36,360 votes will elect as 
many representatives as the Democrats do with with 48,470. A little 
analysis will show that if six members are elected ' ' unless the party 
in a majority exceeds the minority, in a proportion of more than four to 
three, it cannot secure a majority of members, when both parties make 
the best use of their numbers ■,"* and three members of each party 
would be elected in the preceding example in spite of the fact that 
the Republicans had a majority of 12,110. 

If there is any one political maxim more firmly rooted in the 
American mind than another it is the one which asserts that "the 
majority should rule. ' ' As has been said ' ' popular opinion has elevated 
it to the sanctity of a great principle of free government. ' ' A system 
of election which would withhold from majorities power which it is 
thought rightfully belongs to them would be certain to encounter great 
public opposition and excite great dissatisfaction, and would not be 
tolerated for any great length of time. If however five or seven or 
any other odd number of members were elected from each district by 
the method which has been explained, then whichever party has a 
majority of voters can always elect a majority of the representatives. 
Thus with the figures which have been used for the preceding 
illustration, if only five candidates were to be elected then C 
would have been defeated and the Democrats would have elected 
two and the Republicans three. If seven members were elected 
then J would have had to be counted in and the Republicans would 
have had three and the Democrats four. This same result would 
be reached if the Democrats had a majority of only one. In other 
words if an odd number of candidates are elected from each district, 
then, if there are two parties nearly equally divided the one having a 
bare majority of the voters can always elect a majority of the represen- 
tatives ; which accords with the traditional rights of majorities. It is 



*G. Shaw Lefevre, m Nineteenth Century, of May, 1884. 



112 THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

true that if a third party should run a candidate in a district in which 
an odd number of representatives is to be elected, it might produce 
the same condition of things between the first and second parties that 
would exist if an even number of candidates were elected in the district 
by two parties alone, but in that event, the result would be due and 
would be attributed to the action of the third party and it would not 
be a result inherent in the system of election. In times of great 
political excitement, to withhold from the party which has a decided 
majority of the voters, the advantage accruing from having a majority 
of the representatives, would be certain to produce great public hos- 
tility from them which might lead to very serious results. 

The modification of the Burnitz system for electing representatives 
to national, state, municipal and corporate bodies may then be sum- 
marily described as follows : 

1st. An odd number of representatives greater than two should be 
elected in each district. 

2d. Each voter may give on his ballot the names of not exceeding 

- * candidates for whom he votes, and may indicate his preferences 

for such candidates by ordinal numbers marked opposite their names ; 
or, in the absence of such numbers, the order in which the names are 
inscribed on his ticket shall indicate the order of his preferences. 

jd. The first, second, third, fourth, etc., preference names for the 
different candidates to be counted separately ; the total number of first 
preferences of each candidate to be divided by one, the second preferences 
by two, the third by three, and so on. The quotients thus obtained for 
each candidate to be added together, and their sum will be his elective 
quotient. The number of candidates who are to be elected having the 
highest elective quotie?its shall be declared elected. 

This system is applicable to and is adapted for any kind of elec- 
tions in which any number of members greater than two are to be 
elected. It is as well suited to the election of presidential electors 
and members of Congress as it is to state legislatures, and representa- 
tives in municipal governing bodies, primary meetings, corporate or 
other associations. It is believed that if it is adopted any number of 

*The number to be elected. 



THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. II3 

members may be elected in a district without encountering any of the 
difficulties which have been experienced with cumulative voting. Its 
advantages may then be finally summed up as follows : 

1 st. It will give perfect freedom to the voter in the selection of 
candidates and the concentration of his votes, and will give them 
their full efficacy. No additional mental or physical effort greater 
than that which is demanded by the present method of voting will be 
required of him, either antecedent to or during the act of casting his 
ballot. 

2d. No other duties are demanded of inspectors of election, poll 
and ballot clerks, than are required now, excepting to count and 
record several classes of votes, for each candidate, instead of one 
only. 

3d. The general district canvassers will be required, as now, to re- 
cord and sum up the votes reported from the local districts, to divide 
the sums by their ordinal numbers and then sum up the quotients. 
The only additions to their duties are those resulting from the increase 
in the number of ordinal classes of votes or preferences for candidates, 
the division of the sums of their votes by their ordinal numbers, and 
the final summation of the quotients, which are all very simple pro- 
cesses. 

''If," as was said of the Hare system, "there be anything 
which affords a pretense of foundation for the charge of complexity, it 
is the appropriations of the votes after the ballot or polling is over ; 
and this is to be performed by properly instructed and responsible offi- 
cers, under careful and scrupulous control, and subject to the critical 
inspection of the parties especially concerned." Surely a charge that 
the proposed system is complex has little basis to rest on, and even if it 
had the response might again be made that " the object of government 
is justice and not simplicity. ' ' We have it on the authority of the mod- 
ern philosophers that ' ' all organic development is a change from a 
state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity. ' ' Political evolution 
is a like process. 

In order to formulate the general principles of the Burnitz system 
of election into a concrete form the following amendment to the Con- 
stitution of the State of New York has been framed. It is based on 



114 TKE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

the- one proposed by the Proportional Representation Society of New 
York, which contains a provision for the election of state senators and 
assemblymen and members of the legislative bodies of cities by a sys- 
tem of cumulative voting. The following amendment is intended as a 
substitute for some of the provisions of Article III. of the present 
Constitution : 

Article III. 

Section i. The legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and 
Assembly. 

Sec. 2. The Senate shall consist of thirty-five members, and the Assembly of one 
hundred and forty members. The Senators and the Assemblymen shall be chosen for 
two years. 

Sec. 3. The Legislature, at its first session, after this article shall have become 
part of the Constitution, shall divide the State into five Senate districts, and declare the 
boundaries thereof ; and shall also divide the State into twenty Assembly districts and 
declare the boundaries thereof. 

Sec. 4. The Senate and Assembly districst shall consist of convenient and con- 
tiguous territory, shall have a population, excluding aliens, as nearly equal as may be 
conveniently practicable and not less than seven Senators and seven Assemblymen shall 
be elected from each district at the same time. 

Sec. 5. And to insure a real freedom of voting for and of election of Senators 
and Assemblymen, each qualified voter in each of these districts may give on his bal- 
lot the names of not exceeding seven candidates for the Senate and Assembly respec- 
tively, for whom he votes ; and may indicate his preferences for such candidates by 
ordinal numbers marked opposite their names ; or, in the absence of such numbers the 
order in which the names are inscribed on his ballot shall indicate the order of his 
preferences. 

Sec. 6. After the closing of the polls on the day of election, the canvass in each 
election district shall be completed by ascertaining and counting, separately, and mak- 
ing returns to a Board of District Canvassers, in the respective Senate and Assembly dis- 
tricts, of the number of the first, second, third, etc. , votes given for each candidate. 
From the returns so made the Boards of District Canvassers in each district shall deter- 
mine the total number each of first, second, third, etc. , preference votes cast for each 
candidate in the respective districts. The total number of first preference votes for 
each candidate shall then be divided by I, the total number of second preference 
votes by 2, the third by 3 and so on. The quotients thus obtained for each candi- 
date shall be added together and their sum will be his elective quotient. The seven 
candidates for the Senate and Assembly having the highest elective quotients in the 
respective districts shall be declared elected. 

Sec. 7. If a member of the Senate or Assembly shall die or resign, or his seat 
become vacant for anv reason, the remainder of his term shall be served by the can- 



THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. II 5 

didate who had the ne::t highest elective quotient of the body of electors to which 
such member belongs. 

Sec. 8. The Legislature shall also enact a law requiring the several cities of the 
state to be divided into districts for the election of the members of their respective leg- 
islative bodies, which election shall be according to such method of free voting and 
election, described in Sections 5 and 6 of this article. 

Sec. 9. Such municipal districts shall have, as nearly as practicable, an equal 
population, exclusive of aliens. Not less than seven such members shall be elected 
from each of the districts at the same time. 

Sec. 10. In case of a vacancy occurring in any such municipal legislative bodies 
it shall be filled in the same manner as presented for Senators -and Assemblymen in 
Section 7 of this article. 



CHAPTER X. 

POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 

To show still further some of the political evils from which we are 
now suffering, and how they could be overcome, by a system of free 
voting, an illustration will be given. In the city of New York the 
nomination of candidates for the state legislature and the local board 
of aldermen is almost absolutely controlled by the professional politi- 
cians and party managers in and through their organizations, caucuses 
and party machinery. We, the voters, are victims of the " machines," 
and as a practical politician recently said : "It's great sport to see peo- 
ple go to the polls in herds and vote like cattle for the ticket we pre- 
pare. * * * The people think they make the nominations, but 
we do that business for them." The candidates thus nominated as 
some one else has said "represent, not the will of the majority, but 
the tyranny of an active and unscrupulous minority. " If he had said 
of two or more minorities who give us a choice of evils in the candi- 
dates they nominate the statement would have been more nearly in 
accordance with the experience of many voters. Under this tyrannical 
control of political affairs, as Mr. Sterne has said in his book, from 
which we have quoted before : " To become one of the dominant 
majority, the citizen must attach himself to the party in power, or to 
one which has the opportunity to come into power ; to do so the voter 
must, in a majority of cases, surrender his individual preferences as to 
men, and as often to measures, which he believes to be for the public 
welfare, so that some of his opinions may prevail, or that some tenet 
of the opposite party, to which he is more especially adverse, may not 
become law," or what is perhaps still worse for the public welfare 
" many men, not liking the choice of evils which party machinery 
presents to their view, prefer to disfranchise themselves rather than be- 
come party to the elevation of unfit and improper men to political 
power. * * * If they belong to the minority in opinion 
they throw away their votes, as representation is denied to the min- 

116 



POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 1 1 7 

ority. If they belong to the majority, they may be compelled 
to vote for men who turn uppermost in the machinery of party, 
and in whose professions that they will carry out the party princi- 
ples they have no faith." In support of this Mr. Sterne also 
quotes what Mr. J. Francis Fisher says in a pamphlet on Reform 
in Municipal Elections : " that, in the progress of years, when 
he wished to take his humble part as a constituent unit in the 
body politic, he found himself thrust aside from the procession of state 
as if he had no legitimate place in its ranks. At the various elections 
he seldom found any candidate presented to him whom he could sin- 
cerely approve ; still more rarely one whom he could support with zeal. 
He always voted for those he thought the worthiest and generally without 
party prejudice, and the result was that he was almost always in the 
ranks of the defeated. Although classed among the educated and 
wealthy, he felt himself as much disfranchised as if he had been ex- 
cluded from the polls by law. He had no voice in any nomination, 
only a selection among those he would not have chosen. Many of his 
most valued friends were in the same category, and with him almost 
despaired of redress. ' ' This was written more than twenty-five years 
ago and probably it will express with more or less accuracy what many 
persons have experienced at nearly every election held during that 
period. It happens often that honest men having the public interest 
and good government at heart are disposed to use their influence and 
power, whatever it may be to secure the election of worthy representa- 
tives. To quote Mr. Sterne again : "In every electoral district, in every 
community, some men will be found with penetration enough to dis- 
cover the weaknesses, the follies, and the vices of their neighbors, and 
who are both skillful and unscrupulous enough to make them sub- 
servient to their own ends." When the public spirited patriotic 
citizen goes out in the service of his city, his state or his country, he 
often finds that there is no scarcity of the class of people described by 
Mr. Sterne, and he may learn that there is one body of them in league, 
il not with the vice, at least with the vicious in the district, and another 
apparently antagonistic to the first, but with common interests in 
venality and the two are bound together for the protection of those 
interests, and ready to condone any of the short-comings or wrong- 



IlS POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 

doings of their adversaries for the sake of an alliance for the protection 
of their selfish aims or purposes. 

With the exception of Illinois all our states, cities and towns are, 
for representative purposes, divided into districts, each district having 
a certain number of inhabitants who have but one representative, who 
is necessarily elected by a majority of the voters in the district. " The 
hallucination of this, ' ' as Mr. Sterne says, ' ' is, that the right of the 
majority to govern carries with it the right of the majority to sole rep- 
resentation. ' ' In the assembly and aldermanic districts of the city of 
New York the Democrats generally have decided majorities. There is, 
nevertheless a very large body of Republican voters scattered over the 
city who are almost entirely unrepresented in the state legislature and 
in the board of aldermen. The primaries are in the hands of the 
politicians who are prone to make such nominations as will best secure 
their nefarious purposes. From these candidates we, the Democratic, 
Republican, or independent voters must choose the persons who are 
to be our representatives. There is no freedom of choice, on the con- 
trary there is constraint and compulsion to vote for men we would not 
choose to represent ns if we were free to make our own selection. 
The Democrats having a majority of the votes generally elect their 
candidates, with the result that the large body of Republican and in- 
dependent voters in New York are unrepresented or are practically 
disfranchised. Just the reverse of this is true in many of the counties 
where the Republicans are in a majority. 

"Absolute acquiescence in the will of the majority, fairly pro- 
nounced," Mr. Buckalew said, " is a vital principle of our system, or 
one at least, which must be applied and carried out constantly, or our 
experiment of free government would end in failure. But Mr. Mill 
long ago pointed out the fact that the majority vote, as heretofore ex- 
isting in Great Britain and in the United States, does not secure the 
will of the majority — that, in point of fact, the rule which we get 
from it, as we apply it is a rule of the majority of the majority, or 
often of a small portion only of the people. In the first place at the 
popular elections you count out all the minority voters ; you count or 
allow only majority votes and put aside the rest. A large part of the 
people, then, are virtually disfranchised, they have no further voice in 



POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 119 

the government beyond the giving of fruitless votes, which, after being 
scored down, are in effect scored out again. Then the representa- 
tives so chosen meet in a legislative body, and when any measure of 
policy is to be voted upon, the majority rule is applied again, and the 
minority of the legislative body ignored, so that the majority of the 
legislative body pronounces the rule of law for the citizen. 

" Besides, in practice in this country, legislative majorities, upon all 
measures of a political character at least, and many others, act under a 
system of consultation — that is, under what we call the caucus rule. 
The representatives of the majority in the representative body meet 
together, and subject their wills to the decision of a majority of them- 
selves ; and that caucus decision, concerted and settled in secret, be- 
comes the law of the state. The caucus is in the third degree removed 
from the people, and there are three eliminations of popular power be- 
fore the law is enacted. Therefore I say you do not necessarily secure 
the rule of the majority under your majority vote, because the majority 
of the legislative body, made up as I have described it, and acting as 
it does, may very likely represent only a minority of the people out of 
doors, and such, in point of fact, is frequently the case. ' ' 

A great evil, too, in our country is the frequent changes in the 
membership of our legislative bodies. This was very forcibly stated in 
the report of a Select Committee on Representative Reform — of which 
Mr. Buckalew was chairman — submitted to the Senate of the United 
States in 1869. It was then said : 

" It is believed that changes are now too frequent in the House, 
and that the public interests suffer detriment from this cause. The 
committee give their unqualified approval to that provision of the con- 
stitution which assigns short terms of service to members of the House. 
But frequency of election does not involve rapidity of change. Pop- 
ular power may be retained over the House, and yet the great part of 
its members be continued by reelection for a considerable period of 
time ; in other words, frequent elections and permanent membership 
are not incompatible. 

"But, in point of fact, the members o r the House are frequently 
changed so that members of less than four years' service always con- 
stitute a large majority, and it is a rare case that a member continues 



120 POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 

beyond a third term. Under such a system or practice of rapid 
change, the average character of the House for ability cannot be high. 
Two and four year men can know but little of the business of govern 
merit, can be but imperfectly qualified to curb abuses in the executive 
department, and to expose or comprehend the true character of most 
questions of domestic and foreign policy. 

' ' There are several reasons which account for frequent change in 
the membership of the House, of which the single-district system is 
chief. The fluctuation of party power is next in importance, but is 
intimately connected with the former. The single-district system has 
carried the idea of local representation to excess, and has produced a 
class of inconveniences peculiar to itself. The idea of assigning a 
representative by law to a special district within a state is naturally 
supplemented by the idea of rotation in the representative privilege 
among the localities within the district. Hence, very commonly 
party nominations are made in turn to the several counties, parishes, or 
other municipal divisions of the district, which necessitates the fre- 
quent selection of new men for representative nomination. The claim 
of locality becomes more importunate, and is often more regarded 
than the claims or fitness of candidates in making party nominations, 
and this although there is no diversity of interest among the people in 
the different parts of the district. The other cause which we have 
mentioned cooperates with this, though subordi nate to it in effect. 
Changes of party power in districts where one party does not largely 
predominate over another, are at all times likely to occur and to defeat 
the member of the House from the district, although his own party 
may desire to continue him in the public service. These causes of 
change would have but slight operation if delegations from states were 
elected by general ticket, and would have still less if they were selected 
upon the plan of cumulative or free vote as the practicable and effec- 
tual measure of reform. It will continue members of merit for long 
periods of time in the House, because it will relieve them and those 
who support them from the causes of change above mentioned. They 
can be reelected with certainty so long as the party whose representa- 
tives they are desire their continuance in service, and it may be rea- 
sonably expected that some men of distinction and intellectual power 



POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 12 1 

will always be found in the House whose period of service counts by 
twenty or thirty years. They will be the great representatives of the 
party, and will give lustre and power and usefulness to the House, 
while they will be the objects of profound attachment and of honest 
pride in the states they represent. Congress will become, much more 
than at present, a theatre of statesmanship and a fit representative of a 
great people, whose extended territory, diverse populations and varied 
interests demand great ability and wisdom in the enactment of the 
laws. Our present system, admirably calculated to repress merit, will 
be supplanted by one which will produce precisely the opposite result. 

"At present a member of the House holding his seat insecurely 
cannot devote himself to public business with that zeal and confidence 
which his position demands He is involved all the time in a contest 
for official existence, and his energies are thereby absorbed and wasted. 
If he has a just ambition to serve the people he must repress rivals at 
home, must overcome a rule of rotation in his district and fortify him- 
self against fluctuations of party power. It will be expected of him 
that he shall distribute the patronage of the government to men who 
will be efficient in his support for reelection ; and thus appointments 
to office and government contracts are to be his peculiar study and 
their distribution a leading object of his labor. And he must be lib- 
eral in his expenditure of money upon elections to retain his popular- 
ity and place ; and the more of political contribution from abroad he 
can obtain to influence elections in his district the more admired and 
the more secure he will be. 

"■ In brief, his time and his efforts, instead of being expended for 
the public, must be expended on personal objects if he desires to re- 
main for any considerable time a representative of the people. Un- 
doubtedly many of the best men of the country must be deterred from 
entering upon a congressional career, continuance in which requires 
such sacrifices to an evil system, so much of unpleasant effort, attended 
with more uncertainty and probable mortification." 

One of the greatest political evils from which we are now suffering 
is the indifference and apathy which exists among voters with refer- 
ence to political affairs. They say with much truth — why should we 
go to primaries ? We can have no influence there unless we surrender 



122 POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 

our opinions and independence to those who control these organiza- 
tions ; why should we vote ? We have only a choice between two 
candidates, both unworthy. When this subject was discussed in the 
British Parliament some years ago, Lord Cairns said : ' ' With regard 
to the constituency itself — and this is one of the most important views 
of the case — I believe you would gain the greatest possible satisfaction; 
there is nothing so irksome to those who form the minority of one of 
those large constituencies as finding that from mere force of numbers 
they are virtually excluded from the exercise of any political power; that 
it is vain for them to attempt to take any part in public affairs ; that 
the elections must go in one direction, and that they have no political 
power whatever. On the one hand the result is great dissatisfaction, 
and on the other it is disinclination on the part of those who form the 
minority to take any part in affairs in which it is important they should 
take a prominent and conspicuous part. ' ' 

In the same debate Mr. Buxton said : " They (the minority) feel it 
totally hopeless to attempt to carry a candidate, and they resign them- 
selves with more or less bitterness to political death. They feel that they 
are altogether excluded from any influence whatever over the destinies 
of their country : not merely that they cannot hope to rule, but that 
they cannot even be represented in the council of the nation. They 
accordingly sink into hopeless apathy, while the majority having every- 
thing their own way, not enjoying the advantage of being opposed and 
forced to struggle and strive, would themselves also be likely to grow at 
once apathetic and arrogant. He was not devising this state of things out 
of his own imagination ; they knew that exactly this had happened in 
many instances both across the water and in certain constituencies at 
home when one party * * * had held irresistible sway. 

" But now suppose * * * the arrangement proposed (propor- 
tional representation) were adopted ; immediately every elector in 
the constituency would be stirred into life. Those who belonged to 
the minority instead of giving up the whole affair as a bad job, shrug- 
ging their shoulders, and feeling that although they were Englishmen 
they were as destitute of political influence as if they were so many 
Indians, would immediately organize themselves as a party to form a 



POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 1 23 

* * * Political deadness would be exchanged for political anima- 
tion."' 

It was said in the Address to the Public of the American Proportio lal 
Representation League : " When every citizen votes with the full assur- 
ance that each individual vote bears directly upon the final result, tn:- 
men who have withdrawn in despair from politics as something with 
which an honest man can have nothing to do, will return to their duty- ' 

In his article already quoted from Mr. Leonard Courtney said, that 
with minority representation " you will have a real and not an arti- 
ficial democracy. According to the idea of this system any adequate 
number could join together, select their man, and send him in. It 
follows that if there arose a political thinker in the country, men would 
come together throughout the country and return him. Men would 
gather round him and send him in, and you would thus have intro- 
duced into the House of Commons elements of life, strengthening and 
vivifying the whole ; instead of making medicrocity a condition with- 
out which nobody could enter, you would have life and energy secured 
in the return of able men ; and of course if you got candidates thus 
independent you would change the House of Commons, and you would 
operate upon the people outside. ' ' 

As some one else has said : " While it is constantly for the interest 
of cliques and minorities to put knaves and simpletons into office, it 
never can be to the interest of the majority to be represented by them. ' ' 
The majority of our fellow citizens wish to be represented by the ablest 
and best men that the community can furnish ; and Mr. Mill has said : 
" The multitude have often a fine instinct for distinguishing an able man 
when he has the means of displaying his ability in a fair field." Give 
them freedom of selection and the people of the country, it is believed, 
may be trusted to select able and also honest men. 



CHAPTER XL 

INFLUENCE OF FREE VOTING IN PARTY ORGANIZATION. 

It may be thought that a system of free voting like that which has 
been described may diminish the influence of party organization in po- 
litical affairs. Undoubtedly it would give greater independence to 
individual voters, but this would make it none the less possible to 
combine for party purposes, if such combination were desirable. Re- 
garding this Mr. Buckalew will again be quoted : "So long, ' ' he 
said, ' ' as free play is permitted to the human mind in political affairs, 
there will be parties, and government must be organized and adminis- 
tered with reference to them, and that all attempts based upon the 
assumption that it is possible to conduct public affairs without parties, 
are idle and vain ; in fine, that all attempts based on that idea must 
result in complete and disastrous failure. No such object has been 
proposed by persons in this country, or beyond the ocean, who have 
supported this plan of the free vote or cumulative voting. All they 
propose is to put into the hands of political parties an instrument 
by which they can act justly at elections, by which they can obtain for 
themselves a fair share of power by their own votes and by which it 
will be impossible for them to take from their fellow-citizens any por- 
tion of political power which belongs to them. ' ' 

Discussing this same branch of the subject an English writer* in 
the Westminster Review for January , 1884, says: 

' 'A system of preferential voting takes from party organization none 
of its legitimate influence and power, but it gives any section of the 
party dissatisfied with the choice of their local association an appeal 
from its decision. Without endangering the seat they may, if they can, 
start a more satisfactory candidate, and can take the opinion of the 
constituency upon the merits of the rivals, not by any fallacious party 
vote, taken beforehand, but by a test-ballot forming part of the actual 
process of election. Under these circumstances the association 
(caucus) will no longer enjoy the dangerous privilege of irresponsible 



* J. Parker Smith. 

124 



INFLUENCE OF FREE VOTING IN PARTY ORGANIZATION. 1 25 

and absolute authority, but will be in the position of a constitutional 
ministry liable to have their decisions reversed and discredited unless 
they can carry along with them the majority of their party. ' ' 

While free voting is adapted to party organization it also facili- 
tates, as Mr. Buckalew says, "the bolting of nominations by an ag- 
grieved interest, for such interest, if of respectable size, can repre- 
sent, by its own votes, without disturbing or changing the whole 
result of an election. * * * 

"Bolting is deprived to a great extent of its mischievous charac- 
ter, bolters being only able to represent themselves by their own votes 
when their number is adequate, without being able to turn an election 
upside down or prevent a just division of the offices between par- 
ties." 

" Proportional representation," Prof. John R. Commons* says, 
" would permit independent movements within the party without risk- 
ing the defeat of the entire ticket, simply by allowing the nomination 
of a new ticket composed partly of independents and partly of the reg- 
ular ticket. ' ' 

One of the great evils of democratic government, which is especially 
noticeable in great cities, is the facility with which the most ignorant 
and venal voters can be combined and controlled — as Mr. Sterne says 
— "by men with penetration enough to discover the weaknesses, the 
follies, and the vices of their neighbors, and who are both skillful and 
unscrupulous enough to make them subservient to their own ends. ' ' It 
may be added that venality is often the only weakness, folly and vice 
which need be discovered in order to make such voters subservient to 
the purposes of corrupt politicians. The influence of such bodies of 
voters, thus controlled, given to either of the dominant parties, will 
often decide which one of them will be in a majority, in districts in 
which a single representative is elected. Unfortunately the organiza- 
tion of the intelligent and the worthier electors is not so effective in 
controlling elections, because, owing to the fact that they hold some 
definite political principles, or possibly prejudices, they, for that 
reason, give their adherence or votes to one party or the other, while 



* Proportional Representation a Remedy for Gerrymandering, a paper submitted to 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 



126 INFLUENCE OF FREE VOTING IN PARTY ORGANIZATION. 

those who determine on which side the majority shall be are not en- 
cumbered by any such scruples, but vote, "for revenue only." The 
method of the practical politicians is a very simple one and one which 
they have not been slow in comprehending. It is briefly this — first 
announce in the ' '- platforms ' ' of each of the two dominant parties some 
general principles and measures which will secure the adherence of 
nearly equal portions of the honest voters to each. This will leave a 
remnant of say one-fifth or some other fraction of all the voters. All 
that is needed then to carry the election, is to cajole or to bribe a major- 
ity of this unrighteous remnant. The professional politicians are not 
usually slow to work the corrupt remnant, in their vernacular, <( for all 
it is worth. ' ' The political influence of the intelligent, upright and 
worthy portion of the community is therefore, generally, "in the 
inverse ratio of their mental and moral capacity and value. Unless 
this evil is encountered by giving to intellect and integrity a greater 
freedom and effectiveness of action — not freedom to bribe and cajole ; 
but freedom for pure and honorable effort — and therewith, higher and 
better inducements to act, will surely leave them in this country as 
elsewhere in like circumstances, degraded and powerless. ' ' * 

The reform of our elective machinery which is advocated would 
make combinations of the better elements in society easier and more 
effective in political affairs than they can possibly be now. It is true 
that the corrupt portion of the voters would have equal facilities for 
combining but they would no longer be able to control political affairs, 
and their sole object and that of their leaders is to control the power, 
patronage and " boodle." Take away their power to do this and the 
motive for their being " in politics " is gone. As the Hon. Charles 
Francis Adams said in a recent article in the Proportional Representa- 
tion Review : 

' ' Consider what an enormous influence this would give to the 
intelligent individual voter ! How it would bother the municipal 
' boss ! ' Voters are now divided up and segregated by artificial 
lines ; they are in this way so placed that they can be manipulated by 
astute political managers to the utmost possible extent. Their efforts 
at a better state of things can be thwarted. Under the system pro- 

* Thomas Hare in Macmillan's Magazine, February, 1862. 



INFLUENCE O? FREE VOTING IN PARTY ORGANIZATION. 1 27 

posed they would be free from all restraints and put in position where 
the individual could make himself fell, provided he desired so to do. 
He could not be tied hand and foot. 

" Take the city of New York. We all know the character of those 
composing the legislative department of the city. It is notorious — it 
could not be worse than it is. Suppose that instead of the present 
board of aldermen and its common council the city of New York were 
to elect one legislative body in such a way that every proportionate 
part of the voters should have one representative. Suppose every vote 
to bear directly upon the final result, with all useless majorities and 
wasted minorities given their proper effect. If the council consisted 
of 21 members anybody of citizens numbering one 21st part of the 
whole number of voters could and would have one representative. 
Would not the inevitable result be the nomination as candidates by 
citizen organizations of at least a certain number of men, who, if 
elected would give weight and character to that body ? Would not the 
result naturally be that men of the class now composing the legislative 
department of New York city either would not be brought forward as 
candidates at all, or if brought forward before the constituency as a 
whole, and no longer in wards, would be left in the election at the 
foot of the poll ? Every reform organization hoping to represent one 
twenty-first part of the total vote thrown would be under the highest 
possible inducement to put forward as its candidate the man of the 
strongest character, and the man most widely and favorably known. 
The objection to bringing forward men who were only locally known 
would be equally great. The object of each organization would nec- 
essarily be to nominate candidates who would draw to themselves the 
greatest number of votes in the constituency at large. The political 
prison lines, now known as ward lines, would be thrown down. ' ' 



CHAPTER XII. 

OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 

But it may be said as Disraeli did say that, "cumulative voting, 
and other schemes having for their object to represent minorities, that 
they were admirable schemes for bringing crotchety men into the 
House," or as John Bright said, they would "put in the nominees of 
little cliques, " or to quote Gladstone's words, "we do not want to 
have represented immature particular shades of opinion. ' ' Now what 
is a " crotchet ' ' ? Nearly all legislative innovations are, at first, re- 
garded as being "crotchets" — or, as the dictionary expresses it, 
"perverse fancies." If as De Quincey said, "these cannot be ex- 
plained to any rational man," then of course it is not desirable that 
they should have representation. The abolition of slavery, the estab- 
lishing of free trade and civil service reform, and even honesty in the 
public service, all were, or are, regarded as crotchets. If opinions are 
held by any considerable body of men even if they are crotchets 
it is altogether better that they should have a fair hearing. If they 
cannot be "explained to rational people," the hearing will do 
little harm. Mr. Bright' s remark is perhaps true that " little" 
cliques should not be heard in the halls of legislature, but the 
force of his remark is in the word ' ' little. ' ' Ought big ' ' cliques ' ' 
to be heard, that is, if any considerable body of intelligent voters 
hold any opinions relating to the conduct of public affairs, 
ought they to be heard ? It may be true, as Gladstone said, that 
< ' immature particular shades of opinion ' ' ought not to be repre- 
sented, but if the shades of opinion are mature and generally held by a 
sufficient number of people, so as to form important political interests 
in the country then they should have representation and be heard, even 
though those who hold such opinions are not in a majority. It is true 
that the time of legislative bodies and the patience of legislators ought 
not to be consumed and wasted by " cranks " and " wind-bags," but, 
as a writer in the North American Review in 1862*, said : " If the 

* P. 240. 

128 



OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 1 29 

legislative assembly be in its prime intent and use a parliament, a talk- 
ing body, every numerous and respectable party among the people has 
an undoubted right to its share in the talk ; every significant phasis of 
opinion has a right to be presented and advocated ; or, to state the 
case still more strongly, the nation has a right to such practical wis- 
dom as can be elicited only by the free comparison and discussion of 
opposing and divergent theories and measures ; and the legislators who 
represent a bare majority have no right to close their ears and minds 
to the most ample and forceful presentation of the views and arguments, 
of the minority. ' ' 

Mr. Gladstone in his discussion of this question laid down that 
" the principle of parliamentary representation is that we should 
recognize each constituency as being in itself an integer, and what we 
want in the House is the prevailing sense of the community." Now 
is it more philosophical and just to regard bare majorities in restricted 
geographical districts as political ' ' integers ' ' or considerable bodies of 
qualified voters holding common opinions, having like interests, and 
whose " wills are in harmony with respect to the reciprocal rights of men 
and social relations, ' ' but who are scattered over wider areas than the 
present constituencies are ? Just representation it would seem should be 
based on the theory that bodies of people whose interests and opin- 
ions are harmonious are the true political integers which ought to be 
heard. 

The strong argument though which is advanced by the opponents 
of minority representation is that "it is desirable that the party which 
has a majority in the country should have a good working majority, 
considering the power of obstruction even a small minority can 'exert. 
Is it not therefore desirable that the majority in Parliament should be 
greater than that in the country ? " It has been said that it is a mis- 
take to assume that the main object of law is to administer justice — 
that — it is asserted — is only an incident to its operation — but its main 
purpose is to end dispute and contention. So it may be said of legis- 
lative bodies that it is not of the utmost importance that their acts 
should be the wisest possible, but they should be decisive so as to 
maintain "law." The argument of the opponents of minority repre- 
sentation is that it will weaken the decisiveness of governments, by re- 



130 OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 

ducing majorities. But this occurs under the present system where 
opinions in legislative bodies are nearly evenly balanced, as they often 
are. and, if public opinion is very equally divided is it not better, in 
every way, that both sides should at least be fully heard ? When elec- 
tions are decided by bare majorities, it often happens that there are 
sudden changes and one party is turned out and another put in. A 
vacillating government, or one which changes suddenly from one side 
to the other of important questions, is worse than one with a small 
majority. "When majorities are very large parties for that reason are 
liable to split into factions and become disorganized. When public 
opinion is emphatic the government may also be so, but when there is 
a nearly equal division of opinion government should be cautious and 
conservative. 

Considerable complaint comes from Illinois of the narrowness of 
the majority in the House of Representatives, in that state, owing to 
the representation of both parties through cumulative voting. 

The following are some of the opinions received in reply to the 
circular of inquiry : 

" The majority ought to rule and it does not always rule under the 
cumulative system. ' ' Rep. Springfield. 

'• It gives in Illinois Republican representatives in Democratic 
districts and Democratic representatives in Republican districts. Thus 
it weakens the dominant party and so far as I can see helps none but 
it gives the minority a representation everywhere." Rep. Sandwich. . 

' { In some instances the system has so equally divided the members 
of our legislature politically as to prevent action. The cumulative 
system would give minorities in Congress and in the boards sufficient 
strength as to prevent action." Dem. Anna. 

"Some of the disadvantages are, the legislature is too close — as 
instance U. S. senatorships that have been obtained in this state by 
questionable means — that is never a majority of more than a dozen, 
and it is very often two or three ; that you will concede is too close, it 
is not a good working majority." Rep. Austin. 

11 The worst result of the system is that it gives the minority undue 
strength and advantage. In Illinois under this system the minority 
may be said to control legislation, for the legislature is usually so evenly 



OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 131 

balanced that the majority party, which is held responsible for the acts 
of the session, finds its hands tied and can do little without the con- 
sent of the minority. It has happened also that the minority party has 
gained control of the lower house, though the majority against them 
in the state was large. Great and desirable reforms in legislation have 
been hindered and defeated because of this. The two parties being so 
evenly balanced that each could throw the blame of failure on the other. " 
In our system of government the majority must be held responsible for 
legislation, and a system that gives the minority almost equal strength 
and puts every weapon of obstruction and hindrance in its hands is not 
a good system. " Rep. Poutiac. 

The mathematics of this objection does not, however, seem to be 
quite satisfactory or conclusive, for the reason that what a party would 
gain in one section it would be likely to lose in another. Thus the 
northern part of Illinois is predominantly Republican and the southern 
half* Democratic, consequently the influence of the one section would 
counteract that of the other. In the State of New York the Republi- 
cans would gain largely in the city of New York, by free voting, but 
would lose in the rural districts. In Illinois the state senators are 
elected by a majority of the voters in single districts, while the mem- 
bers of the House are elected on the cumulative plan. In 1892 
there were 22 Republican and 29 Democratic senators elected. The 
House consisted of 75 Republicans and 78 Democrats. It is true the 
majority of the Democrats in the senate was larger than in the House, 
but the difference is not greater than might be accounted for by 
accidental circumstances or as the result, possibly, of the gerry- 
mander. 

When this subject was under discussion ten or more years ago, in 
England, Mr. Bright ' ' claimed to have demolished John Stuart Mill 
and his views on proportional representation, to the effect that if pro- 
portional representation had been the practice in the United States at 
the time of the war of secession that it would have been impossible to 
have prosecuted it or abolished slavery. 

"The answer to Mr. Bright is that if proportional representation 
had been the principle on which their elections had been conducted, 

*The extreme southern counties are also Republican. 



132 OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 

slavery would have been abolished, and the war would never have taken 
place. ' ' * 

Of this Prof. Ware in his article in the American Law Review 
said : 

" Could the principle of proportional representation have been 
recognized in the composition of the House of Representatives twenty- 
years ago, it would have introduced into Congress a large number of 
northern Democrats and southern Whigs, occupying a middle ground 
and holding the balance of power — men out of favor at home, but 
strong enough both in numbers and position to check the violence that 
led at last to the civil war. ' ' 

This statement was emphatically accepted and endorsed by the sen- 
ate committee in their report on representative reform, to which refer- 
ence has already been made. According to that report, the declared 
opinion of the picked and chosen members of the United States Sen- 
ate is : 

" The absence of the cumulative vote in the states of the south, 
when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were taken to break 
the Union, was unfortunate, for it would have held the union men of 
those states together, and given them voice in the electoral colleges 
and in Congress. 

" But they were fearfully overborne by the plurality rule of elec- 
tions, and were swept forward by the course of events into impotency 
or open hostility to our cause. By that rule they were shut out of the 
electoral colleges. Dispersed, unorganized, unrepresented, without 
due voice and power, they could interpose no effectual resistance to 
secession and to civil war ; their leaders were struck down at unjust 
elections, and could not speak or act for them in their own states or at 
the capital of the nation. 

' ' By facts well known to us we are assured that the leaders of the 
revolt with much difficulty carried their states with them. Even in 
Georgia, the empire state of the south, the scale was almost balanced 
for a time, and in most of these states if required all the machinery 
and influence of a vicious electoral system to organize the war against 
us, and hold those communities compactly as our foes. ' ' 

* Albert Grey, in Nineteenth Century of December, 1884. 



OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. I 33 

The strong argument in reply to the objection that a government 
in which all bodies of opinions and interests are represented will be less 
decisive than one in which local majorities control is that: "there 
will be less fluctuation under a system of proportional representation, 
because the people who fluctuate will affect only their own quotas, in- 
stead of affecting the representation of those who are staunch by turning 
the majorities in a large number of districts. Now a steady pressure 
is not less potent for progressive legislation, and is more likely to be 
wisely applied than an occasional rush. The majorities obtained by 
large turn-overs are in truth too insecure in themselves to afford steady 
support to a minister."* 

Another argument that is often urged against minority representa- 
tion is that the plan destroys the local character of the representation. 
Of this argument Mr. Mill observed : "Every constituency, it is said, 
is a group, having certain interests and feelings in common, and if 
you disperse these groups by allowing the electors to group themselves 
in other combinations, those interests and feelings will be deprived of 
their representation. Now I fully admit that the interests and feel- 
ings of localities ought to be represented, and I add that they always 
will be represented, because those interests and feelings exist in the 
minds of the electors ; and as the plan I propose has no effect but to 
give the freest and fullest play to the individual electors over prefer- 
ences, his local preferences are certain to exercise their proper amount 
of influence. I do not know what better guardian of a feeling can be 
wanted than the man who feels it, or how it is possible for a man to 
have a vote, and not carry his interests and feelings, local as well as 
general, with him to the polling booth. Indeed, it may be set down 
as certain that the majority of voters in every locality will generally 
prefer to be represented by one of themselves, who is connected with 
the place by some special tie. It is chiefly those who know themselves 
to be locally in a minority, and unable to elect a local representative 
of their opinions, who would avail themselves of the liberty of voting 
on the new principle. As far as the majority were concerned, the 
only effect would be that their local leaders would have a greatly in- 
creased motive to find out and bring forward the best local candidate 
* Nineteenth Century , February, 18S5. 



134 OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 

that could be had, because the electors, having the power of transfer- 
ring their votes elsewhere, would demand a candidate whom they 
would feel it a credit to vote for. The average quality of the local 
representative would consequently be improved, but local interests and 
feelings would still be represented, as they cannot possibly fail to be, 
as long as every elector resides in a locality. ' ' 

This is in substance saying that if electors regard their local in- 
terests as of more importance than general interests they can and prob- 
ably will vote for some one who will represent their local interests 
most satisfactorily. If on the other hand they are most concerned in 
some measures relating to the general public weal, then they would 
select and vote for the candidate or candidates who would most satis- 
factorily represent these interests. In other words they would be free 
to vote for the promotion of either local or general interests as they 
choose or possibly for both. The question then arises whether it is 
desirable that electors should be at liberty to give their political influ- 
ence for the advancement of those interests which they regard as being 
the most important be they local or general. Probably few voters will 
hesitate about deciding in favor of the greatest freedom in the exercise 
of the right of suffrage. 

Besides this reason, as Mr. Horton has said, " the argument in favor 
of the single district that it gives district local interests a hearing, is 
to-day in part neutralized by the rapidity of travel and the facilities of 
communication." As another writer has said : " the end and object 
of reform, whatever it may be, is best attained by the representation of 
electors and not of localities. ' ' Mr. Courtney * stated this argument 
very well in saying that " there would be no more loss of local feel- 
ing than the people living in localities wish to lose. If people are so 
animated with a local feeling that they must vote for one man in their 
own neighborhood, they would have perfect liberty so to do. You 
give them power to join with those who are allied with, them in feel- 
ing and thought, instead of with those who live next door ; but you 
don't force them to go afield, and whenever local wants demanded 
local representation they would be sure to secure it." 

Furthermore, where is the justice or the wisdom of refusing to 

* Xineteenlh Century for July, 1 879. 



OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 1 35 

authorize a man to make laws for us because he lives on the other side 
of some arbitrary line which separates one district from another. As 
Mr. Quincy * has said : "Is there any person outside of politics, and 
outside a mad-house, who desires a law to forbid him from employing 
a worthy man, whether as blacksmith, doctor, lawyer or legislator 
because he lives in an adjoining town, or perhaps across the street in 
the next ward ? ' ' 

Sometimes the principle of local representation is reduced to an 
absurdity. Thus in the lower wards of New York city there is pro- 
perty the value of which is probably greater than that in any equal 
area in the world and amounts to many millions ; and yet, in those 
wards, almost, if not quite, the only persons who vote for representa- 
tives, from these districts, in Congress, the state legislature and the 
common council of the city, are the janitors of the buildings, as they 
are the only residents in these districts. 

* " The Protection of Majorities," by Josiah Phillips Quincy, 1879. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 

It may, not unfairly, be asked what would be gained, practically, if 
the system of free voting which has been described were adopted in the 
city and State of New York, or in other cities and states, and we were 
to elect say seven representatives to our state and municipal legislative 
bodies from each district enlarged with that object in view? 

It may be replied in the first place, it would make it possible for 
any body of voters exceeding an eighth of all in the district to elect 
a candidate by uniting and casting all their votes for him. That this 
could be done can be shown by an assumed example : Supposing that 
there are 30,632 voters in a district, in which seven representatives are 
to be elected, then one-eighth of the voters plus 1 would be equal to 
3830. It will be supposed that our hypothetical district is located in 
one of the strong Democratic sections of New York city and that 22,- 
972 voters are Democrats and 7660 are Republicans. The Democrats 
let it be assumed, are confident, as they have been in the past, that they 
can. carry everything before them and therefore they nominate a full 
ticket of seven candidates for aldermen. A, B, C, D, E, jF and G, 
let us say, and all the voters being loyal to the ticket vote it "straight. ' ' 
The Republicans being in a very decided minority nominate only three 
candidates, H, /andy, and they all vote their regular ticket. The 
results of the election would then be as shown in the third column of 
the table on next page. 

It will be supposed further that when the voting is completed and 
all the votes in the districts have been counted, that the Burnitz 
method, for the final computation is employed, that is, the total 
number of first choice votes for each candidate to be divided by I, the 
total number of second choice votes by 2, the third choice by 3, and so on. 
If this is done and if the seven candidates who receive the highest 
quotients are elected it will be seen that the 7660 Republicans in this 
district have elected two of their men. This they can do under the 

136 



ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 



137 



Burnitz system of free voting in spite of any combination which the 
Democrats can make against them. 



DEMOCRATIC VOTE. 


REPUBLICAN VOTE. 


I 


2 


3 


I 


2 


3 


Candidate. 


Votes. 


Quotients 


Candidate. 


Votes. 


Quotients 


1st A 


22,972 


22,972 


1st H 


7,660 


7,660 


2d B 


22,972 


11,486 


2d I 


7,660 


5*830 


3d C 


22,972 


7>657i 


3d J 


7,660 


■•> f f -> t 
* j j j i 


4th D 


22,972 


5>743 








5th E 


22,9^2 


! 4,594f 








6th F 


22,972 


■OjS >frj 








7th G 


22,972 


-J 7 ■ ° 1 ^ 









The principle on which this result is based may be expressed math- 
ematically if we suppose ^V equals the total number of votes, then 



y 8 iv+ 1 >; 



N 



-=n n - 



In other words, one-eighth of tf//the votes -|- 1 vote (or any other 
number) is greater than one-seventh of the remainder of all the votes. 
Consequently if one candidate gets more than one-eighth of the votes 
there will not be enough left to give each of seven candidates more 
than that number. 

Another illustration of the working of the system may be given. 
Supposing that the two dominant parties should, as they often do 
now, nominate unfit candidates, and the intelligent and respectable in- 
dependent voters in the district revolt and conclude to make nomina- 
tions and run candidates of their own. Not being sure of their strength, 
but hoping to be able to elect more than one candidate, they conclude 
to put two in the field. It will be supposed that the Democrats run 
seven candidates, A, B, C, D, E, T^and G and the Republicans five, 
H, I, J, ^Tand L and the Independents two, O and P, and that the 



138 



ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 



vote is as follows: Democrats, 19,221; Republicans, 17,917; In- 
dependents, 7430. The result under the Burnitz system of free voting 
would be as shown in the following table : 



DEMOCRATIC. 


REPUBLICAN. 


INDEPENDENT. 


I 

Cand. 


2 

Votes. 


3 
Quotients 


I 
Cand. 


2 I 

Votes. 


3 

Quotients 


I 

Cand. 


2 

Votes. 


3 

Quotfents 


1st A 
2d B 
3d C 
4th D 
5th E 
6th F 


19,221 
19,221 
19,221 
19,221 
19,221 
19,221 
19,221 


19,221 
9,610^ 
6,407 


1st H 

2d I 

3d J 
4 th K 
5th L 


17,917 
17,917 
17,917 
17,917 
17,917 


17,917 
8,95^ 
5,972^ 

1 lift 1 / 

Wiry A 

t r ° 1 a 


1st 
2d P 


7,430 
7,430 


7,430 

J" "J 






7th G 


C,V&$ 





That is, the Democratic and Republican parties would both elect 
three candidates and the Independents one. It is true that in this 
case the Democrats have more votes than the Republicans, they both 
elect the same number of candidates. The Republicans and Independ- 
ents together get four representatives but as their aggregate numbers 
exceed the Democrats this result is fair. Evidently there is more 
justice in such a result than ordinarily follows where single repre- 
sentatives are elected from each district. It has already been stated 
that in 1892, although the Republicans had nearly 100,000 voters in 
the city of New York they did not elect a single alderman, assembly- 
man or state senator. 

But the operation of such a system would have other very important 
consequences. It would as has been shown enable any body of voters 
exceeding one-eighth to elect their candidate. The effect of this would 
be that they would be freed from the tyranny of the caucus and 
" machine politics," because by nominating their own candidate and 
concentrating their votes on him any fractional part of the voters in a 
district, exceeding an eighth, could elect one or more representatives 
in spite of the political managers. What is perhaps of equal impor- 



ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 1 39 

tance, they would be able to reelect him and keep him in office so 
long as he represented them satisfactorily. This would give to a 
representative much more independence than he can have if his elec- 
tion is dependent upon a fickle majority of all the voters in a smaller 
district. Under the system which is here advocated he would owe 
his election to the votes of a comparatively small and select constituency 
having interests, opinions and political principles which he has been 
chosen — and which he is presumably fitted — to represent, and, so long 
as he does this to the satisfaction of those who elected him, they can, 
if they choose, continue him in office. In the performance of his duties 
he would have only the demands of his own individual constituents to 
satisfy, and would not be obliged to make his opinions and conduct 
concur with the views, the prejudices, the ignorance and perhaps the 
vices of some of those who help to form a popular majority. 

The system of free voting which is advocated herein, would give 
the most intelligent and best educated classes in the community the 
power to choose and elect men of distinguished ability as their repre- 
sentatives, a privilege which under the existing condition of things 
they can rarely do now. In discussing this side of the subject Mr. 
Mill said : 

" The natural tendency of representative government, as of modern 
civilization, is towards collective mediocrity ; and this tendency is in- 
creased by all reductions and extensions of the franchise, their effect 
being to place the principal power in the hands of classes more and 
more below the highest level of instruction in the community. But, 
though the superior intellects and characters will necessary be out- 
numbered, it makes a great difference whether they are heard. In the 
false democracy which, instead of giving representation to all, gives it 
only to the local majorities, the voice of the instructed minority may 
have no organs at all in the representative body. ' ' 

Although the following remarks by Mr. Mill referred to the Hare 
system of electing representatives, the arguments are equally cogent in 
support of the system of free voting advocated here. 

" The minority of instructed minds," he says, " scattered through 
the local constituencies would unite to return a number proportioned 
to their own numbers of the ablest men the country contains. They 



140 ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 

would be under the strongest inducement to choose such men, since in 
no other mode could they make their small numerical strength tell for 
anything considerable. The representatives of the majority, besides that 
they would themselves be improved in quality by the operation of the 
system, would no longer have the whole field to themselves. They would 
indeed outnumber the others, as much as the one class of electors out- 
numbers the other in the country ; they could always outvote them, but 
they would speak and vote in their presence, and subject to their crit- 
icism. When any difference arose they would have to meet the argu- 
ments of the instructed few by reasons, at least apparently, as cogent ; 
and since they could not, as those do who are speaking to persons 
already unanimous, simply assume that they are in the right, it would 
occasionally happen to them to become convinced that they were in 
the wrong. As they would in general be well-meaning (for this much 
may reasonably be expected from a fairly-chosen national represen- 
tative), their own minds would be insensibly raised by the influence of 
the minds with which they were in contact, or even in conflict. The 
champions of unpopular doctrines would not put forth their argu- 
ments merely in books and periodicals, read only by their own side ; 
the opposing ranks would meet face to face and hand to hand, and 
there would be a fair comparison of their intellectual strength in 
the presence of the country. It would then be found out whether the 
opinion which prevailed by counting votes would also prevail if the 
votes were weighed as well as counted. The multitude have often a 
true instinct for distinguishing an able man when he has the means of 
displaying his ability in a fair field before them. * * - * If the 
presence in the representative assembly can be insured of even a few of 
the first minds in the country, though the remainder consist only of 
average minds, the influence of these leading spirits is sure to make 
itself insensibly felt in the general deliberations, even though they be 
known to be, in many respects, opposed to the tone of popular opinion 
and feeling. * * * 

" The only quarter in which to look for a supplement, or com- 
pleting corrective to the instincts of a democratic majority, is the 
instructed minority ; but, in the ordinary mode of constituting dem- 
ocracy, this minority has no organ. * '"* * The representatives who 



ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 141 

would be returned by the aggregate of minorities would afford that 
organ in its greatest perfection. A separate organization of the in- 
structed classes, even if practicable, would be invidious, and could 
only escape from being offensive by being totally without influence. 
But if the elite of these classes formed part of the parliament, by the 
same title as any other of its members, by representing the same num- 
ber of citizens, the same numerical fraction of the national will — their 
presence would give umbrage to nobody, while they would be in the 
position of highest vantage, both for making their opinions and coun- 
sels heard on all important subjects, and for taking an active part in 
public business. Their abilities would probably draw to them more 
than their numerical share of the actual administration of govern- 
ment. * * * The instructed minority would, in the actual vot- 
ing, cOunt only for their numbers, but as a moral power they would 
count for much more, in virtue of their knowledge, and of the influ- 
ence it would give them over the rest. An arrangement better adapted 
to keep popular opinion within reason and justice, and to guard it 
from the various deteriorating influences which assail the weak side of 
democracy, could scarcely by human ingenuity be devised. A dem- 
ocratic people would in this way be provided with what in any other 
way it would almost certainly miss — leaders of a higher grade of in- 
tellect and character than itself. Modern democracy would have its 
occasional Pericles, and its habitual group of superior and guiding 
minds." 

As Dr. Holmes says, not only are there two sides to every ques- 
tion, but most subjects appear to be at least hexagonal. This one 
seems to be of that kind, and Mr. Quincy in looking at another side 
of this ideal polyhedron says : 

' ' While it is a matter of serious concern that so many men of high 
intelligence and sturdy character are virtually disfranchised by the 
caucus system, it is no less unfortunate that the great body of laboring 
men are nearly as powerless in the hands of the managers. Our social 
organization, which has experienced so great changes in the past, is 
destined to profound modifications in the future. Whether these shall 
come about violently or gradually, whether we shall rise to a nobler 
civilization, or pass into a period of chaos, depends upon the adequate 



142 ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 

representation of the working classes. Plato has significantly told us 
that each Grecian state enclosed two states — one composed of the rich, 
the other of the poor. Our American states are coming to be divided 
in the same way : and, under the management of caucus politicians, 
the dividing line will be constantly deepening. Manual labor has no 
adequate representation in our government. The money powers and 
knavish combinations which hold sway in the caucus have too often 
offered the workingman only a choice between two evils. ' ' 

The system of election which is advocated here, would give to 
any body of workingmen, exceeding an eighth of the voters in a 
district, the power to elect a representative of their own, and they 
could do this independently of any caucus or alliances with party man- 
agers by which their own real interests would be bargained for and 
bought and sold by cunning, adroit and unscrupulous party managers. 
Under this system laboring men would have the same independence 
that it would give to those who have been favored with all the advan- 
tages which are derived from education, knowledge and superior 
opportunities. Not that the interests of these two classes are in any 
sense antagonistic, for as Mr. Quincy well says: "in the last analy- 
sis we shall always find that the real and permanent interest of any 
class is identical with the real and permanent interest of all classes. 
* * * Men of independent thought, thorough instruction, and 
high morality, are the natural allies of the humble and the wronged ; 
but such men are as worthless to the political managers as they are 
precious to the people." 

It is probable too. that nothing would do so much to enlighten 
working men with reference to their political rights, duties and rela- 
tions as to be represented by members of their own selection, elected 
by their own votes and sent to our legislative bodies to speak for the 
people who sent them there. Such representatives would be obliged, 
as Mr. Mill says, " to meet the opposing ranks face to face and hand 
to hand, and there would be a fair comparison of their intellectual 
strength in the presence of the country," and the representatives of 
the laboring men ' ' would have to meet the arguments of the instructed 
few by reasons, at least apparently, as cogent, ' ' and as the same author 
significantly says, "it would occasionally happen to them to become 



ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 1 43 

convinced that they were in the wrong. ' ' The converse of this, in 
all probability, would sometimes occur, that is the ' ' instructed few ' ' 
would be convinced by the representatives of the workingmen of the 
justice and righteousness of the claims and interests of ' ' labor. ' ' In 
this view, what could be more wholesome for the whole body politic, 
in the present condition of discontent among workingmen and the 
antagonism that so often exists between them and their employers, 
than to have the former, as well as the latter, fairly represented in our 
legislative bodies. The workingmen with the limited educational ad- 
vantages which most of them have had, and oftener still, with more 
limited pecuniary resources, their lack of knowledge and experience 
in the management of political affairs, their ignorance of the princi- 
ples in accordance with which wise legislation must be framed, are 
often moulded by the corrupt politicians to serve their uses, as clay is 
shaped by the potter, or are kneaded like dough in the hands of the 
baker, only to have their just interests neglected later and to be flat- 
tered and cajoled when their votes are again needed. Under the pres- 
ent system of electing representatives the only way that workingmen 
can secure representation is by cooperation with the political man- 
agers. While the latter are bargaining for the votes of the men, they 
are also trading with those whom the men regard as their antagonists, 
and thus the true interests of both parties are ' ' sold out ' ' before 
the member to be elected gets into office or power. Free voting 
would make it possible for workingmen to choose, nominate and elect 
their own candidates independently of the politicians and without their 
agency or cooperation. It would give to the working classes real 
freedom and independence in the election of their representatives. The 
system therefore appeals with great force to laborers, workingmen and 
mechanics of all classes for their support. It will place in their hands 
an instrumentality, which will give them the power to be represented 
by members of their own selection, in all legislative bodies, who may 
be true and faithful advocates of their real interests, and be untram- 
meled by bargains with those whom the men regard as their op- 
pressors. 

But the great and incontestible argument in favor of free voting is 
its inherent justice not to one class alone, but to all classes, as it will 



144 ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 

enable any considerable body of voters in any district to secure rep- 
resentation. The principle upon which it is based is that the opinions 
of the entire people, and not those of a mere majority alone, should be 
represented in our legislative bodies, and that in them minorities as 
well as majorities, advocates and opponents, petitions, remonstrances, 
and protests of all sorts and what may be regarded as heresies as well, 
may all be represented and are entitled to a hearing. 

What Professor Ware said in his article in the American Law 
Review for Jan., 1872, of other similar schemes of electoral reform, is 
equally true of the one which is advocated here. " In the first place ' ' 
he says, ' ' the representative body itself would promise to be not only 
more justly but more efficiently made up. Not only would the proper 
political organizations be more fully represented, and that under con- 
ditions likely to bring out their best men, but other interests which at 
present have no hearing, or at least are heard of only through the 
politicians, could, if they saw fit, send their own men, and their best men, 
to speak for them. There could hardly fail to result a deliberative body 
far beyond what we are in the habit of seeing, in point of ability 
and character, embracing a much greater range of knowledge and 
experience, and embodying a much greater variety of opinion and 
conviction. Such a body, truly representative, and containing within 
itself the accredited agents of all parties and interests, need not look to 
the newspapers or to the lobby for facts or for arguments. It would 
be competent to do its appointed work of investigation and discussion, 
and gain in self-respect and in public estimation accordingly. The more 
this was felt to be the case, the more it would come to be perceived that 
real head work was being done, the more careful would all parties and 
interests become to be represented by their best men. It is true that 
the scheme of proportional representation would permit the extremists 
to send extreme men. But it would also permit moderate men to be 
represented by men of their own kind, — a kind which the majority 
rule is sure in times of excitement, when they are most needed, to send 
to the wall." 

Or, as another writer* has said, by the representation of minorities 
' ' you will have a real and not an artificial democracy. According to 

* Leonard Courtney in the Nineteenth Century for July, 1879. 



ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 145 

the idea of this system any adequate number could join together, select 
their man and send him in. It follows that if there arose a political 
thinker in the country, men would come together throughout the 
country and return him. Men would gather round him and send him 
in, and you would thus have introduced into the House of Commons 
elements of life, strengthening and vivifying the whole ; instead of 
making mediocrity a condition without which nobody could enter, 
you would have life and energy secured in the return of able men, and 
of course if you got candidates thus independent you would change 
the House of Commons, and you would operate upon the people out- 
side." 

This is equally as true and as applicable to our own national, state 
and municipal bodies as it is to the British Parliament. 

The same writer says further : ' ' One great result that would arise 
from the reform would be disintegration of party. Parties would not 
cling together so closely as they do now. * * * You would more 
freely detach men, one by one, from any majority. At present scarcely 
any member of a party ever dares desert it ; but if a man had not to 
depend for his seat on mere party cohesion within a limited area — if 
he knew that his independence would bring support from a wider 
range — you would have more freedom of thought, and there would be 
more room for conversion than you now have. Not that men are not 
converted now. Many are converted in their minds, but they do not 
change their votes." 

But to those of us who for years have been tyrannized over by 
ignorant, corrupt and debased political bosses ; who have been humil- 
iated beyond expression by their overbearing insolence ; who have 
been overwhelmed with shame by the demoralization and putrescence 
of our municipal, state and sometimes the national governments ; and 
who are full of indignation and ready for lawful rebellion to release 
ourselves from the iniquitous reign under which we are living — the 
contemplation of a condition of things under which the reputable and 
decent portions of the community could bid defiance to our despised 
oppressors, fills us with hope and should inspire all who yearn for free- 
dom to exertion and effort to throw off the yoke which now oppresses 
us. The adoption of a system of Free Voting would overthrow the 



146 ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 

bosses, would undermine their power, spread consternation in their 
ranks and make us all free. Or as the editor* of Mr. Buckalew' shook 
on Proportional Representation, has said in his preface : 

"The reform when accepted generally, will purify elections, 
establish justice in representation, elevate the tone of public life and 
give additional credit and lustre to that system of government by the 
people which is our proudest boast, and our best legacy for those who 
come after us. ' ' 

To the pessimists who despair of ever effecting so desirable a reform, 
the language of Mr. Hare, the apostle of minority representation, may 
be quoted : 

< ' The quiet admission, ' ' he said, ' ' that we are all of us so ready 
to make, that, because things have long been wrong, it is impossible 
they should ever be right, is one of the most fatal sources of misery 
and crime from which the world suffers. Whenever you hear a man 
dissuading you from attempting to do well, on the ground that perfec- 
tion is 'Utopian,' beware of that man. Cut the word out of your 
dictionary altogether. There is no need for it. Things are either 
possible or impossible ; you can easily determine which, in any given 
state of human science. If the thing is impossible, you need not 
trouble yourselves about it ; if possible, try for it. It is very Utopian 
to hope for the entire doing away of drunkenness and misery out of the 
Cannongate ; but the utopianism is not our business — the work is." 



John G. Freeze. 

THE END. 



APPENDIX A. 

DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRE- 

RESENTATION. 

Under the cumulative system, which has little or no capacity for 
automatic adaptation, as one of our correspondents from Illinois 
pointed out, and as the reports of the working of that system in the 
election of members of English school boards indicate, "a. voter can- 
not tell when he is casting more votes than a favorite candidate needs. ' ' 
If a larger number of candidates are elected by that system from each 
district than are now elected in Illinois, then this difficulty will be 
increased in a considerably greater ratio than the increase of the 
numbers to be elected. If a greater number are not elected in each 
district than are now returned in Illinois, then the freedom of voters 
is curtailed in about an inverse proportion to the number elected. 

As a remedy for these evils what is known as the quota system has 
been proposed. A number of such plans have been devised which 
differ from each other in their details, but may generally be described 
as follows : The total number of votes cast at an election in a general 
district is divided by the number of representatives to be elected. The 
quotient forms the electoral basis, or "quota," that is to say, every 
candidate obtaining this "quota" of votes shall be elected.* No 
more than the quota strictly necessary for his election is counted in 
favor of any candidate. The surplusage of votes given to any elected 
candidate is to be distributed in favor of other candidates. 

The great difficulty about most, if not all, of the plans of this kind 
which have been proposed, is first, as John Bright perhaps jeeringly 
said, very few people can understand them. The next difficulty is in 
deciding which of the votes obtained by each candidate shall count for 
his own election, and which of them shall be released in favor of 
other candidates. One of the writersf in describing the Hare system 

* This is the "quota" adopted by some of the advocates of this plan. It has 
been shown though, that this is not the true quota. See p. 154. 

f From a report by Mr. Robt. Lytton, Her Majesty's Secretary of Legation, on the 
election of representatives for the Rigsraad, 1863. 

147 



148 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION 

says, this ' ' shall be decided in such a way as to secure the representa- 
tion by the candidate in question of all those who would not otherwise 
be represented at all. The remaining votes not needed for his return, 
to be disposed of by lot or otherwise." The latter seems to be a favorite 
resource of the authors of some of the methods which have been de- 
vised. But the admission of any fortuitous conditions whatsoever into 
our electoral machinery should be condemned. The sovereign will of 
the qualified voters should be and is the governing power in republics, 
and is the only power to which we owe allegiance. Once give the 
goddess of chance dominion even to a limited extent, and the conse- 
quences are not easily foreseen. 

It would lead too far to attempt an analysis of the various " quota " 
schemes of voting which have been proposed, but that the objection 
which has been pointed out exists in some, if not all, of them has been 
indicated by other writers on this subject from whom a few quotations 
will be given : 

In answering this objection* some of the friends of the system, 
known as " the Single Transferable Vote," say : " The second votes 
will in general be given to candidates of the same party with those 
named first on the same papers. Therefore the chance will not operate 
as between party and party, but, which is much less important, as be- 
tween different candidates of the same party. 

■ • Moreover, the chance will operate within very narrow limits on 
such large numbers as will have to be dealt with." 

That the element of chance does exist with this system it will be 
seen, is freely admitted by its advocates. 

Mr. Alfred B. Mason, in writing of the Hare system, f said : 
" There are three grave objections to this admirable scheme. First, 
in transferring votes the wishes of very many of the electors may be 
wholly ignored. * * * In every election the element of chance 
is introduced and the element of choice correspondingly disre- 
garded." 



* " Proportional Representation : Objections and Answers." By Sir John Lubbock, 
Bart., M. P. ; Leonard Courtney, M. P. ; Albert Grey, M. P., and John Westlake, Q. 
C The Nineteenth Century, February, 1 885. 

r A New Theory of Minority Representation. The New Englander, July, 1874. 



FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 149 

Mr. Frederick Seebohm, in the Contemporary Review for Decem- 
ber, 1883, says : 

"Mr. Hare's system, even as modified by Mr. Parker Smith, is 
understood by nearly all practical politicians to be too complicated, 
and to leave too much to chance. ' ' 

The writer in the American Law Review of January, 1872, re- 
ferring to the Hare and the Free List Systems, says : 

" The process of counting the votes, involving as it does a con- 
tinual transferring of ballots, is not easy to follow in imagination, and 
is likely to present to the mind that does not fully enter into it, the 
aspect of an ingenious juggle or hocus : pocus that somehow produces 
in the hands of skillful persons most unexpected results, and that 
could, probably, in the hands of men yet more deeply skilled be 
made to produce any results they might desire. Moreover, the con- 
spicuous existence of an arbitrary and fortuitous element, in that the 
order in which the ballots are counted may materially affect the result, 
although not displeasing to the philosophical mind, which recognizes 
the fact that a problem involving so many variable quantities must, 
in the nature of things, admit of a number of solutions all equally 
satisfactory, may naturally be a source of annoyance and distrust to the 
every day citizen." 

Mr. G. Shaw Lefevre, . referring to the system known as the Single 
Transferable Vote says : " It would be a mere chance which of the 
candidates other "than the one whose quota is first filled, would be the 
unsuccessful one on either side, for there is no provision for taking 
into account the order of the preference on the papers used in making 
up the quota of the first or other candidates on the list, and the result 
might be very materially affected if the order of preference on these 
earlier and more numerous papers, were taken into account. ' ' 

Miss Catherine H. Spence, of Australia, one of the latest advocates 
of what she called ' ' Effective Voting, " in a paper read before the 
World's Proportional Representation Congress in Chicago last summer 
{1893), said of The Single Transferable Vote that it "gives that accu- 
rate measure of the proportional strength of the two main parties and 
of outside parties which is so desirable. The contention as to the 
element of chance with regard to surplus votes must be met by laying 



150 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION 

down strict rules which apply to all." This is a virtual admission of the 
charge that chance is an element in the system advocated, and that 
" strict rules " are needed to "meet" this difficulty. Apparently 
after the exercise of the ingenuity of many writers on this system for 
a quarter of a century or more, this fortuitous element has not yet been 
entirely eliminated from the system which Miss Spence advocated 
with so much ardor. 

In a paper by Mr. William H. Gove, of Salem, Mass. , which was 
read at the same congress, the author said of the Hare system : 

' ' The novelty and comparative complexity of the Preferential 
Vote would render its adoption very difficult, and if adopted it would 
work unsatisfactorily because so few would mark more than one or two 
names, or mark them so as to distinguish between them. 

" The second objection is the danger of a fraudulent count, which 
cannot be detected by the public or in any other way than by a re- 
count. 

' ' Suppose one hundred votes cast showing a first choice for X, fifty 
of whom show A as second choice, and fifty show B as second choice, 
and that fifty of X's votes are to be transferred as a surplus. Then, 
although the votes to be transferred are selected by lot, as the system 
intends, and although any one selection by lot may hardly produce a 
materially different result from any other selection fairly made in the 
same way, it is plain that unfair enumerators might, by selecting the 
votes to be transferred, turn over all the fifty surplus votes either to A 
or B as they might choose, and thus the result might be very seriously 
affected. The suspicion of this, even if in most cases groundless, is. 
in itself a strong objection to a system which justifies it. And it is to 
be observed that this objection has the more force where the ballot is- 
secret, and did not arise to so great an extent in the original plan pro- 
posed by Thomas Hare in which the ballots were to be openly given, 
signed by the respective voters and preserved after the election for 
public inspection." 

At the meeting of the Proportional Representative Congress which 
was held in Chicago last summer a number of systems for securing 
proportional or minority representations were presented and consid- 
ered. Two of those were approved by action of the Congress, and 



FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 151 

therefore it may be inferred that they were the most satisfactory plans 
proposed by the friends and advocates of the principles which were 
there discussed, and who were present at those meetings. Inasmuch 
as the system of election proposed by Doctors Burnitz and Varrentrapp 
has been explained and proposed as a substitute for cumulative voting, 
and it is thought would obviate most if not all of the defects of the 
latter system, a comparison and analysis of the three plans may help 
to indicate which of the three comes nearest to being ' ' a thoroughly 
satisfactory scheme. " With this object in view they are printed on 
the following pages and for convenience of reference are numbered I, 
II, and III. 

I. 

GOVE SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

An Outline of a Bill for the Election of Representatives in Con- 
gress According to the "Gove" or Single Transferable Vote System, 
One of the Two Systems Endorsed By the Proportional Representation 
Congress in Chicago, August 12, 1893 : 

Section i. The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected at 
large in their respective states. 

Sec. 2. In any state a ticket composed of as many candidates as the number of 
representatives which said state is entitled to choose may be nominated by any body of 
voters whose numbers equal one per cent, of the total vote cast for such representatives 
at the last preceding election, or by a petition of the same number of voters ; and a 
ticket composed of a smaller number, or of a single candidate, may in like manner, be 
nominated by a smaller number of voters. But no voter shall join in the nomination 
of more than one such ticket. 

Sec. 3. At any time after his nomination and not less than three weeks before the 
day of election, any of said candidates may furnish to the secretary of said state a 
statement in writing signed by himself and acknowledged before any official authorized 
to take acknowledgment of deeds, which statement shall contain the names of one or 
more others of said candidates with whom he believes himself to be in accord on the 
most important public questions, and to one or more of whom he wishes to transfer 
any ineffective votes cast for himself. And all such statements shall be published for 
the information of all voters in convenient tabular form not less than two weeks before 
the day of election, and said statements shall be opened for the inspection of the press 
and public generally as soon as received. 

Sec. 4. Every legal voter shall be entitled to cast his vote in favor of any person 
eligible to said office. No person shall vote for more than one candidate. And every 
candidate receiving a quota of votes, to wit, the number obtained by dividing the total 
vote cast by the number of representatives to be chosen, shall be declared elected. 



152 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION 

Ineffective votes shall be transferred according to the request of the candidate for 
whom they were originally cast to a person named in the list, if any, furnished by said 
candidate as provided in section 3. 

Sec. 5. The following shall be deemed ineffective votes and shall be transferred 
in the order named. 

1. Any votes cast for a candidate in excess of a quota as defined in Section 4, 
beginning with the candidate receiving the largest vote and proceeding to the one next 
highest and so on. 

2. Votes cast for candidates who have since their nomination died or become in- 
eligible, in the same order. 

3. Original votes cast for candidates who received the smallest number of votes, 
beginning with the candidate having the smallest total vote and proceeding to the one 
next lowest, and so on, until the number of candidates whose votes have not been 
transferred as far as possible added to those who have received a quota equals the 
number of representatives to be chosen. Thereupon these shall be declared elected. 

Sec. 6. Every ineffective vote of a candidate shall be transferred to the candidate 
named in his said list, living and eligible at the time of counting the vote, for whom 
the largest number of votes were originally cast and whose vote by transfer or other- 
wise does not equal the total vote cast divided by the number of representatives to be 
elected, hereinbefore defined as the quota. If the same number of votes were origin- 
ally cast for two or more candidates named in said list, the candidate residing nearest 
the one from whom the votes are to be transferred shall be preferred. 

Sec. 7. In case a vacancy shall occur in the delegation of representatives from 
the state after election, any ineffective votes which have been assigned to the member 
whose seat shall have become vacant shall be returned to the candidate for whom they 
were originally cast, and so many of those as are not then effective, together with the 
votes originally cast for said member, shall be redistributed to candidates who pre- 
viously failed of election in the same manner as if said member had died or become 
ineligible before canvassing of the votes, and the candidate not before elected who 
shall then appear to have the largest number of votes shall be declared elected. 

II. 
FREE LIST SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

An Outline of a Bill for the Election of Representatives to the 
United States Congress, Based Upon the Free List System as Embodied 
in the Geneva Law, and the Bill Proposed in the 52D Congress by the 
Hon. Tom F. Johnson, of Ohio, One of the Two Systems Endorsed by 
the Proportional Representation Congress in Chicago, August 12, 1893 : 

Section i. The members of the House of Representatives shall be voted for at 
large in their respective states. 

Sec. 2. Any body of electors in any state, which polled at the last preceding con- 
gressional election one per cent, of the total vote of the state, or which is endorsed by 
a petition of voters amounting to one per cent, of such total vote, may nominate 



FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 



D5 



any number of candidates not to exceed the number of seats to which such state is 
entitled in the House, and cause their names to be printed on the official ballot. 

Sec. 3. Each elector has as many votes as there are representatives to be elected, 
which he may distribute as he pleases among the candidates, giving not more than one 
vote to any one candidate. Should he not use the entire number of votes to which he 
is entitled, his unexpressed votes are to be counted for the ticket which he shall desig- 
nate by title. The votes given to candidates shall count individually for the candidates 
as well as for the tickets to which the candidates belong. 

Sec. 4. The sum of all the votes cast in any state shall be divided by the number 
of seats to which such state is entitled and the quotient to the nearest unit shall be 
known as the quota of representation. 

Sec. 5 . The sum of all the votes cast for the tickets of each party or political 
body nominating candidates shall be severally divided by the quota of representation, 
and the units of the quotients thus obtained will show the number of representatives to 
which each such body is entitled, and if the sum of such quotients be less than the 
number of seats to be filled the body of electors having the largest remainder after di- 
vision of the sums of the votes cast by the quota of representation, as herein specified, 
shall be entitled to the first vacancy, and so on until all the vacancies are filled. 

Sec. 6. The candidates of each body of electors nominating candidates and found 
entitled to representation under the foregoing rules, shall receive certificates of election 
in the order of the votes received, a candidate receiving the highest number of votes 
the first certificate, and so on ; but in case of a tie, with but one vacancy to be filled, 
the matter shall be determined by lot between the candidates so tied. 

Sec. 7. If a member of the House of Representatives shall die or resign, or his 
seat become vacant for any reason, the remainder of his term shall be served by the 
candidate having the next highest vote of the body of electors to which such member 
belongs. 

III. 
BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

An Outline of a Bill for the Election of Representatives to the 
United States Congress, Based Upon the System Proposed by Doctors 
Burnitz and Varrentrapp. 

Section I. The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected on a gen- 
eral ticket in their respective states. 

Sec. 2. In any state candidates for election to the House of Representatives may 
be nominated by a petition of a number of voters for each candidate so nominated, 
equal to one per cent, of the quotient, obtained by dividing the total number of votes 
cast for such representatives in the state at the last preceding election, by the number 
of representatives to which the state is entitled, and cause their names to be printed in 
the official ballot. But no voter shalljoin in the nomination of more than one such 
candidate.* 



* A suitable penalty to be fixed for a violation of this provision. 



154 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION 

Sec. 3. Each qualified voter may give in his ballot the names of not exceeding 
* candidates for whom he votes and may indicate his preferences for such can- 



didates by ordinal numbers marked opposite their names; or in the absence of such 
numbers the order in which the names are inscribed on his ballot shall indicate the 
order of his preferences. 

Sec. 4. The first, second, third, etc., preferences for each candidate shall each be 
counted separately ; the total number of first preference votes for each candidate shall 
then be divided by one, the total number of second preference vote by two, the third 
by three and so on. The quotients thus obtained for each candidate shall be added 

together and their sum will be his elective quotient. The * candidates having 

the highest elective quotients shall be declared elected. A tie with but one vacancy 
to be filled shall be decided by lot. 

Sec. 5. If a member of the House of Representatives shall die or resign, or his 
seat become vacant for any reason, the remainder of his term shall be served by the 
candidate having the next highest election quotient of the body of electors to which 
such member belongs. 

The difficulty of understanding each of these three different schemes 
respectively will, it is thought, be apparent in reading them over. 
Their relative complexity is indicated to some extent by the fact that 
it has taken 710 words to describe the I. or Gove System of election, 
453 for the II. or Free List System and 316 for the III. or Burnitz 
System. It is also thought that the series of measures, described in the 
latter method of voting, for computing the vote are much less involved 
and easier of comprehension by the ordinary mind than those of either 
the Free List or the Gove Systems. 

In both of these schemes the method of calculating the quota given 
does not seem to be correct. It was shown by Mr. Droop in 1868 
that the necessary minimum, or quota, of votes which is enough to 
make the election of a candidate certain is ' ' the number obtained by 
dividing the whole number of votes, given at an election, by the number 
of members to be elected, plus one, and increasing the quotient, or the 
integral part of the quotient, by one. Thus if five members are to be 
elected and there are 36,360 votes, if we divide this number by 5 -f- 1 = 6 
and we have 6060. Then 6060-f- 1 = 6061 = the elective quota. Any 
candidate securing that many votes will be elected no matter how his 
opponents votes may be combined against him. 

The principles of the Gove system, were explained by its author 



The number to be elected. 



FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 1 55 

at the Chicago Congress. In his paper, which was read there, he said 
that : " According to this system, each candidate, officially nominated, 
may file a list to be published with the nomination indicating such other 
candidates as he believes to be so far in accord with him that he wishes 
his ineffective votes to be transferred to some one or more of them. 
The transfer is then made, if necessary, to the one on this list needing 
it, who has shown the greatest personal popularity by receiving the 
largest direct vote. 

' ' The voter knowing this list has only to select a single candidate 
and vote for him, and the thing takes care of itself; he knows that if 
his vote cannot count for the candidate for whom it is cast, it will 
count for some other of the same general way of thinking. In voting 
he takes into account two things, the candidate and his list, just as he 
now regards the candidate and his party. And this plan is especially 
useful in cases where a candidate is independently nominated, as it 
leads him to declare his political affiliations, and thus inform the voter 
of the political position he assumes. It is true that the list of the 
candidates could ordinarily be made up by inserting the names of all 
other candidates of his party, but the parties would be smaller than 
now, either third parties or sub-parties prevailing, and when a party 
containing district elements had not divided into sub-parties, the same 
result would be obtained, as each candidate would be apt to place 
upon his list only the candidates of his own section of the party. ' ' 

In voting under this system an elector would, in effect, be giv- 
ing his vote to a candidate with the understanding, that if it was not 
needed or was ineffectual in electing that candidate, it was to be 
transferred to some other candidate, who was named before the elec- 
tion by the person voted for. Candidates having too many or too few 
votes to elect them would thus have a number of what, in effect, would 
be proxy votes, to be disposed of in accordance with their declaration 
made before the election. It seems difficult to foresee just what the 
effect of this would be in the hands of corrupt politicians and candi- 
dates nominated by and controlled by them. That it might be a pro- 
lific cause of evil, unless the transfer subsequent to the election was 
made compulsory and could be enforced by legal process, seems proba- 
ble. That it might also be made a baneful instrumentality for making 



156 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION 

political bargains beiore the election is also to be feared. The election 
of all the members would, probably, not be decided by the direct votes 
of the electors, but by a secondary transfer of their votes to the candi- 
dates who were named by the persons voted for, as being ' ' in accord 
with them on the most important public questions. ' ' There appears 
to be danger that the intentions of the voter might be diverted from 
his purposes by the transfer of his vote by one candidate to another. 
This plan undoubtedly would give representation to minorities, which 
would also be proportional to their numbers, which would be a great 
gain over our present method of electing representatives, and, if no 
other system was available, its adoption might be advisable. 

The provisions of the II. or Free List system are at first a little puz- 
zling. A voter has as many votes as there are candidates to be 
elected. He can give one of them to each of as many candidates as 
he chooses. These are counted for the candidates voted for. Then 
besides this all of his votes are counted for the party to which the can- 
didates he has voted for belong. After the election all these party votes 
are divided by the elective quota which determines how many mem- 
bers that party is entitled to, and that number of candidates who have 
received the highest number of individual votes are declared elected. 
The same method is of course applied to the other parties. 

This would also give minority and proportional representation to 
parties, and would thus be a great improvement over what we have 
now. It seems though besides being somewhat difficult to understand, 
to have what is perhaps a minor defect in not favoring independent 
voting within parties. This will be explained by an illustration : 

It will be supposed that five members are to be elected in a district 
and that the Republicans have 18,183 voters and the Democrats 
18,177, an< 3 tnat tne regular Republicans have nominated A, B and C 
as candidates and the Democrats F> G and H, and that the voters 
cast their votes for the regular nominees of their parties, as follows : 

Republicans. Democrats. 

A — 18,184 votes. F — 18,178 votes. 

B— 18,183 " G— 18,177 *■ 

C— 18,182 " H— 18,176 " 



FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 1 57 

As each voter can cast five votes for his party the Republican party 
would have 18,183X5=90,915 and the Democratic party would have 
i8,i77X5=9°>885 or a total of 181,800. The true quota of this 
number would be ascertained by dividing the number of candidates 
-|-i.=5+i==6 which will give 30,300. Adding 1 to this =30,301 = 
the true quota, which divided into 90,915, the vote for the Republican 
party, gives three as the number of members to which that party is en- 
titled. Divided into 90,885, the vote for the Democratic party, and 
we have only two, the number of members to which it is entitled. 
Consequently A, B, C, F and G would be elected. 

Supposing though that there are 6061 Republicans who are not 
satisfied with A, B and C as candidates and consequently they nomi- 
nate a fourth Republican, D, and have his name on the regular ticket 
and that they vote for him. As they each have five votes they would 
have a total of 30,305 — which is more than the quota. The vote for 
the different candidates would then be as follows : 

Republicans. 
A — 12,123 votes. 
B — 12,122 " 
C — 12,121 " 
D— 6,061 " 

As there are the same number of Republican voters, who vote that 
ticket as before, the vote for the party would be the same as then, 
which would entitle it to three members, but as the three candidates 
who receive the highest number of individual votes are the ones se- 
lected to represent the party, A, B and C would still be chosen, 
although there is a quota of voters in favor of jD, sufficient to elect 
him, by a correct system of election. The only way they could suc- 
ceed then would be to run D on an independent ticket. 

It seems very desirable that there should be freedom of voting within 
party lines, as well as that successful bolting should be made possible 
and that electors should be able to concentrate their votes effectually 
on any candidate, either within or without the party, whom they may 
prefer. This it is thought the Burnitz system of election will permit 
them to do, of which it may be said as Mr. Buckalew wrote of the 



158 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION. 

cumulative system — although experience has not fully sustained his 
favorable opinion of it — that ' ' it combines the advantages of other plans 
without their imperfections, while it is not open to any strong objec- 
tion peculiar to itself. It will adjust itself to all cases, and it will 
have the most important and effectual sanction ; for it will be put 
under the guardianship of party interest, always active and energetic, 
which will give it directive and complete effect to the full and just 
representation of the people. ' ' * 

* ' ' Proportional Representation. ? ' By Hon. Charles R. Buckalew. 



APPENDIX B. 

A METHOD OF ASSURING TO THE MINORITIES AS WELL AS TO THE 
MAJORITY, AT ALL KINDS OF ELECTIONS, THE NUMBER OF REPRE- 
SENTATIVES CORRESPONDING TO THEIR STRENGTH. 



Described by Gustav Burnitz, Ph. D., and 
George Varrentrapp, M. D. Frankfort on the Main. 1863. 

( Translated by Frank Weitenkampf. ) 

On the occasion of the various attempts at a constitutional change 
in Frankfort, a proper method of electing representatives always proves 
a special difficulty ; even within the same party an agreement was not 
effected, neither formerly nor at present. The wish to contribute to 
a solution of this difficulty, was the principal cause that prompted us 
to seek for a law by which the number of representatives obtained by 
the various parties would be in proportion to the number of their 
members. We believe that we have found this law, a law which 
preserves its validity in all kinds of election. We recommend it for 
trial. 

As soon as any association of individuals, — social or scientific, re- 
ligious or political, — has become too numerous to manage its affairs 
itself or even only to control such management itself, it finds it 
necessary to transfer its authority to a smaller number of representa- 
tives. The election of these representatives is therefore an important 
action of far-reaching results. In all sorts of communities, if they are 
sound and vigorous at all, this importance is recognized. It will be 
regarded as a proper and suitable election of representatives if, in the 
corporate body elect, the opinion of the majority of those convened 
for election preponderates, and if the men of most ability and 
integrity obtain a seat and vote in the same. It does not lie within 
the sphere of legal provisions to see that the voters really cast their 
votes for the most suitable individuals ; education in general, and 
especially m the line of the community in question — /. c. , social, 
political, or other education, — will qualify and instruct for that pur- 

159 



l6o BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP' S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

pose. On the other hand, the proper and genuine expression of the 
opinion and the will of the majority (for the good of the community) 
is, indeed, dependent upon proper ordinances and laws. The pur- 
suit of this object has given rise to the most varying provisions. 
To speak, first of all, of elections in political communities : here, — 
with universal as well as limited suffrage, — elections in larger 
and smaller districts, elections according to rank, professions and 
classes, secret and public, direct and indirect elections have all been 
recommended. On none of these points has an agreement been 
arrived at. 

Improvement of the election laws is striven for everywhere, even 
apart from the prime and most important endeavor to keep unauthor- 
ized influences away from the elections. In this effort we seem, at 
present, to have arrived at a decided turning point, which at the same 
time, in our opinion, demonstrates a great advance. This is the fol- 
lowing : 

All honest and intelligent friends of liberty and truth have sought 
above all to realize the problem of assuring to the majority of the 
voters a majority of the elect. But numerous difficulties, varying ac- 
cording to locality and other conditions, have hitherto permitted only 
incidental attention to the further problem of procuring representation 
also for the minority of the voters. 

Hare, the first to observe this decidedly and clearly, developed it 
in his ' ' Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary 
and Municipal." Hare's system has been much discussed, especially 
among others, in Frankfort papers ("Zeit," December., 1861, Nos. 
213 and 225, and "Frankfurter Reform," Nos. 58, 62, 65, etc.) 
But it found more opponents than advocates, nor has it as yet found 
practical application anywhere. To us it appears difficult, compli- 
cated, and indistinct. Cancelling and adding votes does not seem to 
be the right way of determining the relative worth which a party as- 
cribes to its various candidates. 

If we desire to arrive at a proper solution of the difficult problem 
of producing a method of election which does not invade the liberty 
of the individual voter, which assures to the majority of the voters a 
majority of the elect, but at the same time makes provision for an, at 



BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP's SYSTEM OF ELECTION. l6l 

least, approximately adequate representation of the minority, it will be 
well to begin with a consideration of the simplest conditions. 

We therefore take a corporate body — purely social, religious, po- 
litical or other — of i ooo persons as an example ; we furthermore as- 
sume that all the members agree in their opinions and purposes. It is 
incumbent upon this corporate body to appoint a representative. How 
will this corporate body proceed ? It will convene and will under- 
take an inspection, or an estimation ( Werthschatzung) of its members, 
in order to ascertain what person seems most suitable and capable to rep- 
resent the corporation either in general or for a specified purpose. This 
proposed examination or estimation, in such a homogeneous corporate 
body as assumed, would presumably result in the casting of all votes for 
one person. If a second representative, a third one, and so on, are then 
to be elected, one after the other, then, the conditions otherwise re- 
maining the same, the renewed estimation will lead to the same result ; 
the united vote would again be given, to a second and to a third per- 
son. All those elected in such manner have received the same num- 
ber of votes, and yet these votes have not the same value in the sense 
of the voters, these votes in their equality in numbers do not corre- 
spond to the unequal value set by the voters upon the election of the 
first, second, and third elect. For the second received his iooo votes 
only because and after the first had already been elected, the third 
after the second, etc. The value of seeing the second elected was a 
subordinate one in comparison with the value set on the election of 
the first. This value or the prospect of the second, third, etc., was 
therefore only y 2 , yi, ^, etc., as large as that of the first. The fol- 
lowing relation therefore appears : 

iooo iooo iooo 

iooo : : : 

234 

These numbers, — which, in distinction from the votes received 
in reality by each one, and also in order to simplify matters, we shall 
call the election-figures, — correspond to the estimation which was set 
upon the individual by the corporate body, and thus makes clear the 
real will of the corporate body. 

This estimation is more clearly apparent if the problem is inversely 
presented. Again we take a corporate body of iooo persons; it had 



1 62 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP' S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

hitherto elected 10 representatives at one election, and had unani- 
mously given them each the same number of votes. As the unanimity 
of the corporate body left no prospect of an electoral contest, the cited 
estimation of the individual candidates did not appear necessary. But 
now a change is produced through some circumstance or other, so that 
the same corporate body has in future to appoint only 9 representa- 
tives instead of 10. It must therefore proceed to an estimation, although 
in an inverse direction ; an agreement must be arrived at as to the one 
among those ten men on whose election the least value is set. This is 
repeated if the number of representatives is to be reduced to 8, 7, 6, 
etc. ; an ascertaining of the least qualified continues to take place. Still 
assuming a corporate body that is entirely in accord as to its views and 
purposes, the question as to which of the former representatives is not 
to be reelected, now that their number is reduced, will of course be 
decided with the same unanimity with which those to be elected were 
formerly agreed upon. In both cases the number of votes was the 
same for all the representatives, and yet the corporate body by no 
means set the same value on the individual elections. The one who 
was the last to be elected and the first to be removed was probably 
rated at but one-tenth of the estimation in which the one first elected 
was held. 

This simple example, hardly likely to occur in reality, of a com- 
plete unanimity of all the members of an electoral body, has been 
purposely presupposed in order to show that in each election an 
estimation takes place, even though it does not become apparent 
to the consciousness of the electors until the previous election 
undergoes a change (diminishing, or the like). The conception of 
the election-figure, as the expression of this estimation is therefore 
founded in the nature of an election, and does not arise under certain 
conditions only. This will appear more clearly yet at elections in 
which various opinions stand in opposition to each other. 

Each of the different parties existing in an electoral body will 
nominate its own candidates when an election is to take place. What 
was observed before in the homogeneous society is repeated in the sepa- 
rate parties : they muster their members and proceed to an estimation 
of the same. 



BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP'S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 1 63 

We will assume that there is i representative to be elected, and 
that there are three parties opposed to each other, one of which 
controls 1500, the second 900, the third 600 votes. Here, the can- 
didate of the first party, receiving 1500 votes, is elected, and that 
justly, as the one on whom the highest measure of concurrence is con- ; 
centrated. If a second election is then to be held, — closely drawn; 
party-lines again resulting in a strict party vote of 1500, 900, and 600* 
for the different candidates, — the candidate of the first and relatively 
strongest party will again be elected, and so on in further elections, if 
more representatives are to be elected. The same result is arrived at 
if 3, 6, 10, or more representatives are voted for at one election ; only 
the candidates of the strongest party will be victorious at the ballot- 
box; the minority, be it large or small, will always remain entirely 
without representation. 

This takes place because only the number of votes cast is taken 
into consideration, and not the order of rank given by a party to its 
different candidates, in its relation to the relative strength of the sep- 
arate parties. This relation changes, according as one or more repre- 
sentatives are to be elected. 

1. At every election of one or more representatives by a number of 
persons, an estimation or valuation of those recommended for election — 
either in general or with a view to the attainment of some special object — 
will take place, consciously or unconsciously, and even within the same 
party. This estimation appears at the election in two ways : (a) by the 
number of votes cast for the individual candidate ; (/?) by the order of 
rank in which he is placed by his electors in relation to the other can- 
didates nominated by the same party ; this order of rank expresses the 
estimation set upon a candidate above the others of the same party, 
the measure of the chance of success which the party wishes to 
give one of its candidates above the others. Only at the election of a 
single representative do both estimations concur in one election-figure. 

2. When several representatives are to be elected, and several par- 
ties differing in strength are opposed to each other, it is necessary 
clearly to show on the one hand the strength of the separate parties 
(that is, the number of votes bestowed by them on the individual can- 
didates), and on the other hand the different estimation which the 



164 



BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 



separate parties set upon their individual candidates, and to contrast 
them in a proper relation. This is done by means of the election- figure 
which results if the absolute number of votes received by a candidate is 
divided by the relative number of rank (j. e., that given him on the 
different ballots). 

If this law is put into effect, the majority of the voters will always 
elect a corresponding majority of the representatives, but the minority 
will also receive the number of representatives corresponding exactly 
to its strength. 

This will be made clear by some examples representing various 
party relations that occur, and at the head of which we place the ex- 
ample already referred to. Three parties, of 1500, 900, and 600 
votes, go to the ballot-box, and the following results appear. 



Old method of 


counting. 


Ele 


ction-j 


Igure by ordin 


al rani 






Party 


Party 


Party 


Party 




Party 


Party 


Candidate 


!. A. 


B. 


C. 


A. 




B. 




c. 


I St 


1500 


900 


600 


i5oo_ 

1 


[500 


QOO 


600 

1 


= 600 


2d 


1500 


900 


600 


1500 

2 


75° 


QOO 

~-=45° 


600 
2 


= 300 


3d 


1500 


900 


600 


1500 _ 
3 


500 


000 

x =100 

3 ° 


600 

3 


— 200 


4th 


1500 


900 


600 


1500 _ 

4 


375 


000 

=22^ 

4 D 


600 

4 


= 150 


5th 


1500 


900 


600 


5 


300 


900 -180 

5 


60O 

5 


— 120 


6th 


1500 


900 


600 


1500 _ 

6 


250 


QOO 

6 - J 5° 


60O 

6 


— IOO 


7th 


1500 


900 


600 


I500 _ 

7 


214 


900 -128 

7 


60O 

7 


= 85 


8th 


1500 


900 


600 


1500 _ 

8 


187 


QOO 

8 ~ 112 


600 

8~~ 


= 75 


9th 


1500 


900 


600 


I500 _ 
9. 


166 


QOO 
= IOO 

9 


60O 

9 


= 66 


10th 


1 5?° 


900 


600 


. 15 °° _ 

10 


150 


QOO 

~ = 90 

10 y 


60O 

10 


= 60 




etc. 








etc. 







BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 



165 



According to this, the number of representatives obtained by 
iach party would be : 

By old method of counting. 









Party 


Part} 




At 


an election 


A. 


B. 


of 6 


re 


presentatives. 


6 


— 


" 10 




a 


IO 


— 


" 12 




i i 


12 


— 


" 16 




i i 


16 


— 


" 20 




a 


20 


— 


" 25 




( ( 


2 5 


— 



Party 

c. 



By the election figure. 



Party 
A. 

3 
5 
6 



10 
13 



Party 
B. 

2 

3 
4 

5 
6 

7 



Partv 
C. 



I 
2 
2 

3 

4 
5J 



CD 



For the second representative, the 900 votes cast by the second 
party for its first candidate already yield a higher election-figure than 
those cast by the first party for its second candidate, i. e., 900 is more 

than I ^°° ; similarly, 600 is more than 15^2. 
2 .3 

Now, if two parties— having respectively 60 and 38 votes for 
instance, — are opposed to each other, the following relation appears 
according to the two systems : 



Old method of counting 






By 


Candidate. 


Party A. 


Party B. 


Party A. 
60 


ISt 


60 




38 


1 


= 60 


2d 


60 




38 


60 

2 


= 30 


3d 


60 




38 


60 

3 


= 20 


4th 


60 




38 


60 

~4~ 


= J 5 


5th 


60 




38 


60 

5 


= 12 


6th 


60 




38 


60 

~6~ 


= 10 


7 th 


60 




38 


60 

7 


= 8.5 


8th 


60 




3* 


60 

~8~ 


= 7-5 


9th 


60 




38 


60 

9 


= 6.6 


10th 


60 




33 


60 

10 


= 6 



By the election-figure. 



i 8 

2 

3 
3?" 

4 
5 
6 

J? 

7 
8 
9 

38 



Party B. 

= 38 



J 9 

I2 -5 
9-5 
7.6 

6-3 

5-4 
4-7 
4.2 

3-8 



i66 



BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 



Thus, by the first count of votes, the second party remains entirely 
without representation ; by the sytem of computing election-figures, on 
the other hand, it receives one representative at an election of 3, 2 
against 3 out of 5 representatives, 3 against 5 out of 8 representatives, 
4 against 6 out of 10 representatives, 5 against 8 out of 13 represen- 
tatives, or 2 out of 5, 3 out of 8, 4 out of 10, 5 out of 13. 

The same result takes place when there is a larger number of 
parties : 



Old method of counting. 
Party. 



A. B. C. D. 
1st Repre. 480 250 150 90 



2d 

3d 
4th 
5* 
6th 
7th 
8th 
9 th 
10th 
nth 
1 2th 
13th 
14th 
15th 



480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 
480 250 150 90 



By the Election-figure. 
Party. 



48o_ 

1 
48o_ 

2 
480 

3 

4 8o _ 

4 
48o _ 

5 
480 
~6~~ 
480 

7 
480 



=480 

:240 

;i6o 

-I20 

= 96 
= 80 
= 68.5 



B. C 

250 150 



2150 
—=125 

2 J 



250 -^-=150 

150 



75 



2 5° o I 5° 

1r= 83 - 3 t- =5 ° 



_90 

1 

2 
90 

3 

90 



D. 
=90 

=45 
=30 
=22.5. 



250 . 150 

-j-= 62.5 -2-= 37.5 

4 4 4 

2150 ISO 90 

-=-= 50 ~^-= 30 2— — ii 

5 3 5 ° 5 



250 



41 .6 



150, 



25 



90 



15 



250 150 90 

-=-== 35.7 -=-== 21.4 -±—=12 

7 ° D ' 7 7 



250 



S 



90 

7 V="- 2 



480 250 

V = 53 - 3 9 2J ' 7 



5° /- z: 9° 

— = l6.6 -2— =IO 



480 250 I50 

?—= 48 -^-= 25 -^-= 15 

10 10 ^ 10 ^ 

480 ■ 250 150 . 

- — = 43.6 -^—= 22.7 -^-= 13.6 

11 ^° II ' II J 



9 
90 

10 

90 



480 250 

- — = 40 -^—= 20. 

12 12 



t-5o = 
12 



90 

2 -5 - z — = 7-5 

J 12 ' ■> 



480 , 250 150 90 . 

-i — = 36.9 -=-= 19.2 -^-= 1 1. 5 2— — 6.9 

13 13 13 13 

480 250 150 90 , 

- — = 34.2 -2-== 17.8 -i-= 10.7 -^— = 6.4 

14 14 ' 14 14 



480 

11 — = 3 2 



250 150 90 

-2-= 16.6 -2-= 10 -^— = 6 



BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP' S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 



I6 7 



Thus, by the old method of counting votes the party A (number- 
ing 480 votes), although it is weaker than the other parties put to- 
gether, elects all of its representatives, no matter how many are voted 
for, while by our method of counting on the basis of the election-fig- 
ure, representatives are elected as follows : 



BY PARTY, 



Of iq Representatives, 
12 

20 

27 

3* 
46 

57 



10 

14 

2 3 
28 



BCD 

311 Representatives. 
321 

421 " 

5 3 2 

742 

9 5 3 
12 7 3 

15 9 5 



ties 
are 



If not only a few parties exist, but a separation into very many par- 
, a similarly just result is attained. Five hundred and fifty voters 
divided into ten parties ; and each has less than -J- of the votes. 

Partv. 



c. 



D. 



F. 



II 



K. 



100 

IOO 



: 5° 



90 



80 



: 45 



70 
=40 —=35 



: 33-3 —=30 
3 

90 



70 60 

■26.6 — = 23.3 — : 



50 40 
— =16.6 — : 



30 
: I3-3 — = 



3-3 



90 



80 70 

22.5 — =20 — : 
80 70 



90 

[6.6 -=15 



80 



= 13-3 



60 



60 



60 

:II.I = 



50 



50 



40 



40 



30 



■= 7-5 — = 5 



30 



50 40 30 

— = 8.3 — = 6.6 — : 



— = 3-3 



According to this, the following number of representatives are 
elected by the separate parties : 







A. 


B. 


C. 


D. 


E. 


F. 


G. 


of IO 


representatives 


2 


2 


2 


2 


1 










" 15 


i t 


3 


3 


2 


2 


2 


1 


1 


" 18 


" 


4 


3 


3 


2 


2 


2 


1 


" 20 


a 


4 


4 


3 


3 


2 


2 


1 


« 25 


a 


5 


4 


4 


3 


3 


2 


2 



II. 



EC. 



l68 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP'S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

If it is thought right that the majority of the voters should decid- 
edly have a majority, but not all, of the representatives, and that the 
minority or minorities should also have a representation proportional 
to their strength, then nothing is necessary but that, at elections at 
which different parties are opposed to each other — be it for the elec- 
tion of a few or of many representatives — the voters, on casting their 
votes, should show their relative preference for their different can- 
didates, that is, on whose election they lay the greatest weight, 
on whose election the second-greatest, on whose election the third- 
greatest, fourth-greatest, etc. For the moment this demand, because 
unusual, will perhaps seem singular to one voter or the other, but if he 
be a reasonable man, it will not be difficult to convince him of the 
usefulness, nay necessity of the required valuation and classification ; 
for without it a just and reasonable system of election is not possible. 
But, certainly, only that system of election is just and reasonable the re- 
sults of which give an exact impression of the views predominating in 
an electoral body, which procures freedom and proportional represen- 
tation for each opinion. In future we shall no longer speak of an 
" absolute removal of our opponents, " or of "being ourselves abso- 
lutely removed, ' ' but of ' ' representation of the different parties accord- 
ing to their strength. ' ' Each party will strive, as hereto fore, to induce 
as many as possible of its members to vote, so that it may obtain as 
many representatives as possible. And if the majority acknowledges 
the right of the minority to a proportional representation, and also 
expects the minority to take a very active part in the election, it will 
also recognize that it probably cannot elect all of its nominees, but, 
out of 10 representatives, for instance, can count on only 8 or 7, per- 
haps only on 6 ; it must therefore make up its mind as to which of its 
men it prefers, which first, which second, etc. This valuation and 
classification is made known by putting the candidates in this order 
on the ballot, and no longer in alphabetical or other accidental order. 
That is to say, not Alt, Becker, Christ, Dorr, etc., but : 

1. Becker. 5. Alt. 

2. Fritz. 6. Christ. 

3. Haas. 7. Dorr. 

4. Gerhard. 8. Engel, etc. 



BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP'S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 1 69 

A well-disciplined party will come to an understanding as to such 
a succession, even though some sensibilities will be offended. But this 
will in no wise prevent the individual in the party from making some 
modifications in this succession ; by such alterations he by no means 
produces lost votes, nor does he, on the whole, change the result of 
the election, unless very many members of his party happen to be of 
the opinion that Mr. Alt, set down as No. 5 by the election-committee, 
had not been justly placed before Mr. Christ, set down as No. 6. Even 
so-called ' ' mugwumps ' ' or independents, who choose a few candidates 
from this and that party, will have a certain influence on the election, 
inasmuch as they only reach a certain number, and really take such 
names from the various parties, to which a certain prominence has 
already been given by their own parties. 

As regards the unavoidable irregularities in an election on a large 
scale it is simply necessary to say that the present system is by no 
means tied down to the regularity which has been followed in these 
examples for the sake of clearness, but that it can, in fact, be applied 
just as well to the most scattering and various conditions of elec- 
tion, if only its underlying principle is adhered to, i. e., that each 
candidate receives an ordinal number or order of preference which 
makes it possible to compute his election-figiwe. 

This method of counting votes is furthermore equally applicable, 
valid and just, in the most diverse systems of election, in direct and' 
in indirect election, with universal suffrage or an elective franchise 
limited by census, etc., in elections by ranks or classes. This seems 
hardly to require further elucidation. In larger countries the electoral 
districts are usually so distributed that only one representative has to 
be elected in each ; then the geographically different organization of 
the population (agricultural and manufacturing districts, mercantile 
cities, different denominations, and the like) usually procures currency 
for the difference of interests and opinions, at least to a certain degree. 
It should be determined, moreover,, when a more just count of votes 
becomes possible, if it would not be better to enlarge those election 
districts, in which several representatives must be elected, consider- 
able minorities would then be sure of some representation, which 
they lack entirely under the present systems of election. 



170 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

This method of counting, as is easily seen, commends itself, not 
only at the general elections of deputies, but also at the election of 
larger committees in the chambers of deputies themselves, in clubs, 
etc., in short, everywhere where minorities are opposed to a majority. 
Such committees would in future offer an exact and just image of the 
various parties in the chambers. 

Only when due representation is given in such manner to the min- 
orities, do provisions such as the one that at least two-thirds of the 
votes must be cast for an intended constitutional change, attain their 
true significance. 

No matter where this method of counting is applied, no difficulty 
will ever arise. The officers of election will simply have a slight in- 
crease of work. Beside tabulating the returns, which must be per- 
formed with the greatest exactness, they must do a number of sums in 
division ; their services will perhaps be required for a day longer than 
formerly. But this extra work and the attendant expense (a day's 
pay for computers) are so inconsiderable in comparison with the great 
object aimed at, that a thorough discussion of this point seems hardly 
necessary. 

An elucidation of the defects in the systems of election existing in 
the various countries, and of the improvement which might be effected 
in them by our method of counting, would lead too far. Every at- 
tentive reader, who is acquainted with the election-laws of his coun- 
try, will be able to institute such a comparison for himself. By way 
of example, however, we will examine at least two election-laws more 
closely : that of a small state, the defectiveness of which has long been 
acknowledged by all its citizens, but which has still not been im- 
proved, simply because no one has offered a satisfactory substitute 
(Frankfort, free city), and that of Germany, such as it was proposed 
in the reform-bill as a method of chosing delegates. 

In Frankfort every citizen is entitled to vote, and the citizens are 
divided into three classes: 1. scholars, artists, officials, etc. 2. 
commercial men. 3. tradesmen. The city forms only one election- 
district. Every year each citizen chooses 25 citizens in his own 
division; the 75 delegates thus chosen then, by a majority of votes, 
elect 5 7 deputies. This is not the place to examine whether the kind, 



BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP'S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 171 

number and size of these classes are proper ; we simply accept them 
as an existing fact. Now what is the result of such a class-election ? 
Various contingencies may arise here, all of which have a pretty 
equally defective result. In describing these contingencies we prefer- 
ably cite such as have really occurred here. 

1. In all three classes, one party (it maybe, for instance, the old 
liberal) preponderates, it therefore elects the 57 representatives from 
its midst, and the minority remains wholly unrepresented. This is 
the case even when the majority is only a relative one, that is, if it 
numbers 2000 votes for instance, while the democratic and the con- 
servative parties control 1500 votes each. 

2. A still more defective result is obtained if the two extreme par- 
ties, in order to overthrow the central party, wish to combine and 
enter into a compromise which is opposed to the fundamental prin- 
ciples of each. 

3. If the old liberal party has been victorious in two divisions, 
and the democratic in the third, the 50 old liberal electors elect all 
the deputies from their own party, and the 25 democratic delegates 
have no influence whatever. 

4. If the old liberal party is victorious in the second division, and 
the conservative in the third, while in the first they are so close to 
each other that the old liberals number 1 3 and the conservatives 1 2 
delegates, then 38 old liberals will confront 37 conservatives on the 
day of election of deputies, and if they be well-drilled partisans, the 
former will elect all the deputies. But what takes place ? A delegate 
of the second division (an old liberal) falls ill, the first deputy-dele- 
gate of this division of course belongs to the conservative party, and 
now in reality the opposite takes place, only conservatives being 
elected. This took place on October 28, 1850. 

5. Or the old-liberals are victorious in the first-class, the demo- 
crats in the second, the conservatives in the third. Each party has 
25 electors; but at least ^8 votes are necessary for the valid election 
of a deputy. In this case a defective compromise will finally lead to 
a result that can hardly be good. 

By way of remedy, direct election and a larger number of dis- 
tricts were recommended. But such districts would be created quite 



172 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 

arbitrarily and fortuitously ; no districts are to be formed here which 
represent different social interests. It is not possible to form classes 
according to property or taxes, as no census ever existed here. But if 
our method of counting should find favor, the one-election district 
might very well be continued, and all classes disregarded. Neither 
direct nor indirect elections are in any way anticipated ; in the one as 
in the other, the method of determining election-figures will assure 
adequate representation to a minority or several minorities. 

It is also not our business here to examine the political side of the 
delegate-project. Though it be in itself more proper than direct 
election, though it alone be able to prevent dissension between the 
various country representations and the national representation, though 
there be nothing else possible to Austria, all of which has been re- 
peatedly asserted by the friends of the delegate-project, at all events it 
will be conceded that an unavoidable, nay, necessary and therefore 
irremediable defect of the same consists in this, that the representation 
of each country will only send its majority to the house of delegates, 
nay, that in the proper interest of the party, it cannot act otherwise, 
because it must expect a similar proceeding with regard to the other 
country representations in which the opposite party has the majority. 
Thus, at present, the Prussian chamber of deputies would doubtless 
send no feudalists or clericals, the Bavarian one none of the progres- 
sive party, that of Wurtemberg none favoring smaller Germany, Nas- 
sau and Darmstadt no iC greater Germany" men. Thus, as an au- 
thority on political science has more fully shown, the members of the 
convention of delegates would, it is true, be grouped , according to 
political views, but this would be attended by no sort of mixture of 
the separate countrymen. The division by states would therefore 
make itself felt primarily, and such a convention would very probably 
further a particularistic separation • of the citizens of the individual 
German states, while it really ought to form a most important medium 
for combination and amalgamation. All these disadvantages are com- 
pletely done away with as soon as the method of counting by election- 
figures ', as recommended, is introduced at the election of representa- 
tives of the countries for the convention of delegates. Then the 
Prussian feudalists and clericals, as well as the Bavarian progressive 



BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. I 73 

party, would be sure to send their adequate contingent to the conven- 
tion of delegates. Of course, this universal representation of the 
various parties, corresponding to their relative strength, would be still 
more complete, if the same method of counting had already been fol- 
lowed at the election of the deputies in the individual states. 

The result of the proposed method of counting may, according to 
the preceding, be summarized as follows : 

( 1 ) The parties existing in a population find their original relative 
strength in the representation obtained on the basis specified. 

(2) The minorities are adequately represented, while all the rights 
of the true majority are preserved ; the latter will decide at every 
vote. 

(3) Each party is represented by those members which it holds in 
highest estimation. 



(For mathematical demonstration see next page. 



174 



BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP' S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 



MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRATION. 



Let a be the number of votes received by the candidate of the I st party. 
" b • " " " " " " " " " " 2d " 

a q it a a a a a a a a it a -y^ a 

" n " " " "all the representatives to be elected. 

X ) 

y v the number of the candidates elected by the separate parties. 

zj 

The electoral lists, placed side by side, will, according to this, appear as follows : 

ab 



and 



a b 


c 


a b 


c 


2 2 


2 


a b 


C 


3 3 


3 


a b 


c 


4 4 


4 


a b 


c 


n n 


n 


a 


b 


X 


V 


b 


c 


■ ■ — 


. 


y 


z 


x + y — 


z = n 


a b 




x " " ~ y 




x_ a > r 




b 




b c 




y z 




c ? 




~~ b 




ay cy 


-\-y — n 


b b 




ay — cy -f 


- by = bn 


y - 


— n ■{ 

La+b-(-< 




b 


a — f 


b 1 


x la 


na \ 


b I 


a— b— c i 



I a— b-)-c J 
b 

:n{ a } 
I a-b+c J 



5J 



{ 



n 
z=nc 



b l~ 

i+b+c i 

{ b } 
\ a^-b-^c J 



\(a^b^c)bl 

-{ 



b^c 



consequently 
x=n 



y=n 



.— b— c 

b 



I a— b^c 

n r c- \ 

l a^b-c J 



The strength of the original parties, 
however, reduced to n, is shown in the 
following formations : 

i) a-L-b-i-c : a = n : x 



I a-i-b-j-c i 



a-j-b-f-c 

2) a-^b+c : b = n : y 

_ n f b X 

7 ~~ n \ a+b^c J 

3) a-pb-^c : c = n : z 

z = n{ ° 

I a+b-j-c 

Hence it appears that the election- 
figures correspond exactly to the relation 
of the parties to each other. 



APPENDIX C. 

ELECTION BY PREPONDERANCE OF CHOICE. 
By Dr. L. B. Tuckerman, Cleveland, Ohio. 

The following interesting paper on this subject was also araoir; 
those which were read at the Proportional Representation Congress 
held in Chicago last year (1893), and is reprinted from the Propor- 
tional Representation Review for September of that year : 

In the city of Cleveland, Ohio, the elements composing the labor 
party have worked out a method of their own for securing proportion- 
al representation in caucuses and conventions, and for avoiding dead- 
locks where only a single person is to be nominated. The work can- 
not be said to be wholly that of any one person, all have contributed 
to the result, suggesting improvements here and eliminations there till 
we have developed a method which practically is found to work easily 
and satisfactorily. The method, which I shall call ' < The Cleveland 
Method," is based on the idea of preponderance of choice — a first 
choice does and ought to outweigh a second choice, a third, and so 
on ; and this preponderance is expressed in numerals according to 
a perfectly simple rule which any person of ordinary intelligence can 
apply without difficulty. The rules are as follows : 

1. Each voter will write on his ballot as many names as there are 
persons to be chosen, writing the names in the order of his choice ; 
first choice, first ; second choice, second ; and so on. When nomi- 
nations are made before balloting it is more convenient to write them 
on a board where all can read them. 

2. In tallying the vote the tellers will read the last name on each 
ballot, first, crediting that name with one tally \ the name next to the 
last, second, crediting the same with two tallies ; and so on, always 
crediting the name written first on each ballot with as many tallies as 

there are names written on that ballot. 

: Smith. 

Thus a ballot written : : Brown - 

would be read : Coleman, one ; Fetzer, two ; : J ones - • 

• r etzer. 

Tones, x : Brown, four : Smith, five. '. r 1 



leman. 



175 



176 ELECTION BY PREPONDERANCE OF CHOICE. 

And if a voter fails to write as many names as he is allowed to, no 
variation is made in the method of tallying — the voter simply loses so 
much of his vote, which he has a right to do if he chooses — the last 
name still counts one tally, the next to the last, two, and so on. 

3. The person receiving the highest number of tallies is first de- 
clared elected ; the person receiving the next highest, next ; and so on 
until all the vacancies are filled. In case of a tie with but one vacancy 
to be filled, the incumbent is determined by lot. 

The practical working of this rule (and we have tried it over and 
over again) is, that every element in the electing body large enough 
to have a quota, finds itself proportionately represented, and by its 
own first choice or choices. 

Suppose, for instance, a caucus in a ward containing one hundred 
voters. They are to choose delegates to a convention. Suppose there 
are two factions, one counting on 55 voters and the other 45, and the 
contest so lively that a full vote is polled. Suppose further, that the 
first faction decides to support A, B, C, D and E, in the order named ; 
and the second, B, G, H, /and K, under the Cleveland method, the 
resulting ballot will tally as follows : 

A > 55X5 275 F, 45X5 225 

B, 55X4 220 G, 45X4 180 

C, 55X3 165 H, 45X3 i35 

D, 55X2 no I, 45X2 90 

E, 55Xi 55 K > 45Xi 45 

The five highest are A, F, B, G and C ; three of the majority 
faction and two of the minority — the first choices, the representative 
men of both factions. The advantage of this method in a caucus or 
convention is, that it reaches the result, certainly, directly and quickly, 
there is no counting the number of ballots cast and dividing by the 
number of persons to be chosen to find what the quota is ; there is no 
distribution of second choices, with the dissatisfaction that sometimes 
arises therewith ; the question whether the result would have been 
different had the ballots been counted in a different order. The 
ballots are tallied according to a simple rule the fairness of which 
commends itself to any man of ordinary intelligence, and the more 
sharply the lines are drawn between factions, the more nearly will each 



ELECTION BY PREPONDERANCE OF CHOICE. I 77 

faction be found to have secured its exact proportion of the represen- 
tation. 

Where one is to be chosen. The three ballot rule. 

1. A majority of the votes cast shall be necessary to an election. 

2. In case no candidate receives a majority on the first ballot, a 
second ballot shall be taken in which each person shall express on his 
ballot his first choice and his second choice, by writing the two names 
in the order of his choice ; a first choice tallies as one vote and a 
second choice as half a vote. A vote is not counted when the voter 
fails to express his second choice on his ballot as required. 

3. In case no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast on 
the second ballot, a third ballot is taken between the two candidates 
receiving the highest number of votes on the second ballot, votes cast 
for other candidates being not counted. 

To give an example of the working of the rule, suppose a congres- 
sional district containing five counties and aggregating 500 delegates. 
in convention. Suppose the candidates before the convention, each 
county, of course, having a " favorite son," to be A, with 150 dele- 
gates pledged ; B, with 150 ; C, with 100 ; D, with 60 ; and E, with 
40. It only needs a little mulishness on the part of the delegates to 
deadlock such a convention indefinitely. Under the three ballot rule, 
however, the first ballot would stand as follows : 

A, 150; B, 150; C, 100; D, 60; E, 40; 500 votes cast and 
no election. 

On the second ballot, however, while each delegate would stand 
by his instructions or his pledge and vote for the same candidate as 
before, he must also express his second choice on pain of losing his 
vote altogether. And that second choice must be another of the can- 
didates before the convention. Here individual judgment or prefer- 
ences come into play and delegations solid for first choice will often 
divide on second choices. Suppose in this case A's supporters vote 
for E as second choice ; B's divide, voting 50 for A and 100 for E ; 
C s and D's going, say to E also, and E's to A, and likewise remem- 
bering that a second choice counts as half a vote, the second ballot 
would tally as follows : 

A, 195; B, 150; C, 100; D, 60; E, 245; total, 750. 



I 7 8 ELECTION BY PREPONDERANCE OF CHOICE. 

Again there is no election, no candidate has received a majority, 
but the preponderance of choice has designated two men ; A, with 
195 votes, and £, with 245, as the two really prominent men before 
the convention. All the rest are dropped and the third ballot settles 
it between these two. Like the other rule it works certainly and 
quickly. Under it no charge of unfairness can arise, and there is no 
time for trades and dickers and no place for the bitterness and per- 
sonal animosities that always remain after a long deadlock, a bitter- 
ness which not infrequently lays out at the polls the candidate who was 
finally successful in convention, even when the party whose nominee 
he is, has a substantial majority under ordinary circumstances. 

[This method of election, it will be seen, is almost identical in princi- 
ple with the Burnitz system. The difference being that instead of divid- 
ing the votes for different candidates by the numbers which indicate the 
order of their preferences, they are multiplied by the ordinal numbers ar- 
ranged in the inverse order of preference. Thus the votes for they£/T/ 
choice candidate, when five are to be elected, is multiplied by 5, the 
second choice by 4, and so on, the fifth being multiplied by one. It 
does not seem as though this method distributed the elector's voting 
power correctly. If a voter has five votes which he can give or dis- 
tribute among one or more candidates as he chooses, then he may 
give all five to one, but if he distributes them equally between two 
candidates then obviously the second can get only 2^ votes. In the 
illustration which the author of this paper has given the 55 voters 
might give 275 votes for A, but if they divide them equally between 
A and B, B would receive only 137^2, instead of 220, which have 
been assigned to him. If this method of computing the votes is 
adopted it would seem as though the multipliers should be 5, 2^4, 
1^3 ? ^% and 1, instead of 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1. The proposed multi- 
pliers would give exactly the same results as the Burnitz system, but it 
is much simpler to divide the total votes of the different orders of 
choice by 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 than to multiply them by 5, 2^, 1^3, 
1^ and 1. 

The interesting facts stated in the paper, however, are that this 
method securing proportional representation in the labor party in 



ELECTION BY PREPONDERANCE OF CHOICE. I 79 

Cleveland was developed by the cooperation of a number of its 
members, and that the practical working of the system after many 
trials by a party composed of as many diverse elements as will nat- 
urally be found in the labor party of a great city like Cleveland has 
been satisfactory, and that since it has been adopted, every element in 
that party, large enough to have a quota, finds itself proportionally 
represented.] 



APPENDIX D. 

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MINORITY, PROPORTIONAL OR PERSONAL REPRE- 
SENTATION, CUMULATIVE OR FREE VOTING, ETC. 

[The following list of books, periodicals, addresses and magazine 
articles on the above and kindred topics has been prepared and is 
as full as the means and the time at command would permit, but no 
pretensions to completeness are made. As the writer knows no other 
language than his mother tongue — and that somewhat imperfectly — the 
reference to literature in foreign languages is, as will be seen, very lim- 
ited. It is hoped, though, that this list, imperfect as it is, may be 
useful to those who want to extend their knowledge of the important 
subjects to which the publications enumerated refer. These have been 
arranged chronologically to indicate the relative positions in the order 
of the discussion which the different publications occupied. This ar- 
rangement, it was thought, would be the most useful to those who are 
studying these subjects 

Acknowledgment should be made to the list of books published 
with Prof. Ware's article in the American Law Review of January, 
1872, to a "Bibliography of Proportional Representation," by Prof. 
John R. Commons, in the Proportional Representation Review of Decem- 
ber, 1893, and to Poole's Index. The author will be glad to receive 
any additional titles of books, essays or other publications relating to 
these subjects, which may be included in a more complete list here 
after.] 

•' The Representation of Minorities of Electors to Act with the Majority in Elected 
Assemblies." By Thomas Gilpin. Philadelphia, 1844. This is the first book pub- 
lished on the subject of proportional representation, though Norway, in the Constitu- 
tion of 1 8 14, seems to have been the first to make an attempt to give representation to 
the minority. 

" De la Sincerite du Gouvernement Representatif, ou Exposition de 1' Election 
veridique." Par Victor Considerant. Geneve, 1846. Reprinted by the Swiss Society, 
Zurich, 1892. 15 centimes. Of historical importance, being the first brochure on 
proportional representation in Switzerland. The arguments have not been surpassed. 

' ' A Disquisition on Government, and a Discourse on the Constitution and Govern- 

180 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. l8l 

ment of the United States. ' ' John C. Calhoun. Edited by R. C. Cralle. Charles- 
ton, 185 1. 

"' Minorities and Majorities, Their Relative Rights : A Letter to Lord John Rus- 
sell, M. P., on Parliamentary Reform. " James Garth Marshall. London, 1853. 

" Minorities and Majorities, Their Relative Rights." James Garth Marshall. 
(Review of) Edinburgh Review, July, 1 854. p. 1 16. | 

' ' The Machinery of Representation. ' ' By Thomas Hare. London : Maxwell, Bell- > 
Yard, 1857. X 

' ' Parliamentary Government Considered in Reference to a Reform in Parliament. ' ' 
By Earl Grey. (Review of) North British Review. May, 1858. p. 43. 

"On the Application of a New Statistical Method to the Ascertainment of the 
Votes of Majorities in a More Exhaustive Manner. " Thomas Hare. Journal of the 
Statistical Society, September, i860, p. 337. 

" The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal." First edition. 
Thomas Hare. London, 1 85 9. 

" Mr. Hare's Reform Bill Simplified and Explained." Henry Fawcett. i860. 

' ' Representation of every Locality and Intelligence. ' ' Fraser' s Magazine. April, 
i860, p. 536. 

" Minority Representation, New Theory of." De Bow's Review. November, 
i860, p. 631. 

— ; — Thomas Hare. Journal of the 

Statistical Society. June, i860, pp. 337, 347. 

'■ Report of Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Franchise." June 26, 
i860. 

Thomas Hare. Journal of the 

Statistical Society. September, i860, pp. 351-2. 

"A Plea for a Pure Democracy." Miss Spence. Pub. in South Australia, 1861. 

" Usque ad Caelum." . Thomas Hare. p. 39. London: Sampson Low, Son & 
Co. 1862. 

" De la Representation des Minorites." M. Morin. Geneve, 1862. 

"True and False Democracy. Boston. Prentis & Deland. Congress Street, 
1862. 

' ' Suggestions for the Improvement of Our Representative System. ' ' By Thomas 
Hare. MacmillarC s Magazine. February, 1862. p. 295. 

" A Few Remarks on Mr. Hare's Scheme of Representation." By G. O. Trevel- 
yan, B. A. Macmillan' 1 s Magazine. April, 1862. p. 480. , 

" Ideal of a Local Government for the Metropolis. ' ' Thomas Hare. Macmillan' 's 
Magazine. April, 1863. p. 445. 

North American Review, Vol. XCV, 

1862. p. 240. 

"Considerations on Representative Government." John Stuart Mill. 365 pp. 
New York : Harper Bros. 1862. The chapter in this book on " True and False 
Democracy; Representation of all, and Representation of the Majority only," is one 



102 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

of the best statements of the reasons for giving minorities representation, ever pub- 
lished. Later editions of this book have been issued. 

' ' The Degradation of our Representative System and its Reform. " By J. Francis 
Fisher. Philadelphia. 1863. 

" Methode, bei jeder Art von Wahlen sowohl der Mehrheit als den Minderheiten 
die ihrer Starke entsprechende Zahl von Vertretern zu sichern. ' ' Dargestellt von Dr. 
phil. Gustav Burnitz und Dr. med. Georg Varrentrapp. Frankfort a. M. 1863. 16 pp. 
A translation of this pamphlet is given in pages 159-174. 

Christian Examiner. Boston, 1863. 

Report of Mr. Robert Lytton, Pier Majesty's Secretary of Legation at Copenhagen,, 
on the Election of Representatives for the Rigsraad. Presented by Command. 1864. 
(Printed in the London Daily Nexus, Aug. 30-31, 1864; also as an appendix to a 
speech by John Stuart Mill on Personal Representation, delivered in the House of 
Commons May 29, 1867, and printed in pamphlet form, by Henderson, Raib and 
Fenton, Printers, 23 Berners Street, Oxford Street, London, 1867.) This report deals- 
with the system as applied in Denmark, by Minister Andrae. 

" Les Elections de Geneve. Memoire Presente au Conseil Federal et au Peuple 
Suisse." Ernest Naville. Lausanne et Geneve. 1864.* 

" Conseil de 1' Association Reformiste." Rapport du President. Ernest Naville. 
Geneve. 1865.* 

"Personal Representation." A Review of Hare's Election of Representatives. 
Westminster Review, Oct., 1865, p. 145. 

"Individual Responsibility in Representative Government." Thomas Hare. 
Fortnightly Review, March 15, 1866. p. 350. 

" Principles of Representation." Edward Wilson. Fortnightly Review, April 1,, 
1866. p. 421. 

" Reform in our Municipal Elections. " J. Francis Fisher. Philadelphia. 1866. 

"The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal." A Treatise by 
Thomas Hare. Third Edition. Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1867. 350 pp. 
This is the most complete treatise on the subject to whidh it relates that has yet been 
published. Later editions have been issued since the first one. 

"Personal Representation." Nation, Aug. 15, 1867. 

"The Tyranny of the Majority." The North American Review, Jan., 1867. 
p. 205. 

"Personal Representation." By David G. Croly. In Galaxy, July, 1867. p. 307. 

' ' Report to the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York on Personal 
Representation." Prepared at the request, and printed under the auspice* of the 
Personal Representation Society, by Simon Sterne. New York. 1867. 

" Personal Representation." Speech of John Stuart Mill, M. P., in the House of 
Commons, May 29, 1867 ; with an Appendix, containing reports of Discussions and 
Publications in France, Geneva, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, the Aus- 



* The writings of Professor Naville are numerous, and besides giving remarkable exposi- 
tions of the subject they are a complete history of the movement in Switzerland. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1 83 

tralian Colonies, and the United States. London. 1867. Henderson, Raib & Fen- 
ton, Printers, 23 Berners St., Oxford St. 

' ' Representative Reform. Report of the Committee Appointed by the Conference 
of Members of the Reform League, and Others, on Mr. Hare's Scheme of Representa- 
tion." London. Triibner & Co. 1868. 

" L&s Minorites et le Suffrage Universel. Par le Baron de Layze." Paris. 1868. 

" Del Potere Elettorale negli stati Liberi. Par Luigi Palma." Milano. 1869. 

" Rapport de la Majorite de la Commission nomme par le Grand Conseil de la Re- 
public et Canton de Neuchatel pour la Revision de la Loi Electorale, 1869." 

' ' Report of the Select Committee of the United States Senate on Representative 
Reform." Government Printing Office, 1869. Reprinted in " Proportional Repre- 
sentation." By Senator Buckalew, Philadelphia. 

"A Scheme for Proportional Representation." Walter Baily. London. 1869. 
Mr. Baily' s system seems to be similar to the Gove System. 

' < Recent Discussions on the Representation of Minorities. ' ' The Princeton Re~ 
view of October, 1869. p. 581. 

" On the Political and Social Effects of Different Methods of Electing Representa- 
tives." By H. R. Droop. London. 1869. 

" Constitution of the State of Illinois as Adopted in Convention, with an Address 
to the People." Chicago. 1870. 

"Proportional Representation." David Dudley Field. Putnam's Magazine,, 
June, 1870. p. 712. 

" Representation Proportionelle de la Majorite et des Minorite." Par J. Borley. 
Paris. 1870. 

" Teoria della Elezione Politica." Guido Padebetti. Naples. 1870. 

" Le Suffrage Universel dans l'Avenir." Eugene Aubry-Vitet. Revue des Deux- 
Mondes du 15 Mai, 1870. 

" Representative Government and Personal Representation." Simon Sterne. 
237 pp. Philadelphia : Lippincott & Co. 1871. $1.75. An able presentation of the 
Hare System simplified and adapted to American institutions. 

Proceedings of the American Social Science Association. The application of 
Mr. Hare's method of voting to the nomination of Overseers of Harvard College. New 
York. 187 1. 

Sessional Proceedings of the National Association for the Promotion of School 
Science, The School Board Elections. London. 1871. 

' ' Memorandum on the History, Working and Results of Cumulative Voting. ' * 
( Prepared for the information of the Belgian Government. ) London. Printed at the 
Foreign office. 187 1. 

"The Cumulative Method of Voting." As exhibited in the late School- Board 
Elections. Birmingham. 1871. 

" La Question Electorale." Par Ernest Naville.* Geneve et Bale. 1871. (A 
resume of the publications of the Association Reformiste. ) 

* Refers to note on p. 182. 



184 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Proceedings of the American Social Science Association. The Application of 
Mr. Hare's Method of Voting to the Nomination of Overseers of Harvard College. 
New York. 187 1. 

Sessional Proceedings of the National Association for the Promotion of Social 
Science. The School-Board Elections. London. 1S71. 

" Minority Representation in Europe." T. Hare. American Social Science 
Journal, vol 3. 1871. p. 185. 

" A Short Explanation of Mr. Hare's Scheme of Representation. " By Millicent 
Garrett Fawcett. Macmillaii 1 s Magazine. April, 1 87 1, p. 481. 

" Minority Representation. " The Nation. August 3, 1871. p. 69. 

"Proportional Representation." C. R. Buckalew, ex-U. S. Senator, Penn. 
Edited by John G. Freeze. Philadelphia : William J. Campbell. 1872. 8vo. 
Price $3.00. Includes speeches, addresses, and report of the Senate Committee. 
Favors cumulative vote. 

" Minority or Proportional Representation. Its nature, aims, history, processes 
and practical operation. " By Salem Dutcher. New York : U. S. Publishing Co. 1872. 
165 pp. Price #1.50.' 

" The Machinery of Politics and Proportional Representation." By Prof. Wm. R. 
Ware. The American Law Review. January, 1872. p. 255. 

" Minority Representation. " T. Gilpin. Penn Monthly. July, 1872. p. 347. 

" Minority Representation. " Simon Sterne. Nation. July, 1872. p. 69. 

"Redistribution of Political Power." By E. H. Knatchbull-Hugessen. Mac- 
millait 's Magazine. November, 1 872. p. 67. 

"Proportional Representation." By S. Dana Horton. The Penn Monthly. 
June, 1873. p. 364. 

" Reforme Electorale." M. Leon Petz de Thoze. Bruxelles, 1874. p. 8. 

" Le Progres de la Reforme Electoral en 1873." Ernest Naville. Geneve, 1874.* 

"A New Theory of Minority Representation. " By Albert B. Mason. The New 
Englander, July, 1874. p. 573. 

Leslie Stephen. Fortnightly Review, 

June, 1875. 

" A Note on Representative Government." Thomas Hare. Fortnightly Review, 
July I, 1875. p. 102. 

"The Protection of Majorities or Considerations Relating to Electoral Reform." 
Josiah Phillips Quincy. Boston : Roberts Bros. 1876. 

" Les Progres de la Reforme Electoral en 1874 et 1875." Ernest Naville, Geneve. 
1876.* 

" The Representation of Minorities. " By Leonard Courtney, M. P. Nineteenth 
Century, July, 1879. p. 141. 

" La Democratic Representative. " Ernest Naville.* Geneve et Paris. 1881. 

" On Methods of Electing Representatives. " H. R. Droop. Journal of the Sta- 
tistical Society, June, 1 88 1. p. 141. 

* Refers to note on p. 182. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1 85 

' ' The People' s Power ; or How to Wield the Ballot. ' ' By Simeon Stetson. San 
Francisco : W. M. Henton. 1883. 63 pages, paper, 25 cents. 

"Proportional Representation." (Italian.) Cav. Francesco, Sec. to the State 
Council. Rome. 1883. 

"The English Radicals and Minority Representation." The Nation; October 25, 

1883. p. 347- 

" Minority Representation. " J. Parker Smith. Spectator, November 10, 1883. 
p. 1444. 

" The Minority Vote. " Spectator. December 15, 1883. p. 1617. 

"Proportionate Representation." By Frederic Seebohm. Contemporary Review. 
December, 1883. p. 905. 

" Parliamentary Reform : Minority Representation. " By J. Parker Smith. West- 
minster Review. January, 1884. p. 163. 

" Proportional Representation. " By Robert B. Hay ward. The Nineteenth Cen- 
tury. February, 1884. p. 293. 

"Proportional Representation: A Practical Proposal. " By John Westlake, Q. C. 
Contemporary Review. March, 1884. p. 417. Also reprinted for the Proportional 
Representation Society. 

" Representation and Misrepresentation. " Westminster Reviezv. April, 1884. p. 392. 

" Proportional Representation." By Sir John Lubbock, Bart., M. P. Nineteenth 
Century. April, 1884. p. 703. 

" A Test Election." By H. O. Arnold Forster. Nineteenth' Century. April, 

1884. p. 716. 

" The Representation of Minorities. " By G. Shaw Lefevre. Contemporary Re- 
view. May, 1884. p. 714. 

"Proportional vs. Majority Representation." By Albert Grey, M. P. Nineteenth 
Century. December, 1884. p. 935. 

" Fair Representation. " Walter E. Smith. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 

1885. 63 pages. Price (paper) is., cloth, 6s. A careful examination of Various 
plans of Proportional Representation. 

" La Democratic Representative. Representation Proportionelle de la Majonte et 
des Minorites." By Edouard Campagnole. Rue Soufflot, Paris, 1885. 

" The D' Hondt System and the Single Transferable Vote." (Italian.) Florence. 
1885. 

"Representation and Misrepresentation. The Crusade for Proportional Represen- 
tion." Thomas Hare. Fortnightly Review. February I, 1885. p. 202. 

"Proportional Representation : Objections and Answers." By Sir John Lubbock, 
Bart., M. P. ; Leonard Courtney, M. P. ; Albert Grey, M. P. ; and John Westlake, 
Q. C. The Nineteenth Century. February, 1 885. p. 321. 

"Practical Consideration on the Representation of Minorities. " By I. Boyd Kin- 
near. Fortnightly Review. February 15, 1886. p. 49. 

" Working Men on Minority Representation." The Nation. September 16, 1886. 
p. 229. 



1 86 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

' ' Die Frage der Einfiihrung einer Proportionalvertretung Statt des Absoluten 
Mehres." Bischoff Von Hagenbach. Basel, 1888. 

" Le Suffrage Universal et le Regime Parlementaire. " Par M. Paul Lafitte. 1889. 

"Representation, Imperial Parliament, No. 2." 6th thousand. By Sir John Lub- 
bock. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. , 1890. 90 pages. Paper, 9d. A brief, 
clear discussion. Favors the single transferable vote. Sir John Lubbock is president 
of the English Proportional Representation Society. 

' ' Bericht des Grossrats. ' ' Kommission iiber das Initiativbegehren betreffend 
Einfiihrung der Proportionalvertretung, bei den Wahlen in den Grossen Rat. Basel, 
1890. 

"Congressional Directory Supplements, 1890 and following, Washington." Maps 
and population of all Congressional Districts for each Congress, beginning with the 
51st. A telling object lesson. 

' ' Representation Proportionalle des Opinions Differentes dans les Elections. ' ' Par 
J. Curie, Paris, 28 Rue Serpente, 1891. 

"La Representation Vraie et la Revision." Jean Mommaert. Societe Beige de 
Librairies. Bruxelles, 1891. 

"The Gerrymander of Wisconsin." A. J. Turner. A review of the legislative 
apportionment act of 1891. The author. Portage, Wisconsin. 26 pages. Maps and 
statistics of a remarkable legislative gerrymander, since declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court. 

" Proportional Representation a Remedy for Gerrymandering." By Prof. John R. 
Commons. Philadelphia : American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1 891. 

"An Unrepresentative Congress." Stoughton Cooley. Retford's. December, 1891. 

" A New Plan for Minority Representation." J. R. Commons. Review of Re- 
views. November, 1 89 1. 

" An Appeal to the Canadian Institute on the Rectification of Parliament." San- 
ford Fleming. Toronto : The Copp Clark Co., 1892. 173 pages. Contains an- 
nouncement of prizes by the editor and well selected extracts from writers on party 
politics and electoral reform. Contains also the report of Lord Lytton on the election 
of representatives in Denmark. 

" Legal Disfranchisement." Stoughton Cooley. Atlantic Monthly. April, 1C92. 

' ' The Slaying of the Gerrymander. ' ' Stoughton Cooley. Atlantic Montuly. 
May, 1892. 

"How to Abolish the Gerrymander." J. R. Commons. Review of Reviews. 
December, 1892. 

Cridge, Alfred. — "Proportional Representation. Including its relations to the 
Initiative and Referendum." San Francisco. 1893. Published by the author, 429 
Montgomery Street. 10 cents. 

"Proportional Representation." A series of 13 articles in The Twentieth 
Century ', 1 9 Astor Place, New York, by J. R. Commons, beginning June 29 > 
1893- 

" Proportional Representation." W. D. McCrackan. Arena. February, 1893. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1 87 

" Proportional Representation." Stoughton Cooley. Netu England Magazine. 
March, 1893. 

" Why Municipal Government Fails." Stoughton Cooley. American Journal- 
of Politics. August, 1893. 

Essays Received in Response to an Appeal by the Canadian Institute on the 
Rectification of Parliament. Toronto : The Copp Clark Company, Limited. 1S93. 

' ' Primary Elections. A Study of Methods for improving the Basis of Party 
Organization." Daniel S. Remsen. New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1894. 

PERIODICALS. 

La Representation Proportionelle. Paris, F. Pichon, 1888. 524 pages, 10 fr. 
Published under the auspices of the Societie pour 1' etude de la representation propor- 
tionelle of France. An able exposition of the reform by the secretary of the society, 
and a complete history of legislation in all countries. 

La Representation Proportionelle Revue Mensuelle. Bruxelles, Belgium. Pub- 
lished since 1882. 5 fr. yearly. The organ of L' association Reformiste beige pour la 
Representation Proportionelle. Contributions from the foremost continental reformers. 
The volume for 1885 contains a full account of the international congress at Anvers. 

Btdletin de la Societe Suisse pour la Representation Proportionelle. H. Georg, 
librairie-editeure. Geneve et Bale, 1885. Prix du numero 50 centimes. 

Hope and Home. Alfred Cridge, editor and proprietor. San Francisco. 25 c. a 
year. Devoted to Direct Legislation and Proportional Representation. 

The Proportional Representation Review. Published quarterly by the American 
Proportional Representation League of Chicago. 

"THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION REVIEW." 

CONTENTS OF SEPTEMBER NUMBER, 1 893. 

The Proportional Representation Congress. 

Outline of Bill Based on Free List System. 

Outline of Bill Based on Gove System. 

Proportional Representation, Prof. John R. Commons. 

Ticino as an Object Lesson, W. D. McCrackan. 

Effective Voting, Catherine H. Spence. 

The Gove System, Wm. H. Gove. 

The Proxy System, Montague R. Leverson. 

Majority Myths, Alfred Cridge. 

The Solution of the Problem, T. Curie. 

Preponderance of Choice, Dr. L. B. Tuckerman.* 

Address of The American Proportional Representation League. 



* See p. 175. 



1 88 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

CONTENTS OF DECEMBER NUMBER, 1893. 

Proportional Representation as a Means of Political Reform, William Dudley 
Foulke. 

The Application. Form of Ballot for the Four List System. 

The Cumulative Vote, John Z. White. 

Proportional Representation in Switzerland, Prof. Ernest Naville. 

A Bibliography of Proportional Representation, Prof. John R. Commons. 

State of the Movement. 

Editorial Notes. 

CONTENTS OF MARCH NUMBER, 1 894. 

Reform in City Government, Hon. Charles Francis Adams. 
The Line of Least Resistance. ' 

The Present" Condition of the Proportional Representation Question in France, 
Lieut. -Col. J. Curie. 

Proportional Representation in Belgium, Prof. John R. Commons. 
State of the Movement. 
Editorial Notes. 



THE END 



INDEX. 



PAGE. 

Abingdon. 73 

Able man 123, 139, 140 

Absolute government 52 

Adams, Charles Francis 126 

Address of Am. Prop. Rep. League. . 123 

Alderman 44, 127, 138 

Altamont 60 

Alton 58, 62, 68 

Am. Academy of Pol. and Social 

Science .--. 125 

American Law Review . . . 16, 29, 8^, 

132, 144, 149 

American Prop. Rep. League 19, 123 

Am. Prop. Rep. League, address of . . 52 

Anna 130 

Apathy 52 

Apathy and indifference of voters .121, 122 

Appendix A 147-158 

Appendix B 159-174 

Appendix C 175-179 

Appendix D 180-188 

Apportionment law 18 

Appropriation of votes 100, 113 

Arnold, Matthew 37, ^8 

Arrogance of the majority 122 

Assemblymen 138 

Assemblymen, election of 114 

Assigning votes , 81 

Athenian state 37 

Athens 37 

Augusta 57 

Austin 45, 59, 69, 130 

Austria 172 

Australia 149 



PAGE. 

Australian ballot 54, 55 

Australian system of voting 58, 60 

Automatic action 90 

Automatic adaptation 147 

Automatic system 100 

Average minds 140 

Bad-blood 67, 68, 71 

Balance, beam of .. 26 

Balance of Power 27, 28 

Ballot clerks 99, 1 13 

Ballots, return of 95 

Ballots, transferring .., 149 

Bancroft 6, 7 

Banker 49 

Bavarian 172 

Beardstown 47, 53, 61, 62, 63, 78 

Belleville 70 

Best men, deterred from holding office 121 

Bet 12 

Bibliography 180-18S 

Bill for election of congressmen.. 151, 

152, 153 

Bitterness, party 60, 64 

Blank for return of votes 95, 96 

Blanks 108 

Boards of supervisors 75 

Bolting f 125, 157 

Bosses 76, 145 

Bosses, government by 39 

Boss, municipal 126 

Boss, political 75, 78 

Boston harbor 8 

Bribed 12 



189 



190 



INDEX. 



PAGE. 

Bribery 44, 81 

Briber}-, sovereignty of 27 

Bright, John 88, 128, 131, 147 

British Parliament 122, 145 

Brooks 61 

Buckalew, Chas. R. . .17, 25, 36, 41, 

50, 53, 118, 124, 125, 146, 157, 158 

Bunker Hill 56 

Bureaucratic despotism 36 

Burnitz & Yarrentrapp' s system of 

election 90, 159, 174 

Burnitz, Dr 90, 91, 150, 153 

Burnitz, Gustav, paper by 159 

Burnitz method of computation 136 

Burnitz system of election. . . .81, 92, 102, 
112, 113, 137, 138.. 153, 154, 157, 178 

154, 157 

Bushnell 47, 62 

Buxton, Mr 122 

Cairns, Lord 51, 122 

Calhoun, Mr 51 

Campaign expenses 74 

Candidate, popular and unpopular. ... 58 

Candidates, choice of 93 

Candidates, number of to be elected in 

a district 81 

Canvassers, district 99, 113 

Carlyle 46, 59, 69 

Carmi 57, 60, 78 

Carrollton 54, 62 

Carthage 70 

Caucuses 76, 79, 81, 138, 142, 

175, 176 

Caucuses, attendance on 30 

Caucuses, packing of 74 

Caucus rule 1 1 9 

Caucus system 141 

Certainty of election 74 

Champaign 47, 69 

Chance 71, 72, 148, 149 

Characters, superior 139 



PAGE. 

Charleston 45, 54, 60 

Charter 8 

Chester 46, 59 

Chicago. . . .19, 45, 46, 47, 54, 55, 
56, 59, 69, 73, 74, 75, 78, 149, 

150, 151, 152, 155 

Chicago Congress 154, 155 

Choice 177, 178 

Choice of candidates 93 

Churchman 66 

Circular of enquiry 43 

Cities, members of legislative bodies of 114 

City candidate 66 

City population 66 

Civil liberty „ 5, 29 

Civil sendee reform 128 

Civil war 132 

Classes, instructed 141 

Classes of votes 113 

Cleveland method 175 

Cleveland, O 175, 179 

Cliques 173 

Cliques, should be heard 128 

Colleague 65, 69 

Collective mediocrity 139 

Collinsville 46, 78 

Combination of parties 171 

Committee on Rep. Reform 50 

Committees 9 

Common Council of N. York 127 

Commons, John R 18, 125 

Complexity 100, 1 13 

Computing votes 154, 178 

Congress 120 

Congressional district 177 

Congress, members' of 18, 44, 1 12 

Congress Prop. Rep. . .150, 151, 152, 154 
Congress, representatives in . .151, 152, 153 
Congress, World's Prop. Rep. . . .149, 155 

Constituency an integer 129 

Constitution 12 

Constitutional convention 43, 57 



INDEX. 



I 9 I 



PAGE. ! 

• 36 

:, 43! 



114 

88 
149 



Constitutional monarchy 

Constitution of Illinois 41, 

Constitution of State of New York, 

amendment to 113, 

Constitution of the State cf Illinois . . . 

Conte7nporary Review 84, 

Contention 129 

Convention, constitutional 43 

Convention, nominating 66 

Conventions 175 

Cornfield Si 

Corporate associations 112 

Corporate body 161, 162 

Corrupting the convention 75 

Corruption 44, 83 

CoiTupt voters, combination of 126 

Cost of campaign Si 

Count, fraudulent 150 

Counting, method of . . 171, 173 

Counting votes. .44, 53, 54, 55, 63, 

Si, 94, 97, 99, "3> 140, I49> 

169, 170 

Country candidate 66 

Courtney, Leonard. . . .33, 123, 134, 

144 

Crash, social , 

Cridge, Alfred 14, 15 

Crime, infamous 12 

Crotchets 128 

Crotchety men 12S 

Cumulative system. . . .66, 79, 81, 82, 

S3, 130, 131, 147, 

Cumulative system, advantages of. . . . 

Cumulative system, cumbersomeness 

of 

Cumulative system, objections to . .S3, 

Cumulative voting. . . .40, 43, 44, 45, 

50, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 65, 

67, 7i, 72, 73, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 

85, 87, 88, 90, 97, 100, 102, 103, 

113, 120, 128, 132, 

Cumulative voting, objections to 



148 
36 
26 
1} 



157 
63 

82 
84 



150 

65 



Darmstadt 172 

Dead-locks 175, 178 

Deals 78 

Decatur 56, 58 

Decisiveness 133 

"Decisiveness," the aim of govern- 
ment 129 

Deliberative assembly 30 

Deliberative body 144 

Demagogues, oligarchy of 36 

Democratic government, evil of 125 

Democratic majority 140 

Demoralization of government i_;5 

Denmark 102 

De Quincey 120 

Despair of citizens 123 

Despotism, bureaucratic 36 

Despotism, military 36 

Diagram of vote of Illinois 23 

Diagram of vote of New York 22 

Disfranchisement I S, 25, 116, 117 

Disfranchisement of the people 19 

Disintegration of party 145 

Disraeli 12S 

Distributing votes 81, 82 

Distribution of votes. . .72, 87, 89, 90, 104 

District canvassers 99, 113 

Districts , 40 

Districts, enlargement of. . . .79, 80, Si, S3 
Districts, enlargement of does not im- 
ply an increase of members So 

Districts, increase of 171 

Districts, single , 11S 

Districts, size of 44 

Divine law 10 

Division of votes 63, 104 

Divisions 71 

Dixon 46, 61, 63, 77 

Doctrinaires 53 

Dominant majority 116 

Dominant parties 137 

Droop, Mr 154 

Dutch government . 7 



192 



INDEX. 



PAGE. 

East St. Louis 46, 54, 55, 57, 60, 70 

Education Act, Elementary 84 

Effective voting 149 

Effingham 47? 64, 77 

Egypt 55, 7 2 

Election, Burnitz system of 102, 153 

Election by Preponderance of choice. . 175 

Election clerks 55 

Election-committee 169 

Election figures. .161, 162, 163, 164, 

165, 166, 169, 172 

Election, free list system of 152, 154 

Election, Gove system of 151, 154 

Election inspector, stupid 104 

Election laws 160, 170 

Elections , 160 

Elections, purification of 146 

Elections, result of. 16 

Elective machinery, reform of 126 

Elective quota 156 

Elective quotient 97, 1 12 

Electoral body 162 I 

Electoral machinery 32 

Electoral system, vicious ^t, 

Elementary Education Act 84 

Elgin 47,58,61, 70, 75 

Employers 34 

English school boards 84, 147 

Enlargement of districts 80, 81 

Enlargement of districts, does not im- 
ply an increase of members 80 

Estimation 161, 162, 163 

Evanston 46, 74 

Evils of majority representation 29 

Expense of counting 170 

Expenses, campaign 74 

Extreme men 144 

Farmer 66 

Feuds * , 71 

Fight 68 

Fight, fair stand-up 67 



PAGE. 

First minds 140 

Fisher, J. Francis 117 

Floating vote . 27 

Flora « , . . . 46 

Formula 1 37 

Fortuitous conditions 148 

Fortuitous element 149, 150 

Fortuitous feature 7 2 

Fractional votes 53, 55, 97, 99 

Franchise, extensions of 139 

Franchises 7 

Frankfort 159, 160, 170 

Frankfurter Reform 160 

Franklin, Dr .8, 9, 13, 50 

Fraudulent count 150 

Freedom 143 

Freedom in the exercise of suffrage. . . 134 

Freedom of choice 6^ 

Freedom of voting 88, 113, 157 

Freedom to the voter 79, 80 

Free list system 149, 156 

Free list system of election 552, 154 

Freeport 67, 69, 74, 79 

Free voting. .41, 43, 48, 50, 56, 109, 

120, 131, 137, 139, 143, 145 

Free voting, advantages of 136 

Free voting, evils which it would 

lessen 1 16 

Free voting, influence on party or- 
ganization '. 124 

Free voting in Illinois , 53 

Free voting, principles of S8 

Freeze, John G 146 

" Gang " 78 

Garfield, Pres 18 

General Assembly 58, 59 

Geneva 73, 74, 79 

Geneva law 15 2 

Georgia • 132 

German States I7 2 

Germany I7°> *7 2 



INDEX. 



93 



Gerry, Elbridge 

Gerrymander, .16, 17, 18, 57, 58, 60, 

63, 125, 

Gladstone . 128, 

Good government, promotion of 

Good men crippled 

Government by bosses 

Government by the politicians 

Government, demoralization of 

Gove system 78, 151, 

Gove, Wm. H 

Great Britain 

Grecian state 

Grey, Albert 29, 132, 

Grey, F. W 

Grievances of working men 

Groups, small should not be repre- 
sented 

Guess 

Guizot. 

Guizot's History of Rep. Government. 



131 

129 

44 
33 
39 
28 

145 
154 
150 
118 

142 

148 

27 



Hackney division 85 



Hare's scheme 

Hare's treatise and system, 



89 



139, 



160 
160 

77 
26 

67 



147, 148, 149, 150, 

Hare, Thos 126, 146, 150, 

Havana 46, 47, 57, 62, 70, 74, 

Hay ward, Robt. H 

Henry 

Heresies 141 

Herkimer county 20 

Hillsboro 74, 75 

Hocus-pocus 149 

Holmes, Dr 141 

Horton, S. Dana 8^, 134 

House of Commons 8, 123, 145 

House of Representatives 41, 43, 132 

House of Rep. , changes in. ..... 119, 120 

Ignorance of voters 44, 53, 54, 104 

Ignorance of inspectors 53 



Illinois. .40,41,42,43, 44,45,48,49, 
5o, 5i, 53, 55, 56, 59, 61, 63, 65, 
68, 71, 72, 73, 76, 79, 80, 82, 88, 

97, 102, 107, 108, 118, 130, 131 

Illinois law 78 

Illinois, system 76, 87, 100, 103 

Impracticable 53, 55 

Independence 143, 145 

Independence in the choice of candi- 63 

dates 63 

Independence in voting 88, 156 

Independence of representatives 139 

Independence of voters 124. 

Independent men, withdrawal of 31 

Independent movements 125 

Independent parties 62, 73 

Independents 82, 169. 

Independents, revolt of 107 

Independent ticket 107, 157 

Independent views 30 

Independent voters 79 

Indifference and apathy of voters 1 2 1 

Ineffective votes 155 

Influence of free voting on party organ- 
ization 124. 

Inherent justice of free voting 143 

Injury, sense of 71 

Injustice, sense of 71 

Insecurity of office 121 

Inspector, election, stupid 104 

Inspectors, ignorance of 53 

Inspectors of election. .44, 55, 94, 99, 113 

Instinct for distinguishing an able man 140 

Instructed classes 141 

Instructed few 140, 143 

Instructed minority 139, 140, 141 

Integer 129 

Intellect and integrity 125 

Intellects, superior 139 

Interest in public affairs 63 

Inverse order of preference 178 

Iowa • 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 • 1 1 1 1 • • J 9 



1 94 



INDEX. 



Iroquois county 



PAGE. 
. 70 



IOO 

37 
149 
138 
113 



Jacksonville 59, 74, 75, 77, 79 

Janitors of buildings 135 

Jealousy 67, 71 

Jerseyville 57 

Jewish state 2>7 

Johnson, Tom F 152 

Joliet. .54, 56, 58, 62, 63, 70, 71, 72, 
73, 77, 78 ; 

Judah 

Juggle 

Justice 10, 28, 

ii Justice and not simplicity " . . . . loo 3 

Justice, establishing of 146 

Justice, not the main object of law. . . 129 

Justice of free voting 143 

Kankakee county. 7° 

Kansas 20 

Kentucky 19 

"Kid" 66 

<l Labor " 143 

Labor man 66 

Labor party 41, 175, 178, 179 

Labor strikes 5,8, 9 

Labor unions . . . ., 67 

Lambeth division 85 

Law for election of representatives. . . 159 

Law, justice not its main object 129 

Law Review, Am 16, 29 

Lawyer 65 

Leaders of a higher grade of intellect. 141 

Leading spirits 140 

Lefevre, G. Shaw 84, ill, 149 

Legislature, improvement of 44 

Legislative assembly, a talking body. . 129 

Legislatures, state, members of 112 

Liberty, civil 29 

Liberty in voting 107 

Limited freedom of voting .......... 73 



PAGE. 

Lincoln, Abraham 62 

Local feeling 131 

Local interests 131 

Localities should be represented. .133, 134 

Locality, claims of. 1 20 

Local representation 134, 135 

Lockport . 61 

London School Board 85 

Lot. 148, 150, 176 

Lubbock, Sir John 148 

Lytton, Rob't 147 

Machine politicians 74 

Machine politics 138 

Machinery of Politics and Prop. Rep. . 29 

" Machines ;i 76 

Mac mi 11 ail 1 s Magazine 126 

Macomb 60 

Maine 20 

Majority, acquiescence in will of . . . . 118 

Majority, dominant 116 

Majority, must be held responsible for 

legislation 131 

Majority representation, evils of 29 

Majority, right to govern and to sole 

representation 118 

Majority, rule of. .... 118 

Majority should rule 15, 24, 25, 111 

Majority system, working of . 20 

Male citizens 13 

Manchester 54 

Manual labor, unrepresented 142 

Maryland .6, 20 

Mason, Alfred B. 148 

Mason, Charles. 12 

Massachusetts 6, 16 

Mathematical demonstration 174 

Mattoon 45, 58, 77 

McLanesboro. 58, 69 

Mechanics. 67 

Mediocrity 123 

Mediocrity, collection 139 



INDEX. 



195 



PAGE. 

Members, bad, should be excluded. . . 86 

Members of Congress 44, 1 12 

Men of distinguished abkity 139 

Men of high intelligence 141 

Merchant 49, 66 

Merit, repressive of 121 

Method of assuring to the minority. ... 159 

Metropolis 59 

Military despotism 36 

Mill, John Stuart 21, 24, 49, 118, 

123, 13 1 , 133. 139, 142 

Minds, just and average 140 

Minorities are represented 50 

Minorities have' undue strength 130 

Minorities, representation of 40 

Minority candidate 74 

Minority, despair of 122 

Minority, instructed 139 

Minority, may govern 14 

Minority members 57 

Minority representation 103, 123, 156 

Minority representation, objections to 

considered 128 

Minority represents lion, principle of. . 102 

Minority representation, systems of. . . 147 

Minority representatives 64 

Misrepresentation 14 

Moderate men 144 

Moline 61, 67, 69, 70, 74 

Monarchy, constitutional 36 

Money powers 142 

Monmouth 46, 59 

Montgomery county zo 

Mortification 50 

" Mugwumps " 169 

Multitude, can distinguish an able man 123 

Multitude, the 37 

Municipal governing bodies, numbers 

of 112 

Murphysboro 5S 

Naperville 47, 54, 62, 68, 75 



PAGE. 

Nassau 172 

Nation 102, 103. 

Native 66 

Naturalized person 66 

Naville, M gy 

Nezu Englander 148 

New Netherland 7 

New theory of Minority Represntation 148 

New York 12, 13, 14 

New York city. .21, 29, 43, 116, 118, 

127, 131, 135, 136 
New York state . .20, 21, 24, 29, 40, 

48, 49, 78, 80, 83, 131, 136 
Nineteenth Century, .lb, 29, 2,1-> IJI > 

132, 133, 134, 144, 14^ 

Nominating conventions 32, 35, 66 

Nomination equivalent to election . . 74, 

75, 77, 79 

Nomination of candidates 44, 7 6 

Nominations, control of 16 

North Am. Review 128. 

Objections to cumulative voting. 65 

Objections to minority representation 

considered 12S 

Obstruction 131 

Odd number of representatives. .109, 

in, 112 

Ohio 19, 83 

Old man 66 

Opinion, representation of all shades of 62 

Opponent 65 

Optimistic answers 75 

Order of names on ticket 105 

Order of preference 149 

Ordinal numbers. . . .92, 99, 105, 107, 

108, 112, 113, 17S 

( )rdinal rank 164 

( )rganization of electors 125 

( Organization, party 1 24 

Organizing, power of 85, Sj 

< )ttawa 47, 67, 77 



190 



INDEX. 



54, 01, 



PAGE. 

. . 66 

r.i 77 

8 

122 

124 



Pairs of candidates 

Paris 

Parliament. . . 

Parliament, British 

Parties, influence of. . . . 

Parties, strength of 65 

Partisans, strong 63, 72 

Part}' 32 

Party allegiance 80 

Party bitterness ' 64 

Party domination 36 

Party fealty 71 

Party interest 158 

Party managers 79, 107 

Party organization 62 

Party organization, influence of free 

voting on 1 21 

Party supremacy 6S 

Party, disintegration of 145 

Paster 94 

Patronage, distribution of 121 

Patronage, sovereignty of 27 

Peabody, Dr. A. P 36 

Penn Monthly 83 

People, Government of 13 

People, Sovereignty of 13 

People, the 12, 28 

Peoria 70 

Pericles 141 

Perplexity of voters 72 

Pessimists 146 

Pessimistic respondents 78 

Petitions 144 

Platforms 125 

Plato 37, 142 

Plump 41, 54, 65, 66, 67, 69 

Plumpers 82, 

Plumping '47, 67, 69, 71, 100 

Political bargains 156 

Political boss 75, 78, 145 

Political evils which free voting would 

lessen 1 16 



PAGE. 

Political evolution 113 

Political managers, tyranny of 31 

Political power 51 

Political power, exclusion of voters 

from 122 

Political revolt 82 

Political thinker 123. 145 

Politicians 57 

Politicians, control of 74 

Politicians, government by 28 

Politician, professional 28, 125 

Poll clerks 99, 104, 113 

Pontiac 46, 59, 70, 74, 131 

Poor 142 

Popular man 44, 66 

Popular representation 25 

Potency, voting 109 

Practical politician, remark of 1 16 

Practical politicians 53 

Practical politicians, method of 125 

Preference of voters . . . .99, 105, 106, 

107, 149 

Preferences 94, 100, 168, 17S 

Preferences for candidates 92, 113 

Preferential voting 124, 150 

Preponderance of choice, Election by. 175 

Preponderance of parties 171 

Presidential electors 112 

Primaries 78, 121 

Primary assemblies 32, 35 

Primary canvass 59 

Primary meetings 1 112 

Principles of free voting 88 

Professional politician 28 

Proportional representation. . . . 78, 83, 

84; 85, 122, 131, 132, 156 
Prop. Rep. a remedy for Gerrymand- 
ering 125 

Prop. Rep. Congress. . .19, 150, 151, 

I5 2 , 154 
Proportional representation, need of a 
satisfactory plan of 102 



INDEX. 



19- 



PAGE. 

Prop. Rep. League, Am 19 

Proportional Representation : Objec- 
tions and answers 148 

Prop. Rep. Review 126 

Proportional Rep. Society ot New York 1 14 

Proportional representation, students of 80 

Proportional voting 78 

Prop. vs. Majority Rep 29 

Protests . 144 

Proxy votes 155 

Prussian chamber of deputies 172 

Prussian feudalists 172 

Public aftairs, interest in . . , , . 63 

Publicity , , , . , n 

Public "life . . 30 

Public life, elevation of 146 

Putnam" 1 s Magazine 32 

Qualified, sovereignty of 13 

Qualified voters 13 

Quincy 60, 77 

Quincy, Josiah Phillips, 135 

Quincy, Mr 141, 142 

Quota 147, 157, 176 

Quota, definition of 85 

Quota, elective 156 

Quota, method of calculating 154 

Quota schemes 148, 149 

Quota system 58, 73, 78 

Quotient, elective 97 

Quotients 97, 99, 108, 112, 113 

Reason 10, II, 28 

Rebellion 145 

Recklessness 52 

" Recognition," of committees 9 

Recording votes 99 

Reelection of members of the House . 119 

Reform in municipal elections 117 

Reform League of England 89 

Registers of election 94 

Remnant 37> 3§> 39> I2 5 



PAGE. 

Remonstrances 144 

Report of Select Com. on Rep. Reform. 119 

Representation 5, 8, 10 

Representation, change of 63 

Representation, more just 64 

Representation of minorities 40, 63 

Representation, right of 9 

Representative body 144 

Representative government 6, 19, 139 

Rep. government and Personal Rep. . 6 

Rep government, history of 10 

Representation, equal division of 64 

Representatives in Congress .151, 152, 153 
Representatives, independence of. ... . 139 
Representatives, number in district 

should be odd 109, ill, 112 

Representative system 6 

Requirements of voters 99 

Return of votes. .. , , , 95, 96 

Review of Am. Prop. Rep. League. . . 52 

Revolt of independents 107 

Revolt, political 82 

Rhode Island, people of 6 

Rich 142 

Righteous remnant 38, 39 

Right of majority to govern 11S 

Right of majority to sole representa- 
tion 11S 

Right of suffrage 27, 51 

Rigsraad 147 

Rings 3°> 74 

Rock Island 72 

Rule for counting votes 97 

Rule for voting 92 

Running mate 46, 66, 68 

Rupture among political friends 67 

Rural districts 77 

Rural member 49 

Salem 150 

Sandwich 130 

Scales of Injustice 26 



= 93 



IXDEX. 



PAGE. 

School Board, London , 85 

School boards 102. 147 

School boards, English 84 

School board system 86 

" Scratchers. 54 

Secondary transfer of votes 156 

Seebohm Fredk 149 

Select Committee on Rep. Reform. ... 50 



Senate of Illinois 62 

Senate of U. S. 119 

Senators, election of. 114 

Senator, state 13S 

Sex 12 

Shelbyville 60, 70, 72 

Simplicity 

Single district 

Single-district system , 

Single transferable vote 148, 149. 

Slavery 1 28, 131. 

Smith. J. Parker 124, 

Social crash 

Socialistic organization 

Social organization 

South, states of 

Sovereignty 

Sovereignty of bribery, spoils and pa- 
tronage 

Sovereignty of the People 

" Sovereignty of the Qualified " 

Spence, Catherine H 149, 

Spencer, Herbert 

Spoils, sovereignty of 

' ' Sport " 

Springfield 47, 68, 69, 76, 77, 

Stand-up fight 

State legislatures, members of 

Sterne, Simon. .7, 35, 75. 76, 79, 82, 
116. 117, 118, 

Strikes 5, 8, 

Stuyvesant, Director 

Suffrage, right of 27, 



> / / 
100 

*34 

120 

±5- 
13- 
149 

3 6 

S^ 

141 

13- 

27 



13 

13 

150 

36 

27 
66 

13° 

67 
112 

125 
9 



PAGE. 

Summation of votes 97, 98 

Superior intellects and characters.... 139 

Suspicion 67, 71 

Switzerland 102 

Talking body 129 

Tallying votes 175, 176 

Taxation, none without representation . 8 

Tax, internal 8 

Tellers 175 

Texas 20 

Theoretical 53, 55 

Thinker, political 123 

Third party 112 

Third party candidate 73 

Three ballot rule 177 

Ticket, independent 107 

Ticket, order of names on 105 

Tickets 54, 93 

Tickets, samples of 105, 106 

Timid voter 54 

Transferring ballots 149 

Transferring votes \... 155 

Transfer of votes ■ 156 

Trickery 71 

Truth 10, 28 

Tuckerman, Dr. L. B., paper by. . . . 175 

Tyranny of bosses 145 

Tyranny of majority 27 

Tyranny of political managers 31 

Tyranny, party 76 

Union men of the South 132 

United States 118, 131 

United States, early history of 7 

Universal representation 173 

Universal suffrage 25 

•' Unworkable " 53, 55 

Urbana 6r 

Utopian 146 

Vacillating government 1 30 



INDEX. 



I 99 



PAGE. 

A^arrentrapp, Dr. George. 90, 91, 150, 

153, 159 

Venality of voters. ........ : 125 

Venal votes 28 

Virden 54, 62, 74, 76 

Virginia, charter of 5 

Vote, computing 1*54 

Voter, freedom of. 79, 80 

Voter, ignorant 54, 104 

Voters, corrupt combinations of 126 

Voters, ignorance of. 44, 53 

Voters, preference of 99 

Voters, requirements of. 99 

Voter, what he expresses 107 

Votes, appropriation of 100, 113 

Votes, assigning, distributing and 

counting them 81, 82 

Votes, classes of 113 

Votes, counting and recording of 99 

Votes, counting of. . . .44, 94, 97, 99, 

113, 149 

Votes, counting and weighing 140 

Votes, distribution of. .72, 87, 89, 90, 

100, 104 

Votes, division and counting of 63 

Votes, division of 97 

Votes, fruitless 119 

Votes, ineffective 155 

Votes, number given to each candidate 109 

Votes, return of 95, 96 

Votes, secondary transfer of 156 

Votes, summation of 97, 98 

Votes, transferring „ 155 



PAGE. 

Votes, venal 28 

Votes, waste of , 8^, 84 

Voting 63 

Voting, how it is done 94 

Voting, liberty in 107 

Voting power 109 

Voting, rule for 92 



I Ward politicians 

Ware, Prof 8t„ 132, 

War of secession 

j Warsaw .47, 68, 

I Waste of votes 

! Waukegan 

Weighing votes 

Westlake, John 84 , 

West, McHenry 

Westminster Review 27, 

White, Hall 61, 

Will county 

Williams, Roger 

Wills, individual ic, 

Wisdom 37, 

Working classes 

Working classes, representation of . . . 

Working majority 

Working men 34, 142, 

Workingmen, representation of 

World's Prop. Rep. Congress *49> 

Wurtemberg 

Yeardley, Sir George 



Zeit. 



57 
144 

131 

71 

84 

70 

140 

148 

69 

124 

76 

73 

6 

11 

3 s 

143 

142 

129 

143 

H3 

155 

172 



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